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In this thesis I undertake a comparison of novels and video games in order to clarify the 
ontological and ethical processes involved in reader construction of fictional characters. I 
demonstrate how the sequences of novels necessitate inference of textual authority. In contrast, 
although video games offer control over sequence, such control is unstable and can be compared 
with the effects of reader emotional engagement where inference as to what might happen in a 
narrative will often transform into what should happen next on behalf of various characters. 
Furthermore, I argue that as all characters must be constructed and staged on an ongoing basis 
for any feeling of allegiance to be sustained, identification should be seen as representing the 
ongoing construction and evaluation of all fictional characters in a given text.  
As a result of these arguments, I propose the concept of reader/player causality, by which I refer 
to the general philosophical orientation underpinning what the player brings to the text in this 
regard even beyond what textual revelations can erase. In video games, for example, players 
seem synonymous with their avatars, but frequently game narratives will provide explanations 
for player actions that are inconsistent with the real life player’s intention, with the player’s 
initial bias still affecting the character produced. Reader causality operates in a similar way 
where the reader’s wish for certain events to occur will likewise affect interpretation and 
identification even if subsequent narrative events contradict prior assumptions or wishes. In 
turn, the reader’s acceptance of such additions or alterations to characters carries with it ethical 
responsibility and choice. In this manner, I define identification as the imposition of reader 
causality/feeling combined with the absorption of diegetic rewriting of all characters in a text on 
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Theories of Reader Construction of Character from the Empathy-Altruism 





In the following thesis I will put forward a theory of identification with fictional characters that 
argues for a broadening of the term’s definition to encompass many component processes of 
reader construction of fictional characters which might hitherto have been seen as merely 
related. In order to do this, I analyse prose novels alongside video games. Games frequently 
permit their players to engage in decision-making and hold responsibility for diegetic outcomes 
in a far more explicit manner than might seem apparent in reader involvement in novels, 
allowing divergence in diegetic events in different play-throughs and an almost literal sense of 
presence for the player in the synthetic kinesthetically-navigable space of the narrative at hand. 
My overall methodology in this regard is to intervene in debates using problematic examples to 
more clearly demonstrate the ‘normative’ workings of the reading process. Throughout my 
work I also destabilise various concepts that might somewhat ironically have become settled 
since deconstructionism, such as the incoherency of the self and the resulting avoidance of 
concerted discussion of fictional characters as a concept in literary and narrative fields. 
 
My intention throughout this thesis is to build towards an initial hypothesis as to what occurs 
when readers encounter fictional characters in texts. To this end I work through various 
elements that might be seen as logically important in the reader’s construction of characterising 
details from a prose text, particularly the ontology of the fictional character as emerging from a 
necessarily sequential encounter with characterising details on the micro-level of style and 
macro-level of events. Firstly, I consider how such sequences might generate a sense of what 
the text is asking the reader to do. The resulting authority inferred by the reader might be 
identified with any number of factors including the traditional figure of the author, for example. 
I consider how reader inference of a text’s authority combines with the reader’s emotional 
engagement to affect how future characterising details are accepted into the reader’s overall 
model of a particular character. After exploring how this process works in relation to the 
existence of multiple characters within a text and the reader’s own ongoing decision-making – a 
factor which becomes clearer when compared with identification in response to video game 
characters -- I define my model of identification with fictional characters as follows: ‘the 




characters in a text on a moment-by-moment basis with new versions negotiated in contract 
with inferred authority’. 
 
I not only explore the nature of fictional characters and reader construction of character in 
ontological terms, however, but throughout I also consider questions as to the ethics of such 
identification, particularly with regards to feminism and misogyny. In the arguments of this 
thesis I am drawn between multiple aims and concerns that could fail to convince many of my 
readers on philosophical terms – ‘how can you know readers will respond in a particular 
manner?’ – and likewise risk trivialising or speaking for groups I do not possess membership of. 
I discuss what I deem to be potential likelihoods of reader reception and co-construction of texts 
with an argument that frequently gestures as to how different groups such as women, feminists, 
and misogynists might engage in the reading process. However, my thesis is based in part upon 
a necessarily simplified and even caricatured version of each hypothetical group and which, 
apart from a brief foray into international literature with Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch (1963) in 
Chapter One, will not yet deal with urgent intersectional elements of these processes and their 
ethics relating to race, ableism, LGBT concerns, and class.  
 
I focus upon problematic texts usually written by cis white men inattentive to such 
intersectional concerns primarily due to my interest in the reader acceptance of what I term 
‘inferred authority’ – what readers believe texts demand of them on a moment by moment and 
often implicit basis. I am interested in the way in which such engagement often de facto leads to 
acceptance of a world where a certain group are ontologically lesser and distorted compared to 
their real life counterparts, in this case women. Although my thesis throughout concerns itself 
with the depiction of women, this is not just to provide feminist analysis of the texts at hand but 
also to make broader hypotheses about the nature of identification using the case study of such a 
pervasive and immediate problem as that of gender inequality in character construction. The 
demonstration of identification’s workings in this regard is much clearer when there is less 
ambiguity over whether the author is intending to critique misogynistic attitudes from a 
supposed feminist position, as opposed to implicitly representing women in such a way that 
most readers will believe the author thinks women are ‘like that’.  
2. The Ethics of Narrative Empathy and Engagement with Fictional Characters 
 
Suzanne Keen has defined narrative empathy as ‘the sharing of feeling and perspective-taking 




condition’.1 Extensive and almost ubiquitous testimony exists from non-academic readers and 
audiences of the deep feelings they believe they share with fictional characters; however, 
whether such narrative empathy is positive or even ethically beneficial for readers stands as a 
matter of contention. The role and nature of narrative empathy has experienced unparalleled 
theorisation and conceptualisation by non-academics within a debate that has raged for several 
thousand years since the time of Plato, involving not only literary critics but philosophers, 
politicians, religions, corporations, civil servants, and the general public as to whether the 
experience of narrative empathy is harmful or beneficial to readers’ lives. In this introduction I 
explore debates regarding narrative empathy between those who view the process as possessing 
utopian potential – the ‘empathy-altruism’ hypothesis – and those who view such processes as 
potentially dangerous and leading to ‘psychic infection’. I show how this debate often revolves 
around the power of fictionality, returning to questions posed since Plato’s Republic (c.380BC), 
and I suggest some preliminary ways in which consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethics 
might relate to the ethics of fiction. As a result of my analysis of prior theories and debates 
relating to fictional characters, I posit the role of sequence in producing a sense of a text’s 
authority, narrative empathy, and a reader’s ethics to be of prime importance. 
 
The philosopher Martha Nussbaum, for example, argues that fiction is a particularly powerful 
tool for social change and ethical betterment as it promotes an understanding of others.2 As Ann 
Jurecic highlights, this view is seen throughout Western secondary education systems, where 
novels are often selected for students based on the values they might teach. Furthermore, Jurecic 
shows how this view is reflected at the highest levels of political office; for example, Barack 
Obama spoke in 2007 about how it is ‘books more than anything else that are going to give our 
young people the ability to see other people. And that then gives them the capacity to act 
responsibly with respect to other people’.3 Praise of the power of empathy is also found 
throughout popular culture; Jurecic points towards the influence and popularity of Oprah 
Winfrey’s empathy-praising Book Club as suggestive of the widespread belief that such 
empathy leads to altruistic action.4 Associations are made throughout much of modern society 
between one’s cultured reading of novels and one’s status as a model citizen; the social sciences 
themselves have extended their consideration of empathy towards novels in C. Daniel Batson’s 
                                                          
1 Suzanne Keen, ‘Narrative Empathy’, in The Living Handbook of Narratology, ed. by Peter Hühn et al. (Hamburg: 
Hamburg University Press, 2013) 
<http://wikis.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/index.php/Narrative_Empathy> [accessed 3 August 2015]. 
2 Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 85. 
3 Ann Jurecic, ‘Empathy and the Critic’, College English, 74.1 (2011), 10-27 (p. 14). 





inclusion of fictional encounters within his ‘empathy-altruism hypothesis’, by which Batson 
refers to the theory that empathy with others is likely to lead to altruistic action.5 
 
However, the elevation of the novel to be a paragon of cultural sophistication and ethical 
refinement is a relatively recent occurrence; throughout time, theatre, novels, films, and video 
games have all been seen in their turn as having the potential to lead audiences astray. Neither is 
this cultural suspicion of artistic forms relegated to the past, as the video game medium itself 
still suffers from such cultural scrutiny even today. There is a fear echoed across hundreds of 
years of literary criticism that fictional forms such as these invite an excess of identification 
with people who are not fully ‘real’, that readers might blur the boundaries between their own 
selves and characters they read about and mimic their actions in reality. As Lee Grieveson noted 
regarding the censorship of film, it was feared that epidemic ‘psychic infection’ might spread 
and compel viewers to become bank robbers, delinquents, or fall into general immorality 
through what was seen as lowbrow entertainment.6 It might seem easy to dismiss this as small-
minded politicking designed to take advantage of the fears of the electorate, but more 
sophisticated versions of these arguments exist in artistic spheres. Most famously, Bertolt 
Brecht argued that over-identification and too much empathy with particular characters in 
theatre could lead to a loss of perspective of the overall social situation portrayed on stage; as a 
result, audiences would lose sight of the way in which such fictional situations might signify 
specifically real-world issues that could be judged and acted upon outside of the fictional after a 
theatrical performance has ended.7 Brecht’s philosophical perspective here contrasts with that of 
Nussbaum, whose championing of narrative empathy rests upon the consideration of empathy 
and emotion as forms of reasoning in themselves rather than ‘irrational’ states of intoxication.8  
 
New media is likewise attacked as lowbrow and pernicious in a manner that specifically takes 
aim at its affordances for narrative empathy; contemporary arguments against video games, for 
example, seem repeatedly to focus upon the notion that children will lose a sense that they are 
engaging in a fictional simulator and that somehow the performance of actions in a fictional 
space will lead to violence being carried out in the real world. Every year news stories of 
murder and violence recur with the discovery of a copy of a Grand Theft Auto (1997-2015),9 
                                                          
5 C. Daniel Batson et al, ‘Empathy, Attitudes, and Action: Can Feeling for a Member of a Stigmatized Group Motivate 
One to Help the Group?’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28.12 (2002): 1656-66 (pp. 1665-66). 
6 Lee Grieveson, Policing Cinema: Movies and Censorship in Early Twentieth-Century America (London: University of 
California Press, 2004), p. 12. 
7 Bertolt Brecht, ‘Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting’ in Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, ed. 
and trans. by John Willett (London: Methuen, 1964), pp.  91-99.  
8 Martha. C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), passim.  





Call of Duty (2003-14),10 or World of Warcraft (2004) game in the killer’s room;11 journalists, 
organisations, and politicians sensationally exploit public fear relating to such cases based on a 
faulty logic of mimetic association between the content of video games and real-life equivalents 
in the manner of prior attacks on film and other mediums. For example, with the Sandy Hook 
killings, the killer was found to have been interested in video games; to combat allegations that 
gun control systems in America were not working, the NRA attempted to blame video games 
instead, playing off of the popular association of video games with the First Person Shooter 
(FPS) genre when in reality this killer’s favourite games were the Super Mario (1985-2013) 
series and dancing games.12 
 
Beyond this specific instance, even when FPS games have been found to have been played by 
criminals, attacks on the medium fail to account for the extensive popularity of such video 
games in modern culture; if this ‘psychic infection’ hypothesis that fiction can cause people to 
commit certain crimes were true, then the statistically low incidence of such crimes in relation 
to the millions of people who play these games would suggest this link is not accurate. 
However, whether this form has no power at all to influence its players is also debatable; press 
coverage of the ‘Gamer Gate’ online harassment movement for example, driven by misogynist 
attacks and conspiracy theories regarding feminist critics of video games, posits a problem in 
how video games depict women but also how gamer ethics might be influenced by their 
playing. It is ironic that so many attack the notion that video game depictions of women might 
be harmful, only to issue bomb threats and torrents of misogynist abuse over Twitter against 
women who dare to make these claims.13 Chapter Three of this thesis explores issues relating to 
the depiction of women in video games whilst Chapter Four explores player motivation for 
decision-making in games; both chapters serve not only to show how and why these events and 
ethical charges might have been levelled at video games but also the resulting implications for 
criticism and theory on prose novels. 
 
Much mainstream narrative theory has neglected the potential role of video games in clarifying 
and opening up old questions for new debate. For example, Suzanne Keen’s Empathy and the 
Novel (2007) intervenes in the empathy-altruism debate but excludes video games from her 
                                                          
10 Call of Duty, created by Ben Chichoski (Infinity Ward, 2003-14). 
11 World of Warcraft, designed by Rob Pardo, Jeff Kaplan, and Tom Chilton (Blizzard Entertainment, 2004). 
12 Super Mario, created by Shigeru Miyamoto (Nintendo, 1985-2013); ‘Remarks from the NRA press conference on 
Sandy Hook school shooting, delivered on Dec. 21, 2012 (Transcript)’, Washington Post, 21 December 2012 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/remarks-from-the-nra-press-conference-on-sandy-hook-school-
shooting-delivered-on-dec-21-2012-transcript/2012/12/21/bd1841fe-4b88-11e2-a6a6-aabac85e8036_story.html> 
[accessed 31 August 2015]; Amy Davidson, ‘The Final Report on Sandy Hook?’, The New Yorker, 26 November 2013 
< http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-final-report-on-sandy-hook> [accessed 31 August 2015]. 
13 Kevin Rawlinson and Leo Kelion, ‘GamerGate: “Press must tackle misogyny,” says developer’, BBC News, 14 




analysis despite the urgent and current nature of this contemporary debate over video games and 
its similarities to prior debates about the novel and film. Her brief mention of the medium 
locates it as an ‘extreme case of voluntary exchange of one’s own reality for the sensations of 
another’ that ‘takes to its furthest logical extension the fusing with another object that 
aesthetics’ Einfühlung set out to describe in the 1890s’. However, Keen’s location of games as 
the ‘furthest logical extension’ of her source material is ghettoised a page later not only through 
its juxtaposition with an analysis of pornography but also through quotations suggesting games 
are ‘antisocial’ and stressing the danger of such mediums.14 This thesis will attempt to reverse 
and rectify such exclusion, not just because the games medium deserves this attention but 
because the incorporation of games in such theories can act as a disruptive force for our analysis 
of prose novels going forward, problematizing existing ideas to allow critics and theorists to 
revisit assumptions about what novels are capable of doing.  
 
For example, in her analysis of prose novels, Keen concludes that theories of literary empathy 
leading to altruistic social behaviour lack real evidence as to their having occurred in any real 
meaningful way. Keen argues that this lack of evidence does not mean that empathy cannot 
have both positive and negative effects upon readers, but that this hypothesis requires further 
evidence if bold claims about empathy’s extensive powers are to be made.15 Keen can therefore 
be seen as bridging both the pro-social ‘empathy-altruism’ position and negative ‘psychic 
infection’ position on narrative empathy, downplaying and mitigating our sense of the power of 
what narrative empathy can really achieve in society. By introducing video games in such a 
debate, I will show how such concepts as identification, empathy, altruism, and ethical action 
are problematized in novels through comparison with games where such terms seem to become 
far more literal in their application via an avatar through which players can alter diegetic events 
in an explicit and self-conscious manner. 
 
Arguments regarding the powers or dangers of narrative empathy not only need to take into 
account new technologies but should also revisit old ideas and explore their continuity 
throughout time; in many respects Keen’s central critique represents a return to ideas as old as 
Plato, bringing this debate over the ethics of narrative response and fictionality full-circle. 
Plato’s critique of fiction in Book X of the Republic prefigures attacks on fiction throughout 
time, as Alexander Nehamas has demonstrated; novels, television programmes, films, video 
games, and even art installations have been feared to potentially corrupt or distract individuals 
from leading ethical lives ever since. Nehamas writes: 
 
                                                          
14 Suzanne Keen, Empathy and the Novel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 39-40. 




I find Plato's attack on Homer upsetting not because I think Homer is pernicious but 
because I find in it all the features that have characterized every attack on popular 
culture and entertainment since his time. He was there first, and he is still in the lead. 
The irony is that those who repeat his attack, in the name of taste, cultivation and 
refinement, do so in ignorance of the fact that they follow on his footsteps.16 
 
However, Plato’s critique of fiction in Book X of The Republic does not simply involve an 
attack on fictionality as potentially depicting immoral actions or as inaccurately representing 
some metaphysical reality. In a more mundane and relevant manner to modern debates over 
narrative empathy, Plato argues that poets are not as qualified as we give them credit for in their 
‘imitation’ of human beings, and, indeed, that poets are potentially more successful at creating 
seductive pleasures and pains for their listeners than real ethical effects. Plato repeatedly refers 
to his narrator Socrates’ enjoyment of poetry and his desire for the concept to somehow be 
rehabilitated – ‘Therefore, isn’t it just that such poetry should return from exile when it has 
successfully defended itself[?]’17 – yet his speaker finds the problem lies in a lack of evidence 
for fiction’s effects. Plato asks why Homeric-inspired cities and rulers do not exist if fiction is 
really capable of inspiring ethical improvement in this manner, prefiguring Susanne Keen’s 
questions regarding fictional empathy’s supposed social effects. 
 
Furthermore, unlike Keen, Plato does not try to maintain some possible albeit small social 
benefit for narrative empathy in the face of a lack of evidence. For Plato, fiction corrupts 
primarily because it is a seductive and enjoyable waste of time that not only diverts thought 
from tasks the mind’s energy could better be diverted towards but which also encourages us to 
enjoy what Plato terms our ‘womanish’ melodramatic expression of emotion and therefore to 
respond more emotively and with less exercise of reason in everyday life.18 Plato’s misogyny is 
not just a product of his time but prefigures much of Western culture and literary theory since. 
Attacks on empathy as a reasoning method throughout time are frequently gendered in this way, 
with empathy and emotion often seen as particularly feminine and often opposed in binary 
opposition with reasoning and masculinity.19 Plato’s other arguments likewise find continuity in 
later thinking, as do those positions he attacks such as trying to hold on to poetry as a desirable 
social good. Plato’s question of the lack of evidence for fiction’s moral power has still not yet 
been fully answered in later work, and has even been forgotten in part, as witnessed in the 
recurrence of similar questions in Keen’s work on empathy.  
 
                                                          
16 Alexander Nehamas, ‘Culture, Art and Poetry in The Republic’, 
<http://www.college.columbia.edu/core/lectures/fall1999> (New York: Columbia College, 1999) [accessed 3 August 
2015]. 
17 Plato, Complete Works, ed. by John M. Cooper (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), p. 1211. 
18 Plato, p. 1210. 




What if literature has little effect other than inducing slight personal pleasure or pain in its 
readers, rather than the utopian and apocalyptic potentials for social change that so many have 
theorised? Is narrative empathy, as Suzanne Keen suggests, capable of slight positive social 
function, or have arguments such as Keen’s reduced fiction’s power so much that Plato’s 
argument becomes the inevitable conclusion we must hold to – that at the end of so many 
defences and attacks on fictional empathy, our engagement with fiction might be a distraction, a 
way of feeling better or worse in our everyday lives, like going for a short walk or having a brief 
sleep? We could mitigate the strength of this conclusion by locating Plato’s anti-affective bias 
as a product of his particular philosophy and time period, suspending awareness of the 
continuity of such attacks throughout time. We could raise some alternative perspectives that 
see fictional distractions as being of some usefulness insomuch as this pleasure or pain might 
assist with normal cognitive and emotional functioning and help us cope with the stresses of our 
everyday lives, functioning as intellectual and affective entertainment. Yet what then for an 
ethics of literature? What if these serious arguments about the purpose of fiction, empathy with 
characters, and the role of our response to texts in wider society turn out to be a search for a 
meaning that simply is not there to the extent we wish it to be? 
 
These concerns can be analogised to Camus’ analysis of religious and existential thought in The 
Myth of Sisyphus (1942); a search for meaning in the face of oblivion and the absurd gives way 
to theories that deliver peace of mind but in the same breath delude the individual from their 
‘awoken’ state and lived experience of the world. What Camus calls the tradition of ‘humiliated 
thought’ never goes away;20 theories that try to bring meaning to our lives will recur with the 
same types of reasoning regardless of how many arguments have been made against these kinds 
of theories in the past, whether they posit God, spirituality, or any other alternative as a buffer 
against a nihilistic void. So it is here potentially with a search not just for meaning in fiction, but 
the attempt to charge that meaning with altruistic or corrupting ethical and social effects upon 
those who read, watch, and play fiction, in spite of difficulty in finding evidence for such 
effects. The repetition of such defences and attacks on fiction demands another question be 
asked; why and how has empathy with fictional characters become a battleground for such a 
debate? Why has this aspect of literary response created such diversity and intensity of opinion? 
Fictional empathy does not appear to be a matter of life, death, and ultimate meaning as with 
those arguments Camus addresses in The Myth of Sisyphus, so why is narrative empathy such an 
important reading hermeneutic for so many, that it must be defended in this way? 
 
                                                          





There are those, however, who do not consider narrative empathy important or interesting either 
in an altruistic or dangerous sense. This alternative perspective can shed light on the existence 
of this debate over the power of narrative empathy – a perspective that does not merely mitigate 
claims for narrative empathy’s power, as Keen does, but rather ignores such claims entirely. 
Many literary critics and theorists deny or sidestep the existence of literary empathy as 
something that does not happen or that happens to such a weak and indefinable extent that it is 
not worth talking about. For such critics, to read with empathy and identification represents an 
inferior or juvenile mode of reading, and that even if empathy is admitted as part of the reading 
experience of fiction, its discussion nevertheless has little place in mainstream literary criticism 
and theory. Instead, these theorists frequently prioritise the reader’s affective relationship with 
authors or anthropomorphic ‘texts themselves’ above empathetic relationships with 
particularised literary characters. In many ways, what may be deemed the ‘anti-‘ narrative 
empathy spirit of this critical position invites parallels with arguments that consider the dangers 
of narrative empathy. However, rather than viewing such processes as dangerous, these critics 
instead consider narrative empathy negatively as a naïve or unintelligent way of reading but not 
necessarily as harmful. 
 
In this perspective, the non-specialist reader's emotional response to individual characters – (‘I 
really identified with the protagonist’) – is viewed with a diluted form of Brechtian suspicion. 
Academics are instead directed away from what this position views as a distraction with 
individual characters towards a supposedly more objective ‘text itself’ composed of formal 
features to be identified and analysed. The phenomenological reader-response criticism of 
writers such as Georges Poulet largely ignores narrative empathy with fictional characters and 
instead suggests a surrender to authorial consciousness.21 Meanwhile, practitioners such as 
Vladimir Nabokov recommend that students should not engage in 'infantile' identification with 
characters but with the author who creates them.22  
 
However, even these and other similar proposals that we should identify with authors instead of 
characters are for the most part abandoned as naive in the wake of the various deaths of the 
Author that occur in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet the reader-response theory 
that followed seems little interested in the reader's relation with mere characters but instead 
focuses on the author's replacement (the text), returning once again to formalism. Indeed, as 
Jane Tompkins observes, much reader-response theory develops 'within the confines of a 
                                                          
21 Georges Poulet, ‘Criticism and the Experience of Interiority’, trans. by Catherine & Richard Macksey in Jane P. 
Tompkins ed., Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism (London: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1980), pp. 41-49. 






formalist position', a 'text-centred' view that finds value in 'the words on the page'.23 Wayne 
Booth's 'implied author' begins to work alongside the 'text itself' as a concept that does not 
require critical focus upon a 'flesh and blood author' but which maintains the prior relationship 
between these figures.24 Likewise, we can see Wolfgang Iser's 'gaps' as implying missing textual 
detail that the 'good' reader is supposed to insert due to the text's anthropomorphic 'intention' 
asking him or her to do so.25 Ansgar Nünning objects to Booth’s ‘implied author’ as he tries to 
define this figure both as the structure of a text as a whole and as an ‘addresser in the 
communication model of narrative’ at the same time, wanting a term that avoids the trap of 
personification.26 Michel Foucault’s reading of the ‘author-function’ in his essay ‘What is an 
Author?’ demonstrates how such a function of the text as the ‘implied author’ is inferred, and 
discusses how readers assume meaning, purpose, relevancy, and resolve contradictions in texts, 
despite those texts being ‘just’ writing without such operations being necessary.27 The text does 
not necessarily ‘imply’ an author; a reader infers an author and pieces of information that must 
be interpreted and reconciled in order to understand the text at hand.  
 
However, not only do many theories that overlook or disregard narrative empathy resemble 
weak versions of censoring attacks on narrative empathy as distracting or naïve, but so too can 
they be seen unintentionally and inadvertently to contribute to the theorization of the nature of 
narrative empathy they exclude from their work. Whether a contemporary reader necessarily 
cares about the existence of a real being communicating with him or her via the medium of the 
novel is not a given, and particularly in an era where many works are produced by many hands -
- where films and video games represent collaborations between many often unseen figures – 
the elevation of the biographical author to a high pedestal in the minds of the majority of readers 
is not necessarily likely. Roland Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author’ (1967) has partially come to 
pass not due to force of persuasive argument but due to the maturation and greater popularity of 
these new media forms. However, the very act of trying to link together disparate fragments of a 
text into a whole – whether these fragments are chapters, scenes, bits of characterising detail or 
information in need of interpretation -- represents an assumption on the part of the reader that a 
text does have unified meaning in a manner reminiscent of Barthes’ delusory ‘victory to the 
critic’ upon deciphering ultimate meaning.28 Even if alternative meanings in a text are to be 
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found, they still must be justified in some element of the existing text and therefore represent a 
latent and unlockable coherency.  
 
This thesis will argue for an ‘inferred authority’ rather than an ‘implied author’. By ‘inferred 
authority’, I mean a way of responding to the sequence of a text that seems to be sanctioned by 
the text and that the reader seems encouraged to follow in his or her interpretation. This inferred 
authority allows for the fact that readers often accept many such ways of reading a single text 
even though some interpretations also are largely perceived to be ‘better than others’. This new 
term ‘inferred authority’ contains within it the prior suggestion of ‘author’, whilst also allowing 
some notion of a voiceless yet authoritative ‘text itself’ to be seen to issue commands or 
invitations to the reader. The inferred authority is what the reader thinks he or she is supposed to 
follow in order to read or respond to a work, inferring meaning from the order in which 
narrative details are encountered. As I demonstrate throughout this thesis, inferences as to where 
a sequence is going to go and what has not yet been revealed work together to shape how we 
respond to the rest of a narrative from an early stage, shaped by genre assumptions and reader 
idiosyncrasy. This thesis will attempt to make the same argumentative move that Keen made 
with theories of narrative empathy and account for the reality of the existing critical situation; 
even if it is arbitrary and unnecessary, real readers do tend to try and read fictional narratives as 
if they are inferring some kind of authority to be followed within the narrative in order for 
everything to be made coherent and understood. Therefore, criticism and theory should account 
for the intricacies of this process rather than necessarily try to change the way people engage 
with fiction such as those who oppose identification (whether on ‘dangerous’ or ‘juvenile’ 
grounds) have attempted.  
 
The methodology I employ throughout my thesis is similar in a sense to James Phelan’s concept 
of narrative progression in relation to character as explored in Reading People, Reading Plots 
(1989). Phelan and Peter Rabinowitz’s concept of narrative progression posits a theory of the 
forward movement of a narrative and the way in which a reader feels about the author’s role in 
this process. My methodology may initially appear similar to Phelan’s in tracing the structure of 
texts through a combination of close readings and an attention to larger narrative concepts 
regarding the various possible tensions the reader might be enmeshed within – even going so far 
as to analyse one of Phelan’s own source texts in the form of George Orwell’s 1984 (1949). 
However, I am philosophically opposed to Phelan’s suggestion of the primacy of fiction as 
communication between reader and author; although such a model is sometimes relevant to 
some readers, changing models of what ‘authorities’ are trusted in texts have already shifted due 





Moreover, the internal tensions within Phelan’s own analysis in Reading People, Reading Plots 
hints at the difficulty of maintaining an author-centric communication model. For example, 
Phelan’s analysis of 1984 shifts from frequently referencing what the author or text does early 
on in his argument to a gradual emergence of ‘we’ and the reader’s creative action in the second 
half without needing to reference the author.29 Although I frequently reference authors, texts, 
and apparent intentionality throughout my analysis, I do so from a position of considering all of 
these elements as inferred constructs by possible readers in given situations that do not 
necessarily resemble different authorities inferred by other possible readers. I am as concerned 
with the processes readers engage in whilst constructing characters as what these readers think 
they are doing; therefore, models of the author cannot entirely be abandoned as they reflect 
reality for many readers. In such ways, throughout this thesis I will argue that the reader’s 
inference of authority and ongoing decision-making in complying with this authority is a subject 
of great ethical interest wherein much of the ethical potential of fiction lies. 
 
Reader engagement with inferred power structures in a text could be used to explain why 
theories of narrative empathy’s potential power as a positive or negative force are so often made 
to such hyperbolic extents. As mentioned earlier, when faced with the problem of absurdity, 
death, and meaning, Camus claims in The Myth of Sisyphus that we cannot simply replace these 
figures with alternatives such as God or merely optimistically proclaim their opposite; Camus 
argues instead that the person who faces such a situation should, if they wish to continue living, 
accept the futility of arguing against death and face up to the time-limited freedom this entails. 
Here, with these grand arguments of narrative empathy, an ethics cannot be formed through 
some generic and contrary proclamation that narrative empathy does wield huge social power in 
spite of a lack of evidence (symptomatic of reader emotional investment in characters), or 
through an escape to theorisation of the author or ‘the text itself’ instead (symptomatic of reader 
investment in inferred authority). The disparity and force of existing arguments in this arena 
should not be seen as mutually exclusive but as revelatory insomuch as they reveal what such 
emotional investment tells us about the nature of these processes and why different aspects of 
the process of character construction might be foregrounded in particular claims.  
 
Furthermore, we cannot entirely escape the notion that fiction does have some bearing upon the 
real world in which humans live and die; fiction takes the real as its life’s blood, and without 
some level of mimesis it would be nonsensical. Therefore, if fiction uses reality for its 
backdrop, and reality is a matter for ethical analysis, then is not fiction a matter for ethical 
analysis by extension? Keen partly accounts for the failure of the empathy-altruism hypothesis 
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through fictionality, suggesting that the fictional itself allows readers to express great emotion 
without feeling the need to respond in the real world, and that this fictional status may indeed in 
fact inhibit altruistic expression elsewhere in response to similar issues.30 In his aforementioned 
theory of character in Reading People Reading Plots, Jim Phelan distinguishes between three 
aspects of character – what he terms the mimetic, thematic, and synthetic – with each element 
vying for prominence according to the author’s wishes in a given text.31 Although Phelan’s 
concern is not primarily ethical and his analysis using this schema is unnecessarily author-
centric, his highlighting of the interplay between different parts of characterisation helps to 
provide an initial and clear terminology for aspects covered by much of this thesis and a 
common vocabulary with other theories of character. 
 
Three branches of normative ethics can be seen as having a bearing upon the construction of a 
fictional character in this regard – consequentialism, where ethical judgment is based upon 
consequences of actions; deontology, where such ethics is rather found in behaviour and actions 
rather than any consequences; and virtue ethics, where the person himself or herself is the locus 
of ethical judgement rather than his or her behaviour or the consequences of actions. 
Deontological ethics would, in valuing behaviour rather than consequences, have some bearing 
upon fictional interactions with and construction of character, as there are no ‘real life’ 
consequences to fictional (synthetic) actions but possibly an altered fictionally-oriented range of 
behaviours. Likewise, virtue ethics might shed light upon the nature of characters constructed 
and how narrative empathy and identification reflect upon the individual. The greatest objection 
to an ethics of narrative empathy with fiction would seem to be in consequentialism; as prior 
debates have claimed, there is little evidence that narrative empathy has led to strong positive or 
negative consequences upon society. Moreover, in the case of an individual response to a 
particular fiction, how one constructs and feels about a fictional character has no real 
consequence upon any real or indeed even any fictional person, as that person is synthetic and in 
prose novels at the very least characters cannot in an explicit sense ‘know’ the reader’s feelings. 
Phelan argues fictional texts work to encourage mimetic, synthetic, and thematic ways of 
viewing character at different moments and in different combinations. However, I will argue 
that when considered in an ontological sense the synthetic component of character is of prime 
importance insomuch as it is already contained within the mimetic (the mimetic distinguished 
from the real due to its ‘copying’ imitating nature) and gives coherency to the thematic (values 
are anchored through their inferred reference to the synthetic being). This synthetic 
underpinning to all aspects of character may seem common-sensical, but its implications for 
                                                          
30 Keen, pp. 16-19, passim. 




moment-by-moment character construction by the reader are crucial not only for an 
understanding of identification but of the ethics of this process. 
 
A consideration of the ontologically synthetic nature of characterisation alongside these three 
branches of normative ethics sheds light on several theories of narrative empathy discussed thus 
far. Plato’s arguments about fiction as a distraction are in some senses comparable to the 
demandingness objection posited by many in response to consequentialist utilitarianism – that 
maximizing good consequences from our actions as a moral duty might lead to what outsiders 
could see as supererogatory actions, whereby it might be wrong to play a video game instead of 
feeding a homeless person, for example.32 However, while this objection might save the notion 
of fiction-as-distraction from rendering fiction morally pernicious, it does not recoup fiction as a 
site for positive ethical engagement nor does it account for fiction’s ambiguous relation to real 
world ethical issues. Robert Nozick’s false reality ‘Experience Machine’ thought experiment 
depicts a fictional simulation where a person could experience pleasure and maximize what 
seems to be a utilitarian benefit even though nothing actually happens outside of the 
simulation.33 Nozick argues that if all that matters in a hedonist-utilitarian sense is the 
maximisation of pleasure and the reduction of pain, why not remain in such a machine 
indefinitely? Any objection that such a machine might not ‘really’ change anything and that it 
just produces pleasurable sensations fails to adhere to hedonist-utilitarian thinking; this 
objection is just contrarian, based on some notion that propositions in a real sense produce 
better consequences than the false reality. Fiction is quite capable of temporarily bringing 
propositional states into being in the imaginations of readers, so the objection that fictional 
worlds do not establish propositions as a result of actions is not accurate. The ability of fiction 
to evoke and link in to real life values would also seem to allow a whole range of other 
consequences that utilitarian thinkers might value to come into being.  
 
Consequentialist ethics poses little substantiated opposition to considering construction of and 
response to fictional characters as an ethical matter, particularly when texts such as choice-
based video games are considered with their ability to allow players to explicitly alter diegetic 
events and bring situations into being. The arguments of my thesis will demonstrate not only 
that control is unstable in video games (see Chapter Two) but that novels and non-choice based 
texts can likewise be seen to involve what I term ‘reader causality’ (see Chapter Four); by this 
term I refer to the way in which reader/player involvement in constructing characters leads to 
the ‘alteration’ of such characters in such a way that lends aspects of the reader’s own life or 
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values to the character at hand. I propose the term ‘causality’ instead of ‘control’, 
‘interpretation’, or ‘involvement’, and so on in order to better highlight the broad philosophical 
orientation I argue to be a common element to all such terms, allowing for a range of reader 
behaviours that bring things into being in a fictional sense due to implicit and explicit reader 
action. By demonstrating the commonalities as well as the distinctions between video games 
and novels throughout this thesis, I build to a conclusion that will determine that fictional 
consequences are still an ethical matter when considered in and of themselves due to this 
concept of reader causality, even aside from ‘real world’ mimetic and thematic ramifications. 
 
Such mimetic and thematic aspects of character as defined by Phelan in Reading People 
Reading Plots still prevent any pure sense of the synthetic ‘in and of itself’, rendering such a 
consideration a hermeneutic tool for exploring the ethics of fiction as opposed to a separable 
reality for readers. The inseparability of many of these elements could be said to account for the 
persistence of debates surrounding various ways of considering character; in this light, Phelan’s 
tripartite model of characterisation has as much to do with incorporating antagonistic positions 
for the purposes of resolving theoretical disputes – those who argue for characters as collections 
of values versus those who place far greater emphasis upon their mimetic person-like aspect – 
as it does with creating a theory of character beyond prior arguments. Phelan admits a leaning 
towards the mimetic model in this debate whilst accounting for thematic elements as part of his 
main goal. However, almost two decades after this work, value-centric models of character and 
similar debates persist in the work of writers such as Richard Walsh. 
 
In The Rhetoric of Fictionality (2007), Walsh argues that using mimetic representational models 
of character as our criteria for emotional investment and emotional response does not make 
sense conceptually speaking — we feel emotion in response to phrases and values before a 
character has been fully established in a mimetic model, and what is a character but the values 
and ideas attached to him or her? According to Walsh, the reader’s feeling that they feel 
emotion for an individual rather than in response to values associated within an individual 
emerges as a by-product of interpretation, not as the beginning of the chain. He writes:  
 
Emotional involvement is the recognition of values inherent in the discursive 
information given by a narrative rather than in the actuality of the characters this 
information generates. It is a response founded upon the idea of innocence, for example, 
rather than upon the innocent girl to which that idea contributes […] it is grounded in 
semiosis rather than representational illusion […] In this sense, character can be 
understood as integrating the mimetic paradigm of being with the textual paradigm of 
meaning: fictional being follows, and is itself the realization of, the evaluative 
emotional dynamic of fictional narrative. Character, viewed from a rhetorical 
perspective, is in fact no more than characterisation itself. […] Instead of saying that 




with a represented person, it assumes that their emotions attach to the particular 
complex of meanings constituting that character.34 
 
To Walsh’s arguments I would add that the reader’s belief that they are responding to 
individuals is not so easily discarded; whether in a mimetic or synthetic sense, characters are 
viewed by the majority of readers as individuals and logically this is likely to have some impact 
upon the reader’s emotional response even if much of that response emerges from values 
evoked by the text as opposed to a concern for a real individual. It could even be argued that this 
tendency of readers can be used to account for the ability of fictional arguments to achieve 
reader agreement and investment to a greater degree than factual arguments. Even if we do 
differentiate between what is actually happening in our experiences with narrative and what 
readers think happens as the product of narrative experiences, the fact that readers think certain 
things occur in the narrative experience is crucial to understanding fiction’s effects.  
 
Rather than debating whether the mimetic, thematic, and synthetic components of character are 
dominant, each element can be viewed as interdependent upon the others to the point of each 
term being a hermeneutic tool for theory as opposed to representing a lived reality for reading 
experiences. If the presence of these elements is taken as a given, however, these hermeneutic 
tools are still required for ethical analysis, as whether we consider synthetic or mimetic 
implications of a given reading experience affects the question of the ethics of identification a 
great deal. A comparatively neglected brand of narratology in character theories derived from 
the social sciences becomes illustrative here as a prior attempt to consider the similarities 
between real-life social interaction and the processing of fictional characters. Marilynn B. 
Brewer’s ‘dual-process’ theory stands as a particularly influential model for narrative studies.35 
Brewer describes how most social interactions involve the consideration of newly encountered 
individuals as part of pre-existing categories within our minds, forming mental impressions of 
the encountered person that may or may not be altered according to the extent to which the 
person defies their categorisation. Brewer further describes how, if such categorisation is not 
possible or we are somehow encouraged to avoid categorisation, we may instead consider some 
people as individuals from our very first encounters. Cognitive theories of literary 
characterisation by Richard Gerrig, David Allbritton, Ralf Schneider, and Herbert Grabes 
suggest these models of processing information related to ‘real life’ individuals can also be used 
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to explore reader construction of literary characters.36 Schneider modifies the terminology used 
by Brewer, Gerrig, and Allbritton to suggest that most reader construction of character involves 
stages of categorisation, individuation, and decategorisation, with categorisation occurring in 
light not only of social stereotypes but also of prior literary texts and genre codes the reader has 
encountered. This initial stage of character construction can therefore be seen as heavily 
invested in ideological assumptions on the reader’s part about such things as gender, race, 
nationality, socioeconomic status, and more. Individuation, decategorisation and personalisation 
only occur once more specific details are encountered about a character to discourage such 
generic stereotyping.  
 
These ideas represent something similar to that which Hans-Georg Gadamer describes as a 
hermeneutic circle, in which prior prejudices affect how new information is received which in 
turn alters those original prejudices and affects thought moving forward.37 As with my earlier 
proposition of the term ‘inferred authority’ in relation to what a reader or a player might believe 
a text is asking them to do, sequence likewise operates here as a crucial part of how we parse 
and construct characters in our minds. However, such theories as those regarding Brewer’s work 
rarely address the specifically fictional nature of these exchanges and how they might therefore 
differ ethically from real-world interactions, once again rather problematically for a 
consequentialism that would exclude fictional ethics as it suggests little difference between the 
real and the fictional other than the terms themselves. What is unaccounted for is the ontological 
difference between what it means to be a real person and what it means to be a fictional person, 
although the human inability to know or understand the thoughts and subjectivity of other 
humans means this ontological difference is partly inaccessible to analysis. 
 
We can however put forward the following initial hypotheses based upon the above. Firstly, 
readers appear to feel empathy for literary characters and create opinions about their behaviour, 
yet these literary characters are nothing more than words sequentially arranged on a page 
without existence beyond this. Therefore, the behaviour the reader recreates in his or her mind 
echoes real world behaviour understood by the reader in his or her own unique way, and 
likewise the empathy the reader feels for a literary character is to a limited extent similar to how 
the reader might respond to real-life non-fictional individuals. Therefore, even if fiction might 
only nudge opinions and judgements about individuals in certain directions, succeeding more 
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with some than with others and often merely confirming or strengthening an existing social bias 
or potential opinion within the given readership, the way someone responds to and constructs a 
fictional character can be seen to some extent to reflect the reader’s already existent real-life 
ethics and prejudices if these initial hypotheses are correct, as an unconscious mirror to the 
reader’s mind. Unlike the ‘empathy-altruism’ hypothesis where fiction leads us to good deeds or 
censoring fears of ‘psychic infection’, literary identification might not produce such dramatic 
effects. However, neither is identification necessarily meaningless or a subject unworthy or 
incapable of study. Instead, this thesis will ask a straightforward question with complex results 
– what happens if we view fiction itself as a site of ethical action, rather than ask what fiction 
may or may not cause in ‘real life’ after one has finished reading a text? What if instead of 
evading fictionality or neutering the synthetic in an attempt to shift the discussion of ethics into 
other arenas, it was precisely in the ontology of fictional character as co-constructed by the 
reader that we find the potential for good or ill? In the first chapter of this thesis, I will begin 
exploring this question through an examination of how exactly possible readers might feel about 
such co-construction of characters with what they infer to be the power structures behind a text 




CHAPTER ONE: Authority in B.S. Johnson’s The Unfortunates, 





As posited in the introduction of my thesis, the role of sequence in identification and reader 
construction of characters is of paramount importance in understanding these processes; due to 
the naturalised common-sensical nature of sequence to many readers, however, it is difficult to 
use ‘normative’ sequenced prose texts to clearly explore what seems straightforward in this 
manner. On the other hand, to use multiple-sequence video games as the initial foundation for 
this thesis might encourage a misleading impression of radical difference between prose novels 
and video games in addition to suggesting that games are my prime focus. Instead, I intend to 
use similarities between the media to make claims primarily about readers of novels, and it is 
easier to do this if I proceed from such source material as my initial point of departure (as, 
indeed, I do in all chapters of this thesis but for the final chapter where I reverse this sequence).  
 
Appropriate source material for my initial analysis can be found in a loose group of 
experimental novels that problematize sequence by offering multiple routes through the text (in 
a similar manner to the multiple paths available in video games) yet nevertheless with the 
constraints and affordances of an exclusively prose-based medium. This formal disruption 
throws into relief the operation of normative sequential processes but so too does the fictionality 
of these texts raise consequentialist and deontological ethical issues that might not be as 
apparent if they were found in set-sequence texts. In this chapter I analyse three prose texts that 
disrupt traditional sequence in different ways through invitations to obey various kinds of 
inferred authority – either by offering explicit instructions to read the novel by flicking between 
different sections (Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch), by necessitating a random pathway through the 
text through lack of book binding (B.S. Johnson’s The Unfortunates), or by offering multiple 
sections that might be read in different sequences depending upon one’s familiarity with various 
genres and therefore produce a range of likely inferences as to what readers might infer the 
text’s authority is asking them to do in their interpretation and identification (Vladimir 
Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1962)).  
 
In each text, the role of chance serves to foreground the importance of reader-inferred authority 
by making the reader aware that there is, indeed, a choice, that one does not have to read a text 
in a specific sequence as most novels seem to demand. These experimental texts likewise 




for his or her sense of action and the consequences of those actions. Moreover, these three 
novels thematise the relationship between reader identification, ethics, and perception in a 
diegetic sense (the protagonist of each text finds it particularly difficulty to ‘read’ other human 
beings) and in a technical sense (the sequences that compose these texts represent the 
protagonists’ inability to properly represent their experience). This chapter will use these 
multiple sequences in order to explore how identification and character construction are 
contingent upon the possibilities permitted by sequences and how readers themselves are 
responsible for inferring such authorities from the possibilities made likely (but not 
necessitated) by the text. On this basis, this chapter will make certain foundational hypotheses 
as to the operations of reader construction of character that will underpin my arguments 
throughout this thesis as to the nature and ethics of this process.  
 
 
2. The Ethics of Categorisation in B.S. Johnson’s The Unfortunates 
 
To read any prose novel is to bring together and synthesise disparate details from a given 
sequence in the text; to read B.S. Johnson’s 1969 autobiographical novel The Unfortunates is to 
perform this reconstruction in a particularly explicit and self-aware fashion. The narrative is 
composed of a series of bound sections contained within a box, with all the sections but the first 
and last readable in random order. They present Johnson’s reflections on the death of his friend 
Tony Tillinghast from cancer and his memories of the city in which they spent time together, 
with the random chance-based form of the novel’s sequences acting as a tangible metaphor for 
both the workings of memory and the metastasis of cancer. The novel is a mixture of fiction and 
non-fiction and regards topics that traditionally evoke both social and narrative empathy, as 
witnessed by the success of such novels as John Green’s The Fault in Our Stars (2012).38 It is 
notable in contrast that The Unfortunates has been met with partial or absent empathetic 
responses for some of its characters, particularly its most fictional character, Wendy, who is 
based on a real-life girlfriend of Johnson’s but with a name alteration and other changes. 
Wendy’s arguably misogynistic portrayal in the narrative simultaneously evokes a set of urgent 
real-world socio-political issues at the same time as she stands as the least ontologically real 
character both in terms of her fictionality and in the amount of detail given about her in the text 
for the reader to reassemble as a person. 
 
In the critical response to this novel, there have been reported problems with the sense of 
characters’ reality and depth, which is perhaps surprising considering the real-life nature of 
many of the events reported. If narrative empathy is for some an integral part of the process of 
                                                          




literary reading, then something appears to be wrong with Johnson’s novel. In his biography of 
Johnson, Jonathan Coe notes that in many reviews of The Unfortunates ‘the same reservations 
kept recurring’ regarding Johnson’s characters. He cites Richard Holmes’ claim that the text’s 
‘technical self-absorption – for both author and reader – is finally at the expense of the reality of 
other lives’, which are said to ‘blow away like loose leaves in the wind’, and Julian Jebb’s view 
that the novel’s characters have ‘peculiarly little concrete life. They seem more like visitors to a 
consciousness than individuals encountered, observed and described’.39 Not only have readers 
found this novel difficult, but the novel’s lack of signposting of its own partly non-fictional 
status combined with its novelistic style and experimentation with chance can be said to 
potentially contribute to the lack of authenticating force its autobiographical status might have 
given the novel. Holmes’s comment suggests that the novel’s experimental technical aspect is to 
some extent to blame for these ‘leaf’-like and unreal characterisations; likewise, there is a 
similar emphasis in Philip Pacey’s claim that the tactile nature of The Unfortunates acts as a 
Brechtian alienation effect insomuch as it makes the reader aware that they are reading a book,40 
and also in David Lodge’s suggestion that the novel’s form ‘advantageously’ puts painful ‘real’ 
experience at an aesthetic distance.41  
 
However, as Kaye Mitchell claims, the novel’s multiple possible sequences do not necessarily 
create radically different readings from one another despite the apparent promise latent in its 
randomised form, as there is a lack of evidence to demonstrate such variant readings.42 Yet as I 
posited in the introduction of my thesis, sequence logically plays a key role in reader 
construction of character; if Mitchell is correct, then either my hypothesis is faulty or some 
element is missing from her analysis that might account for the importance of sequence in the 
text even if radically different readings are not created by different readers. As I will argue, 
sequence can and should be explored as to the effects it produces on the micro-level of prose 
style in tandem with macro-level mechanics such as The Unfortunates’ book-in-a-box format. A 
combination of close-reading and macro-level narrative concepts – zooming in and out as 
required – can be used to demonstrate the nuanced and subtle effects of sequence in many texts 
that might have eluded critics searching for more dramatic results in variant sequences such as 
those presented by The Unfortunates.  
 
In support of my claim regarding the importance of micro-level style, recent work on The 
Unfortunates has highlighted the novel’s unusual prose style, an element which has been 
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underrepresented in the novel’s criticism perhaps due to the more obvious distraction of its 
unusual book-in-a-box format. The sense of movement implied in reviews that suggest the 
novel’s characters ‘blow away’ and pass through both the reader’s and Johnson’s minds as 
‘visitors’ finds a stylistic analogue in the prose of The Unfortunates. As Julia Jordan has 
demonstrated, Johnson’s typical sentence structure is marked by a host of qualifications and 
repetitions which mark a doomed and unstable attempt to depict the particularity of events, and 
in the end underline the narrative’s inability to present the material it addresses. Jordan suggests 
that ‘each sentence contains its own first – and sometimes second and third – draft’.43 The 
temporary, provisional, and transitory nature of the resulting draft-like prose is one factor we 
can link to the problematized and almost absent narrative empathy found in response to some of 
the novel’s characters in the aforementioned reviews, with the style giving the characters an 
apparent lack of concrete reality. Johnson drafts these characters in a kind of paraphrase, with 
direct speech, physical description, personal histories, and statements alluding to often absent or 
problematized interior feeling.  
 
As I explored in this thesis’s introduction, Marilynn B. Brewer’s model of interpersonal human 
interaction has been imported into narrative studies by Ralf Schneider to show how different 
readers might individualise newly encountered characters or place them into pre-existing social 
categories and stereotypes within their minds. In The Unfortunates, it is significant that the two 
other main characters aside from Johnson and Tony are women and that they are afforded less 
narrative explication than the two male protagonists yet simultaneously recur at key points in 
the narrative’s development. Reviews of the novel bear out a difference in response to the two 
sets of characters, suggesting a distinction in the way the text seems to invite response to male 
and female characters. Something about this novel’s style and process of characterisation seems 
to disrupt processes of identification and narrative empathy for all characters and for female 
characters in particular, and therefore it may not be so simple a matter to conveniently attribute 
this disruption wholly to the novel’s unusual form. 
 
While Coe judges cancer patient Tony and narrator Johnson to represent a ‘vortex of shared 
grief’ in their struggle, he instead deems the recurrent Wendy archetype in Johnson’s writings 
(based on the real-life Muriel Starkey) to be boring and overblown.44 If we explore the 
substance of Wendy’s appearances in the novel, The Unfortunates contains various statements 
that could be inferred to idealise or objectify its leading female character Wendy (‘leading’ 
considering the greater amount of space and affective effort in the narration devoted towards 
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Wendy than towards the character of June), or damn Wendy for her behaviour in her 
relationship with Johnson; these include apparent generalisations about the role of women. In 
the section beginning ‘Up there, yes’, Johnson and Wendy attend a dinner at the home of Tony 
and June. After stressing how June had been ‘out at work all day long’ prior to preparing their 
meal, the narrator issues himself (and the reader) with an imperative: ‘Remember Wendy did 
not do anything domestic to help. She was not like that’ (‘Up there, yes’, p. 5).45 These remarks 
are ethically problematic: Wendy might not have offered to help, yet what of Tony or even 
Johnson himself? Why allow the moment to lead to a brief summary of Wendy’s history as 
being entirely dependent upon a mother who did not teach her how to cook or sew, as if these 
were essential human virtues?  
 
The inference here is that in past situations, and indeed in future situations, it would be unlikely 
for Wendy to be the kind of person who would engage in an action such as helping June if the 
opportunity arose. Likewise the use of the imperative ‘remember’ here suggests that if Wendy 
does not perform according to Johnson’s expectations of the functions of the female gender, 
then this is something that Johnson should not forget and indeed should ‘remember’ with 
imperative force. These suggestions by Johnson as both narrator and author of the text form an 
intrinsic part of the reader’s conceptualisation of Wendy, as we have no means of accessing her 
character other than the details Johnson imparts. Regardless of whether the text refers to 
someone real, as most readers will not know of or see Wendy in any other text or real life, the 
‘Wendy’ produced in readers’ minds is fictional for all intents and purposes as an act of make-
believe. There is no possibility of gaining more information about Wendy other than that which 
is provided, and so to make sense of the novel, readers must provisionally accept and be limited 
by the text’s inferred authority even if they reject it afterwards. 
 
No section of The Unfortunates goes on to personalise Wendy sufficiently to remove her from 
this initial stage or position of being ‘like that’, as someone who does not fit the values 
associated by the novel with her social role. Johnson does not redraft Wendy in his subsequent 
sentences as he does with so many other impressions in his novel – including descriptions of 
buildings, bodies, and events – by narrowing down her behaviour in specific ways to make her 
more of a person and less of a stereotype. Instead, he merely claims that the impression might in 
some sense be inaccurate – ‘perhaps I exaggerate in my bitterness, perhaps I am unjust’ (‘Up 
there, yes’, p. 5) – only to complete this tricolon of drafts by bringing the sentiment back to its 
original position, that Wendy is indeed ‘like that’ kind of person in this specific instance: ‘But 
                                                          
45 B.S. Johnson, The Unfortunates (Oxford: Picador, 1999). Due to the unusual format of this text, references to this 
edtion will be given in parentheses after each quotation, with the first few words of the relevant pamphlet followed 




certainly she did nothing to help June on this occasion.’ This idea of judgement, of being 
‘unjust’, of amalgamating one’s memories of actions on various occasions into some proof that 
someone is or is not concretely like something, is encouraged by the reader’s elision of different 
moments in a sequence of characterising details into a single unified character. Misogynistic 
readings are again simultaneously limited and encouraged by the way Johnson questions his 
character’s knowability beyond these actions. He asks ‘How did she feel, it was often so 
difficult to know how she was feeling, what she felt?’ (‘Up there, yes’, p. 8); even as this 
rhetorical question suggests his interpretation of her character might be inaccurate, it further 
depersonalises Wendy and casts her as unknowable. 
 
This initial drafting of Wendy resembles in its effects what Alexandra Georgakopoulou terms 
‘small stories’: ‘an umbrella-term that covers a gamut of under-represented narrative activities, 
such as tellings of ongoing events, future or hypothetical events, shared (known) events, but 
also allusions to feelings, deferrals of tellings, and refusals to tell’.46 Small stories are often 
incomplete, deferred, and provisional narratives which establish the kernel of a story only to 
leave it unfinished, as opposed to the ‘big’ stories found in large autobiographical life-story 
summations. We encounter analogous situations constantly in literature when the small stories 
of minor characters briefly cross the radar of the focalisers’ ‘big stories’; the comparison with 
the life stories of the social sciences is particularly productive here in relation to The 
Unfortunates’ pseudo-status as an autobiographical text. A small story, as the beginning of a 
moment of characterisation upon which we see little expansion, affords enough opportunity for 
the reader to process Wendy as representing a category of a certain kind of person. Many of the 
characters found in The Unfortunates are likely to afford the possibility only of what the 
character theorist Schneider calls categorisation, where readers sometimes fit new characters 
into generic categories of types of people but may later on individuate and de-categorize 
characters after more information is gained. Partial forms of the later stages in Schneider’s 
schema may or may not be attainable here, depending upon the sequence read, but the 
multiplicity of possible sequences itself renders any normative form of dramatic arc or ordered 
development unlikely.  
 
Alex Woloch’s The One Vs. The Many (2003) argues that ‘character-space’, the amount of 
characterisation an individual in a novel is given in comparison with other characters, can be 
manipulated to mount arguments about the nature of particular types of individuals or 
societies.47 The Unfortunates represents an even greater complication of Woloch’s theory, as the 
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sense of how much character-space has been devoted to a particular character might be distorted 
depending upon reading sequence and how frequently references are encountered. Character-
space can furthermore be linked to my theory of readers inferring authority from a given text’s 
sequence; in the scenario presented in this novel, for example, the inferred authority of 
character-space can be seen as gender-biased, stereotyping the kind of empathy so often 
gendered in theories of narrative empathy into a Madonna-whore complex. Reader construction 
of these characters appears to not only reflect real-world judgements of women but also clearly 
emerges from certain stylistic and sequential choices, allowing a case-study in these effects. As 
a novel with no set sequence, something unanticipated by much work on characterisation to 
date, The Unfortunates affords an unexpected test-case to explore the importance of the 
contingency of sequence for all of these theories. Furthermore, the novel highlights the utility of 
applying Georgakopoulou’s ‘small stories’ concept to existing narrative theories of 
characterisation, hinting at the way in which deferred, cut-off, and provisional narratives may 
provide a highly ideologically-driven basis for initial character assessment in the reader’s mind, 
echoing the original critical move made in importing another social sciences concept into 
narrative theory where Brewer’s dual-process model was translated into Schneider’s schema of 
character response.  
 
Johnson’s remarks as narrator in the passages I have been highlighting may be taken as 
misogyny (‘Johnson has negative views on women in general’), or as indicating the 
interpretative difficulty he encounters in trying to remember what human beings are like, 
including whether Wendy was or was not how he recalls her. When readers try to assess 
whether Johnson’s remarks are misogynist or not, it could be hypothesised that readers may 
draw on their own prior prejudices and on the generalisations they may have framed in response 
to textual gaps encountered in a given sequence. This can be demonstrated through comparison 
with the avant-garde continental predecessor of The Unfortunates, Marc Saporta’s Composition 
No. 1 (1962), which also takes the form of a ‘book in a box’ (in Saporta’s novel, each page can 
be read in any random order). Composition No. 1 has no unifying narrative theme comparable to 
Tony’s cancer. While some characters recur, its events and images bear no clear relation to any 
coherent narrative whole. Just as with The Unfortunates, the novel’s reception history suggests 
that its characters are problematic. The Oulipo group deemed Saporta’s work ‘no good, 
although there is undeniably a structure there’.48 Johnson himself read Saporta’s work whilst 
creating his own, and conceived of The Unfortunates as in part a ‘modified form of Saporta’s 
technique’, superior insomuch as each section in his work would be at ‘whatever length the 
material dictates’ as opposed to the ‘arbitrary’ single pages of Composition No 1.49 In his review 
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of Composition No. 1’s modern reprinting, Coe echoes the comments about ‘technical self-
absorption’ and lack of solidity that were made in the original reviews of The Unfortunates, 
applying them to Saporta: 
 
The wispiness is a frequent pitfall of experimental fiction: its authors can become so 
preoccupied or enamoured with their technical innovation that the content itself remains 
underdeveloped. Readers will certainly not find here the solid satisfaction of The 
Unfortunates, the sense of charged memories willed into recollection, or personal grief 
rendered so honestly.50 
 
In this contrast, it is the figure of Johnson himself, his will and personal grief, that Coe invokes 
against the comparatively underdeveloped consciousness of Composition No. 1’s protagonist. 
The contrast does not apply to the other characters of The Unfortunates. In both novels, the 
majority of peripheral characters are women, and in both, most of them are heavily categorised 
according to their gender, presenting a useful contrast in terms of how both novels might 
generate these effects and also suggestive of something about the way postmodern male writers 
of the 1960s perceived the opposite gender.  
 
In The Unfortunates, these depictions of women are clearly focalised through Johnson as 
character and narrator. The question of focalisation is much less clear in Composition No. 1. 
The arbitrary and incoherent nature of Saporta’s narration is accentuated in the most widely 
available edition of the text recently produced by Visual Editions in 2011.51 As Coe notes in his 
review, this edition ‘bizarrely’ omits a key page of instructions, which originally featured the 
only direct reference to the novel's protagonist in the entire text. In a documentary blog about 
the making of this edition, the publisher provides a scan of the instructions page accompanied 
by the comment: ‘Original instructions to “the reader”. But we doubt we’ll do the same’.52 The 
decision to remove these instructions has very specific effects on the text, rather as if the section 
labelled ‘First’ were to be removed from The Unfortunates. In Composition No. 1, there is no 
framing point of departure for the reader, it is not exactly clear when diegetic events are 
occurring in relation to one another, and the relevance of each page in relation to other pages is 
likewise unclear. While The Unfortunates tries to offer what Jordan terms ‘a mimetically 
truthful representation of how memory is experienced randomly’ through the sequences the 
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book generates, the missing instruction page from Composition No. 1 reveals that the 
fragmented text is supposed to form the order of a man’s life, with the very story itself altering 
upon different readings.53  
 
In the original instructions for Composition No. 1, the chance-element in reading this text is 
compared to both a game and an act of fate, with the reader dealing the ‘deck of cards … as at a 
fortuneteller’s’; however whereas the traditional tarot is believed to reveal a pre-existent fate, 
dealing here is conceived of as determining this fate: ‘The order the pages then assume will 
orient X’s fate.’ The instructions of Composition No. 1 reveal that the entire narrative relates to 
a particular protagonist, named ‘X’ for his indeterminate nature. The text as a whole contains 
few markers of X’s presence; rather, it recounts other characters’ interactions with X, without 
direct reference to X himself beyond reference to ownerless limbs, sense perceptions, and 
occasional hypotheses as to how a certain person in certain situations might ‘perhaps’ respond 
to a given situation. Thus without this instruction page the majority of modern readers may well 
not even realise X exists. However, this does not mean that readers will not try to recuperate 
those fragments into a coherent albeit depersonalised whole as an act of unifying interpretation. 
While I am not arguing that the term ‘interpretation’ is interchangeable with ‘identification’, all 
identification can be considered in part a form of character-centric interpretation involving 
anything relevant to the construction of a given character, following many similar rules such as 
an attempt to render diverse details coherent. 
 
The instruction page goes on to describe hypothetical ways in which ‘the order of the pages’ 
may ‘orient X’s fate’: 
 
Nor is it a matter of indifference to know if he met his mistress Dagmar before or after his 
marriage; if he took advantage of Helga at the time of her adolescence or her maturity; if 
the theft he has committed occurred under cover of the resistance or in less troubled 
times; if the automobile accident in which he has been hurt is unrelated to the theft – or 
the rape – or if it occurred during his getaway. 
 
The reader may struggle to infer the interconnection of events implied by such instructions from 
the stylistic ambiguity of each narrative segment, failing to link a rape to a ‘getaway’ and a theft 
to a resistance movement for example. The interpretation of many pages in Composition No. 1 
rests upon initial dislocation, with the reader not yet knowing at the start whether we are reading 
(for example) about a rape, a military action, or a theft, and the subject often remains 
undecidable until the page’s conclusion in this manner. As each potential explanation is 
implicitly compared and contrasted, we learn to hold them all as possibilities until they are 
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resolved down the page, thus suggesting to the reader the symbolic interconnectedness of all 
these events. Even when it comes, interpretative resolution is partial. The narrative voice may 
suggest that ‘perhaps’ certain things are the case, as it does twice in the page beginning ‘A 
sputter in the telephone receiver’. The second such instance, the rape of Helga, is of evident 
importance, situated as it is here in relation to the life of X – albeit an X who may be totally 
unrealised by many readers (in which case there is no contextualisation of the rape as connected 
with the same man as was involved in such other events as a marriage, a theft, or membership of 
a resistance movement). 
 
If a reader of Composition No. 1 takes its pages in a sequence which includes many early pages 
relating to the rape of Helga, this will affect interpretation of later-encountered events. 
Ontologically, the fictional characters here are little different to the partially non-fictional 
characters of The Unfortunates, as temporal positioning in that text is also ambiguous – an 
ambiguity which requires greater creative work on the reader’s part. Since many segments begin 
without a clear subject and readers hold multiple possibilities in mind, then whether rape has 
fully and repeatedly entered the narrative set of possibilities is very important, particularly given 
the political and affective charge it carries. Whether or not the reader even classifies the event as 
rape may depend upon the influence of sequence. For example, the page beginning ‘Helga is 
becoming aroused’ progresses for two paragraphs highlighting her enjoyment of sex before two 
further brief paragraphs suggest that the action began as a rape: 
 
This is no longer a powerless child letting herself be looted, but a woman in the making 
who greedily collects each scrap of emotion. 
 
Her whole body suddenly becomes vigilant, as her will dissolves. 
 
The page’s final third emphasises the girl’s forceful agency and her enjoyment of sex, 
encouraging the reader to suppress outrage at the rape by appealing to notions of sexual 
maturation, liberation, and pleasure. If we accept this encouragement, and read this page early, 
then in future references to the event that include suggestions that she is not enjoying sex we 
may take this lack of pleasure as again a prelude to ‘liberation’. In this process, the brute fact of 
rape is overwritten, not exactly by the diegesis but by reader inference as to what the narrative is 
asking for in terms of response – an inference partly based on an entirely changeable sequence 
here.  
 
The possibility of such a reading is, however, threaded through the internal logic of other 
sections, suggesting that they await the catalyst of a specific reading sequence being 
encountered for their possibilities to fully manifest. The page beginning ‘Helga no longer offers 




even takes a secret pleasure in passively yielding’ – leads to a final declaration of liberation: 
‘But youth is victorious, and the energy of a flesh that cannot keep itself from reacting. The 
breasts once again grow firm.’ In between, Helga’s body is declared ‘dead’ and ‘broken’, terms 
which elsewhere suggest the rape is to be viewed as a crime but which here act as a penultimate 
step in a dramatic arc. Elsewhere, in the passage beginning ‘Helga protects her face’, we see the 
girl ‘stunned’ by physical assault, compared to a ‘little slave girl’; here, the reader is reminded 
of what the action consists in. Either sequence might allow us to convert a violent rape into a 
coming-of-age tale of seduction, but it is hard to escape from the reader’s likely initial belief 
either that Helga enjoys the action, or on the contrary that this is a violent and despicable 
assault. Interpretation is further complicated by the narrator’s self-effacement. If we believe the 
narrator to be omniscient, or are not even aware of a homodiegetic narrator’s presence, then we 
may accept without question the account of Helga’s sensations. However, if readers take 
themselves to be reading the limited subjective account of X, we may view his narration as 
unreliable and as reflecting X’s views on women. In this case readers may link the rape to the 
treatment and description of X’s other lovers throughout the book, and to his obsession with the 
female body which he presents in an overtly abstract, animalised, or sexual manner, or indeed in 
any combination of these three perspectives.  
 
If there is misogyny in the way that The Unfortunates presents Wendy, it is of a much more 
casual nature. Johnson’s chiding remark that Wendy was ‘not like’ women are expected to be in 
her reluctance to perform domestic tasks is made in passing and has no bearing on the central 
theme of Tony’s cancer, and readers are unlikely to respond to it in such an affectively charged 
manner as they will to a rape scene. However, just as sequence may affect reader response to 
misogyny in Composition No. 1 (as this analysis has shown), the same might apply to this less 
dramatic instance in The Unfortunates. We have seen that The Unfortunates represents a 
denaturalisation of standard novelistic sequences, and that Composition No. 1 denaturalises the 
notion of a focaliser. Saporta’s text thus highlights how the ethical responses of readers reflect 
back upon their acceptance of what they might infer to be the authority of the text. Even in the 
face of the randomised sequence found in both novels, as Kaye Mitchell noted earlier, this 
potential for random sequences does not feel radically different from a traditionally-sequenced 
novel. Readers can be seen to still operate with the same habits that define their reading of 
traditional texts, trying to generate coherent narration, characters, and fictional worlds that are 
sanctioned by the novel in question, even if the sequence followed unconsciously encourages 
particular inferences as to what that novel is demanding in terms of interpretation. In The 
Unfortunates, Johnson’s explicit presence as narrator and character encourages even more of a 
sense of ‘authoritative’ sequence even in spite of the possibility of chance; such is the power 




experience an author seems to provide.  
 
Therefore Johnson as author might seem responsible for whatever misogyny might be inferred 
by readers. Here too, however, randomisation of sequence might similarly impact on readers’ 
trust in the authority of the narration they build. If, for example, the passage chiding Wendy for 
her failure to help domestically is encountered early on in a particular reading of The 
Unfortunates, a reader inclined to regard this statement as misogynistic may view future 
depictions of Wendy and other women through such a frame of reference. Alternatively, a 
reader might encounter this section belatedly towards the end of a particular reading of the text, 
having already established a more entrenched view of Johnson’s character that involves no 
sense that he is a misogynist up until this point. While such a reader may still find this statement 
misogynistic, it might perhaps just be one statement among many from a narrator not considered 
as being ‘like that’, or it might be distorted into the existing characterisation formed according 
to reader belief as to Johnson’s character.  
 
Johnson himself (either as character, narrator, or author – in all senses an ‘inferred authority’ 
synonymous with the protagonist’s narration) is subject to the processes of categorisation and 
personalisation we bring to literary texts and everyday social interactions. These processes are 
denaturalised in The Unfortunates as the importance of sequence is highlighted, and readers are 
made aware of the malleability of character and of their own power in its formation. In a 
Brewer-derived schema, for example, if the sections we read early on focus on Johnson’s 
friendship with Tony and his emotional response to Tony’s death, a ‘personalisation’ response 
may be encouraged, whereas if a complex of Wendy passages predominates certain readers may 
instead ‘categorise’ Johnson as a misogynist and use that as the foundation for further 
characterisation. In either case, Johnson may be read as misogynist but the weight given to this 
aspect may well vary depending on the process and sequence followed. In her analysis of 
personalisation and categorisation responses, Brewer uses the statement ‘Janet is a nurse’ as an 
example of how these alternative models of impression formation can operate.54 In a 
categorisation response, weight is placed upon the category of nurse, with Janet immediately 
read as an example of that category; in a personalization response, weight is placed upon the 
figure of Janet, with her status as nurse acting as just one factor in a multifaceted personality. 
Which path we take depends upon the amount of information about Janet available prior to this 
statement, our sense of Janet’s importance in relation to our own goals as perceivers, and our 
own social stereotypes. So too does this framework apply to our reading of Johnson’s comments 
on women.  
 
                                                          




To take another example, Johnson elsewhere juxtaposes Wendy with the appearance of June, 
writing of one meeting that June was ‘the same as ever, calm, tall, elegantly unglamorous, 
honest, realistic, infinitely supporting’ (‘For recuperation’, p.3). The implicit comparison that 
emerges from the presence of such different women implies that these attributes are not merely 
praiseworthy but are those Johnson believes women in general should have, as an ideal 
contrasted with Wendy’s actions. Nicolas Tredell claims that Wendy occupies a ‘phallocentric 
mythology in which women are split into Madonnas and whore-witches’.55 Referring to the two 
passages we have been discussing, where Wendy does not help with domestic tasks and June is 
‘infinitely supporting’, Tredell notes that women are ‘subjected to male discursive constructions 
… contrasted with this “bad” woman [Wendy] are “good” women – all, significantly, maternal 
figures’.56 The contrast which informs this observation is not automatic: it must emerge from a 
reader’s attentiveness, from close juxtaposition, or from a combination of both. Readers will 
more readily respond to the text as encoding gendered assumptions if earlier sections have 
encouraged them to do so, a behaviour I will explore in greater detail in Chapter Three of this 
thesis in relation to the male gaze and Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love (1997). Both nuance and 
force of judgement arrive through sequence; indeed, this was Johnson’s favoured method of 
composition, throwing together various notes for novels in different orders and acknowledging 
that accidental sequences ‘often dictate juxtapositions which weren’t there by design’.57 As an 
ironic but logical consequence of this, different sequences can encourage readers to take issue 
with what they perceive to be Johnson’s treatment of women, even if Johnson did not seek such 
a reaction, or intend to focus on female characters in what is, after all, an elegy for Tony and a 
reflection on Johnson’s own status as elegist.  
 
Critics have tended to situate Johnson’s approach to women within philosophical and cultural 
contexts, rather than in relation to his self-representation within his own works (which would in 
a Brewer-derived model perhaps demonstrate a personalisation rather than a categorisation 
response to Johnson). Despite observing a Madonna-Whore complex in his work, Tredell does 
not judge Johnson’s treatment of women in terms of the individual personality of the author: 
 
In considering the representation of women in Johnson’s texts, this study does not intend 
to indict him, as an individual, for ‘sexist’ attitudes; his attitudes were, in many respects, 
characteristic of certain widespread discursive constructions of femininity at the time they 
were written, and indeed for centuries back in Western culture.58 
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Philip Tew repeatedly makes an equivalent argument in his analysis of Johnson’s work, 
situating Johnson’s textual representations of women in a larger philosophical discourse on 
modernity. In one instance, he extrapolates the commodification of women to the 
‘commodification of human relations’ in general.59 He takes the view that in Trawl (1966), 
Johnson’s ‘disgust and self-loathing’ are ‘extended to any women generally of promiscuous 
sexuality [echoing] his uneasiness with the exterior, with the surrounding world, the breaking of 
the boundaries of subjectivised identity and corporeality’, and suggests regarding the novel’s 
reduction of women to ‘ciphers’ that ‘the sexual and its commodified presence is a paradigm of 
modernity more generally’.60 Johnson himself broadens his treatment of women from their 
specificity as characters to a representation of femininity as a concept. After describing June, 
Johnson speaks of his ‘failure to find anyone to replace [Wendy], to be as good as she was, or as 
I had thought she was, had made her out to be’ (‘For recuperation’, p. 3). The description 
suggests that she is not an individual, irreplaceable person for Johnson, but a set of functions 
and attributes that constitute her female identity, what he ‘had made her out to be’. His ‘grief’ is 
not about Wendy as a person, but is about himself and his prejudices: he says it was ‘the loss I 
wanted, the self-suffering, not her’ (‘For recuperation’, p. 3). 
 
Although Johnson or others may attempt to transform statements about women into broader 
comments on culture and subjectivity, it is precisely Johnson’s treatment of women that allows 
us to grasp how the novel’s different possible sequences may matter in a politically urgent way. 
There is more at stake here than Johnson’s real-life feelings on an ex-girlfriend, but a malignant 
cancer throughout fiction whereby female characters are frequently rendered ontologically 
‘lesser’ or distinct from male characters. Through the different ways in which writers can be 
seen to treat male and female characters differently within their fictions, we can better 
understand the workings of identification as a whole through such contrasts. The move by prior 
critics of Johnson’s work to attribute misogynistic aspects of texts to the misogyny of 
contemporary culture at large is suspect. Johnson is not solely a disembodied product of his 
culture; he proclaims textually and narratively the extent to which he stands apart and can be 
judged as an individual. Even though his misogyny is undercut by the avowal that his 
judgement is tentative and unsure, this does not erase his initial impulse, a gesture by which the 
reader may in turn construct an idea of his character. Johnson’s judgement of Wendy as not 
‘like’ the kind of person who would help domestically may distance the reader from the text, 
and lead us to read Johnson’s performed failures to understand others as indicative of a certain 
kind of personality rather than of an existential condition.  
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In one of her hypotheses for further study, Suzanne Keen claims that: 
 
Both authors’ empathy and readers’ empathy have rhetorical uses, which come more 
readily to notice when they conflict in instances of empathic inaccuracy (discordance 
arising from gaps between an author’s intention and a reader’s experience of narrative 
empathy). Experiences of empathic inaccuracy may contribute to a reader’s outraged 
sense that the author’s perspective is simply wrong...61 
 
How ‘readily’ aspects of The Unfortunates come to notice may result from sequential choices, 
but readers may fail to respond to Johnson’s invitation to empathise with his grief over Wendy 
and his view of her personality even as they empathise with his response to Tony’s illness and 
death. We have seen that for Coe, to read of Tony and Johnson ‘is to be drawn, inexorably, by 
the coiled, unyielding threads of Johnson’s prose, into a vortex of shared grief’.62 Wendy’s 
marginalised status as a small story within the narrative stands as a contrapuntal theme; 
Johnson’s ‘grief’ over a failed relationship is a lesser matter than the great grief he experiences 
over a cancer patient’s death. The narrative’s devices encourage even non-misogynistic readers 
to engage in potentially misogynistic and marginalising processes in responding to Wendy’s 
character, insomuch as readers try to understand what the novel appears to be asking them to do. 
 
Although the ontological nature of these characters as fictional might mean no real person is 
affected by reader construction of character and judgements as to behaviour in these texts, is 
misogyny merely evaluated on its effects on real individuals? Or, by its definition as a category-
based attack eliding individual difference between women, should misogyny be evaluated 
ethically by the harm it perpetuates towards a category? If gender categories are in part 
performance and culture-based, then what is the meaningful distinction between physical and 
written performance of gender and response to it? In these senses, the reader’s engagement in 
the text’s misogyny could be seen as deontologically wrong unless we engage a ‘fictional’ 
caveat to separate the fictional action from the real, but if gender is in part enacted through 
behaviour and self-definition, then what is the meaningful difference here? Indeed, the synthetic 
nature of characterisation might further problematize such character construction as more than 
just misogynistic response but as ontologically limiting fictional women to the reality of the 
author and reader’s whim.  
 
The only safe harbour for a reader accused of unethical behaviour in recreating the text’s 
misogynistic processes of categorising women might rest in the abdication of responsibility – 
that the authors Saporta and Johnson are misogynist, not the reader who recreates their texts. 
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However, as my analysis has demonstrated reader complicity in this recreation, deontologically-
speaking readers might engage in unethical behaviour here even if in a virtue-ethics sense 
readers did not intend to do so or even if they intended to repudiate the text’s depictions after 
making sense of them by staging them within their minds. To use a popular culture analogy, in 
the film The Ring (2002), viewers of a particular film die shortly after watching it; viewing 
leads to death.63 Here, reading texts that engage readers in re-creating certain patterns of thought 
in response to inferring characters from sequences and the gaps in sequences can be seen as 
leading to outcomes that can be ethically judged. Not all fictional mimicry of real life social 
situations and behaviour can necessarily be deemed a matter for ethical judgement on the 
reader’s part in terms of fictional recreation – for example, murder in a novel affects no real 
person, a criterion of murder’s unethical status as affecting a real specific individual. Misogyny, 
however, as a category and non-individual based ethical matter that exists as an already cultural 
performance act, can be seen as a fictional action where the reader is more clearly culpable for 
ethical judgement; therefore throughout my thesis I will persist in analysing similar situations in 
order to more clearly understand the workings and ethics of reader construction of character. 
 
The birth of Johnson is the death of Wendy; the sequencing of a novel is the death of a reader’s 
radical freedom to create his or her own idea of a fictional character, a character who only 
ontologically ‘exists’ insomuch as that sequence establishes his or her nature. Is it then possible 
to see Johnson as unfairly provoking a misogynist reading of a woman’s nature when Johnson is 
the creator of that character and that world, when the very rules of that fictional world might 
lead readers to infer that in some senses it would be ‘correct’ to view characters in that manner? 
Even partially successful narrative empathy, even simple attempts to understand a novel, might 
lead to the temporary establishment and acceptance of an ethics contrary to the reader’s own, 
and in so doing, the reader’s own understanding of ethical possibilities will be used to define his 
or her belief in what the novel is saying. If fiction can make readers temporarily good people, 
can fiction make us bad? If consequentialism is applied to this, if readers are not influenced or 
‘trained’ to commit further misogynistic categorisations there might be no real problem, but 
deontologically, if misogyny is categorically unethical, then the decision to read a novel that 
might engage a reader in perpetuating such processes could be seen as leading to an unethical 
situation. It could be argued that consequently readers might conversely be trained to recognise, 
understand, and avert themselves from such thought patterns, but this is perhaps dependent upon 
the reader’s pre-existing ethics to some extent, so there is not necessarily any such alteration. 
We could therefore and perhaps surprisingly be led to a situation where to decide to read a book 
in some senses might be undesirable for what we might do as a result, even if the reader does 
not want to even temporarily adopt and practice values other than their own, unless further 
                                                          




examination of other instances of fictional ethics can better explain and elucidate this situation.  
 
 
3. The Ontology of Fictional Being in Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire 
 
As seen with Composition No 1’s ambiguously absent narrator ‘Mr X’, pronouns, proper nouns, 
and other naming conventions suggest to readers that certain parts of texts are ‘supposed’ to be 
read as mimetically referring to people, and without many of these referents characters might 
not be generated in a stable form by readers. These fictional people are often -- unless 
information is given to the contrary -- read as having a stable and continuous existence, with 
each reference to an individual taken to refer to the same individual as previous references with 
that name within a sequence; we do not imagine, when reading ‘Superman’, that subsequent 
iterations of ‘Superman’ are suddenly not the same character unless the text indicates otherwise, 
and might feel cheated if such a thing were to suddenly be revealed. If a text is a tapestry of 
interwoven threads, as Barthes suggests it is in ‘The Death of the Author’, then readers can be 
seen to knit together characterisation statements;64 we create unnecessary continuities, believing 
in the inferred authority’s representations and control of the text, but also that these characters 
are unified whole persons rather than a mess of fragments, and thus provide missing details until 
the text delivers them.  
 
We infer the Iserian gaps between moments of characterisation, between details unsaid, and 
incorporate each new detail of characterisation into the structure formed up to that point, or alter 
our existing inferences in light of new information. This gapping does not usually lead to 
radically free interpretation; although nothing technically prevents a reader from, for example, 
deciding that Homer’s Odysseus is a dinosaur in disguise, most would view this interpretation 
as a radically creative act on the part of a reader – ultimately as ‘incorrect’ and unsanctioned by 
the text. This is not to say either that one fixed meaning delivered from an author on high is 
valued either; plenty of readers, as with J.K Rowling’s statement that her character Dumbledore 
from the Harry Potter series is gay,65 may feel free to value the ‘text itself’ more highly than 
author-mandated judgement. For such readers, the ‘text itself’ functions as an authority outside 
of the author’s control but as an authority the reader may feel is outside of his or her control 
also. 
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The notion of inferring authority can be seen as operating with powerful effect in various texts, 
most notably in the powerful reframing device of the ‘twist’. In such cases narrative details are 
omitted in negative space with identification and interpretation occurring around this, only for 
the resulting characters formed in reader’s minds to be ‘contradicted’ by later revelation -- for 
example, that the welcoming Lord Bertilak is really the sinister Green Knight in Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight (14th cent.) or that Bruce Willis’s character Malcolm Crowe has been 
dead all along in The Sixth Sense (1999).66 These are all revelations rather than contradictions of 
prior narrative material – we are never told that Crowe is alive in The Sixth Sense, for example; 
the majority of viewers are just likely to assume he is. The same principle operates in less 
extreme examples of revelation such as discovering the occupation of a character or some 
hitherto unknown and surprising aspect of their belief system or ethics which might alter the 
reader’s working model of that character moving forward and looking backwards. Twists or plot 
events that heavily contradict the themes, tone, or integral parts of the belief system generated 
by such readings are often rejected, leading readers to declare certain actions ‘unbelievable’ or 
‘implausible’ for a certain character to be involved in – for example, claiming that Bruce 
Wayne, whose parents were killed by a gunman, ‘wouldn’t’ use a gun despite narrative 
depiction of him doing so.67 Such claims indicate a higher-level character formed within the 
reader’s mind that is, beyond a certain point, no longer beholden to the inferred authority of a 
text – a character that has gained, or exceeded, that same authoritative status. This claim is 
supported by the fact that characters that appear in multiple works by multiple authors are often 
the ones to gain this greater status, not as subject to a single textual authority due to their 
expansion beyond a single text or single author (traditionally perceived to hold such authority).  
 
This situation of the author, the ‘text itself’, and narrators in competition for the reader’s trust is 
illustrated vividly by the critical response to Vladimir Nabokov’s novel Pale Fire and the 
potential ‘twists’ of this text. The novel consists of a poem by a deceased fictional writer named 
John Shade and a commentary on that poem by a fictional editor named Charles Kinbote, 
representing a parody in part of academic tendencies through the poor criticism Kinbote 
engages in and his self-aggrandizing explication of his own life instead of Shade’s. The novel 
eventually suggests that Kinbote may have been deceiving the reader as to the diegetic status of 
events all along, with various characters potentially fictional within the diegesis itself. In order 
to decipher what is actually happening, trust is required or broken in the authority of various 
narrators found throughout the text. In this manner, there are three authorities likely to be 
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inferred in Pale Fire – the name on the cover of the text, ‘Vladimir Nabokov’; the name signed 
to the poem ‘Pale Fire’, ‘John Shade’; and the name signed to the commentary to this poem, 
‘Charles Kinbote’. The concept of inferred authority (as I have termed the reader’s belief in 
certain sanctioned ways of responding to a text) does not have to be located within a singular 
monolithic entity within a text and can indeed sometimes still be located in pre-existing 
narrative concepts such as a sense of authorial presence, a fictional character, focalisation, style, 
and so on. In novels such as Pale Fire, the presence of various found documents create a 
doubling of inferred authority insomuch as readers might not only conceive of what the ‘text as 
a whole’ or Nabokov intends for their response, but what the fictional authors Shade and 
Kinbote intend for their texts on a different diegetic level. 
 
Nabokov is a textual ghost between the cracks in these texts, standing behind both Shade and 
Kinbote so that readers might, for example, infer that when Kinbote suggests readers buy 
multiple copies of the book and/or cut them up to place each page side by side,68 such readers 
are not ‘really’ supposed to do this, that this goes beyond the amount of effort and cost we are 
normally expected to go through in reading texts. Yet if this instruction is humorous and not 
‘meant’ to be followed (and there is no absolute reason why this instruction could not be 
inferred to be serious), there is no clear replacement instruction as to how to move between 
poem and commentary, whether the reader is supposed to weave between each or read one 
before the other or, indeed, to follow various redirections to ‘see’ various notes in between. 
Unless recommended a path of action by an outside source or critic of the text, the way the 
reader moves through this text emerges from what that reader thinks the text is asking him or 
her to do – what the reader thinks it means to read a poem and a commentary, albeit a 
commentary with equal (fictional) importance to that poem. For example, as I explore in 
Chapter Three of this thesis, players controlling a hero rescuing a young woman in the video 
game Bioshock Infinite (2013) and viewers watching another hero travelling with a young 
woman in the film Oldboy (2003) may make certain assumptions as to the romantic potential for 
such situations due to prior genre experiences, only to have these assumptions manipulated 
through the revelation that both pairs represent unwitting father and daughter relationships. 
Likewise, the sequences of Pale Fire work to play upon genre expectations; an academic used 
to reading poems and their commentaries might read Pale Fire in a far different way to someone 
who assumes such commentaries are subordinate and uninteresting ‘extras’, or indeed someone 
far more interested in prose novels than in poetry. The inferred authority of the cumulative ‘text 
as a whole’ emerges here out of the kinds of authority the reader has encountered and sustained 
in past readings of other texts. 
                                                          






As soon as the opening material mentioning ‘Nabokov’ is left behind (cover-xxii), the 
remainder of the text is (fictionally) a found document with documentary status. This found 
document version of Pale Fire is presented as having been edited by the character Kinbote with 
an additional commentary and a bizarre index to the events in both so that a (fictional) reader 
might receive the entire text as Kinbote has arranged it. As already suggested, Kinbote is no 
mere narrator, therefore, but a kind of inferred authority in his own right, as (fictionally) he can 
be inferred to have ‘created’ the arrangement of the text.69 This inference is further 
problematized by the quickly undermined notion that Kinbote is delivering a documentary of 
Shade’s final days, delivering this authority a similar status to Johnson’s in The Unfortunates, as 
a consciousness attempting to present the ‘real’ without being able to properly perceive it. 
Rather than existential solipsism, however, Kinbote suffers from selfishness and, quite possibly, 
partial or total insanity, with various statements in his own text suggesting that his world-view 
is not authenticated by the events or direct speech he includes. Shade does not seem to act like 
the ‘friend’ Kinbote’s narrative voice characterizes him to be, with repeated diegetic actions 
suggesting Kinbote is unwelcome in Shade’s home (p. 75).  
 
Indeed, Kinbote begins discussing the importance of the last King of Zembla to Shade’s poem, 
which becomes (or already seems, depending on the order of reading) improbable when the 
reader attempts to relate the commentary to a poem which seems to have nothing to do with 
either the King or Kinbote. Eventually, in a twist (or very early on, if redirections to ‘see’ 
various notes have been followed)70 the reader sees a switch to the first-person to discuss the 
King and Kinbote as one being (p. 194); this switch demonstrates that Kinbote is in fact this 
King and has been talking about himself as ‘King’ in the third person (or will go on to talk 
about himself in the third-person) throughout the text (pp. 62-63, passim). Two versions of the 
character in the reader’s mind are therefore either smashed together retrospectively to become 
one character or the reader unites these hitherto distinct characters as they are encountered in 
future instances. There is also a third possibility where the reader has already been led to guess 
this ‘extraordinary secret’ through Kinbote’s improbable knowledge of secrets relating to the 
king’s life and interiority unavailable to all others (p. 171). In many of these cases, the reader’s 
ongoing inference of the ‘text as a whole’ and its inferred authority – the way the reader thinks 
he or she is supposed to move through the text – leads to very different sequences of character 
formation and therefore very different potential inferences regarding various characterizing 
details.  
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These multiple sequences become significant in the commentary’s conclusion which acts as the 
terminal point of many different sequences, whether the sequence involves redirections, 
interweaving between both texts, or reading the poem first and then the commentary. At the end 
of the final note, Kinbote destroys any tenable surety as to his identity, narration, and even the 
notion that he is mad by admitting that the country of Zembla may not exist (as it does not in 
‘real life’) (p. 236). ‘Kinbote’ reveals that he might lying, diabolic, or a metafictional creation of 
Nabokov himself in a final triumph of the hidden spectre behind the text – that the twist of the 
novel might be that it was all just written by a ‘Russian writer in exile’, Nabokov himself. The 
reader already knew this but for his or her suspension of disbelief and the lack of constant 
reminder that the fictional characters he or she reconstructed were not ‘real’ and did not need to 
have the unity of meaning the reader might have granted them. The text can be inferred to 
express the meaning that it does not have ultimate meaning. In The Unfortunates, the inferred 
authority of Johnson’s prose could not fully interpret the world, but his sincerity in this inability 
to interpret was never in question; here, we cannot trust Kinbote. In a 1967 interview, Nabokov 
named Kinbote’s final gesture in the text as suicide, an apt description of what happens here.71 
The inferred authority loses his authority, his very nature, through his own utterances, just as the 
character formed in the reader’s mind is blown apart in a loose collection of utterances and 
values, losing its mimetic and synthetic cohesion. 
 
Pale Fire’s reception history demonstrates an interesting tendency in response at this point in 
the text, where in discovering Kinbote’s unreality and this lack of ultimate meaning, many 
readers’ first impulse is to force meaning back upon the text and to select one of the possibilities 
posited as to Kinbote’s ‘real’ identity rather than suspending judgement. Brian Boyd, for 
example, claims that the ‘true’ meaning of the text is that Hazel – the poet Shade’s daughter 
who commits suicide prior to the time-frame in which Kinbote is allegedly writing (line 500, p. 
43) – has become a ghost and subliminally inspired both Kinbote’s Zemblan fantasy and John 
Shade’s poem in the form of a butterfly, and that Pale Fire’s ultimate theme is the afterlife.72 
Eric Naiman notes in his review of Boyd’s analysis, however, that he disagrees with Boyd’s 
conclusion even as he finds further evidence for its justification within the text.73 Indeed, even 
here, quoting Hazel’s surname, ‘Shade’, emphasises her ghostlike potential in this reading.  
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It is important to note that Boyd is not right or wrong in his construction of the text, whatever 
claims are made regarding his providing a ‘key’ for the text’s secret truths; his construction 
makes it true for him, and those who arrive at similar positions, as texts necessitate nothing in 
terms of construction but merely suggest certain authoritative patterns to readers who are 
looking for certain things. Indeed, Boyd here assumes that all sequences through the text should 
be subsumed within a supposedly superior master-sequence taking all into account, leading 
Boyd to form a stronger surety as to there being an ‘ultimate meaning’ rather than abandon the 
text to uncertainty.74 Boyd presents a fascinatingly elaborate ideal reading method for the text 
where he would have readers re-enact their reading several times in a row, each time better able 
to fit disparate details into their staging of Kinbote as each reader proceeds with the end-
knowledge of Kinbote’s collapse (therefore no longer a shock, but a foundation for the 
continuing formation of the character in the reader’s mind). The reader proceeds, in this 
hypothetical path, with the assumption that all these disparate details can not only be made to 
cohere within a stable version of Kinbote, but that they should be subsumed within a whole 
unified being. However, ultimate meaning here is undecidable in the sense that nothing 
necessitates or makes one reading of sequence ‘superior’ to any other; this does not necessarily 
even mean that we should leave the text as ‘undecidable’, as this is just the same as choosing 
any other interpretation, even if it seems to make sense for a text divested of inferred authority, 
of cohesive and authenticating structures in its final moments. 
 
Just as the Boyd version of Pale Fire has its own textual evidence, so too does this ‘suspended 
judgement’ version of the text have its own supporting moments and even – somewhat 
surprisingly for a fictional construct which destroys any stable notion of its make-believe 
existence – its own emotional potential. As mentioned earlier, throughout the text Kinbote uses 
the third-person to refer to a King we may or may not believe to be synonymous with himself. If 
it is a delusion, the wish to be the King of Zembla appears as a grandiose and egotistical escape 
into a land where everyone loves him but for his Marxist oppressors, a land of ‘mirrors’ that 
reflects Kinbote’s own distorted views of his present and predominantly hostile town of New 
Wye. However, in one passage late in the text, Kinbote’s distancing from his own apparent 
experiences allows him to analyse his own behaviour in a poignant manner simply not viable in 
his everyday existence, inviting the reader to potentially assume a greater degree of sincerity on 
Kinbote’s part in contrast to the humorous selfishness he demonstrates elsewhere. 
 
Kinbote claims that his King-self ‘was, had always been, casual and heartless. But the heart of 
his dreaming self, both before and after the rupture, made extraordinary amends’ (p.166). 
Hitherto encountered as selfish, cloying, paedophilic, and dismissive of his wife, Kinbote 
                                                          




nevertheless demonstrates unusual mature sympathy for his King-self with his claim that he 
loved his wife Disa within his dreams: if the reader sees Kinbote as capable of such high 
emotion, this would indeed make ‘extraordinary amends’. Dreaming is posited as a method of 
sobbing ‘away the monstrous past’ (p. 167), aligned to the alternative escapes of Kinbote’s 
‘brilliant invention’ of Zembla and his possible suicide (p. 188). Kinbote’s dream-love, 
however, possesses a superior claim to those of any objective reality, exceeding ‘in emotional 
tone, in spiritual passion and depth, anything he had experienced in his surface existence’ (p. 
167). The earlier distinction between characters as synthetic and as mimetic of particularised 
human beings is functionally irrelevant in this case, as difference is suspended in favour of an 
appeal to powerful affective response, ‘exceed[ing] in emotional tone’ all else – we are given 
access to an inner self that Kinbote cannot even fully admit he has, charging the reader with 
absorbing this new characterisation into his or her identification going forward. This unification 
by the reader of Kinbote’s subject matter with Kinbote’s own emotions occurs even though the 
reader ‘knows’ that he or she is not ‘supposed’ to know he is talking about himself as the King, 
making the gesture on Kinbote’s part even more sincere, showing multiple levels of inferred 
authority operating in symphony.  
 
After this passage, Shade (to whom Kinbote has been recounting these thoughts) questions 
whether the King’s love for Disa is indeed true and how Kinbote can know it is true, two 
questions that encapsulate the epistemological demand of Pale Fire as explored by many of the 
novel’s critics. Kinbote replies: 
 
Do not worry about trifles. Once transmuted by you into poetry, the stuff will be true, 
and the people will come alive. A poet’s purified truth can cause no pain, no offense. 
True art is above false honor (p. 170).  
 
Kinbote is claiming that the truths of a story or a dream may not be empirically valid but 
possess a status superior to rational objections, which become trifles in the face of this new 
realism based upon the hyper-realistic affective tethers of ‘true art’. Indeed, the text thematises 
the way plot no longer matters here – ‘the gist, rather than the actual plot of the dream’ (p. 167) 
– recalling Shade’s comment that ‘not text but texture’ is the key to understanding life (l. 808). 
The entire dream is encapsulated by the coincidence between Shade’s textual portrait of his wife 
Sybil and Kinbote’s ‘memory’ of Disa, a ‘plain unretouched likeness’ (p. 164). The ability of a 
reader to understand this note is extended not merely to the reader’s ability to appreciate any 
fiction, but to the existence of ‘sense’ and meaning in ‘anything at all’: 
 
I trust the reader appreciates the strangeness of this, because if he does not, there is no 





Kinbote has issued a challenge to the reader to appreciate this strangeness as strangeness, not 
attempting to resolve it as something else and remove its dream-like power. The issue is 
universalised to establish the ‘sense’ in both literature and larger reality. 
 
Nevertheless, at the moment Kinbote considers the possibility that this dream-love for Disa 
might just be a ‘glimmer’, it disappears into mutually exclusive realities placed in a deceptive 
progression reminiscent of the novel’s conclusion with Disa ‘no longer there’ (p. 168). The 
crumbling of Kinbote’s dream-love is Pale Fire in miniature, with the ‘notes’ that are passed to 
him detailing abrupt ontological shifts: this configuration begins with Disa ‘inaugurating a fire’ 
reminiscent of the novel’s title, moving onto an odd conception that Disa ‘had married an 
American businessman’, that Disa ‘had become a character in a novel’, and at that moment of 
admitting fictionality, that Disa is ‘dead’ (p. 168). The dream is not sustainable, despite the 
supposed superior claims of art’s truth.  
 
Pale Fire may be inferred, in part, to enact a tragedy of metafiction, with Kinbote’s multiple 
existences all finally untenable (regardless of which one is ‘true’) resulting in his (and the 
text’s) suicide. Nabokov wrote that the ‘closest we can get to a definition of art’ is the formula 
of ‘beauty plus pity’, that ‘where there is beauty there is pity for the simple reason that beauty 
must die: beauty always dies, the manner dies with the matter, the world dies with the 
individual.75 Significantly, Nabokov stands as one of the critics of theories of narrative empathy 
with particular characters mentioned in this thesis’s introduction; Nabokov claimed that we 
should not read ‘for the infantile purpose of identifying oneself with the characters’ of a novel, 
to share ‘the emotions of the people in the book’, but that we should instead read to share ‘the 
emotions of its author – the joys and difficulty of creation’.76 However, contrary to the author’s 
own theory, in Pale Fire, this distinction between identification with characters and the ‘joys 
and difficulty of creation’ is somewhat blurred: we are presented with a fictional author talking 
about the creations of his own potential fictions. Not only this, but we see the death of both 
these joys and their beauty; the various narrative worlds created throughout the text do indeed 
die with the individual who appeared to have partially inspired them. Shade created the poem 
‘Pale Fire’ and claimed that the ‘password’ to life is ‘pity’ only to be gunned down by the 
pitiless Gradus, his assassin (p. 179).  
 
It is in the figure of Gradus that much of this identification and inferred authority of 
characterisation in this novel is established, in a similar exclusionary manner to the way in 
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which Wendy was treated within the novel The Unfortunates. The reader of Pale Fire may be 
led to feel disgust towards Gradus. In Ugly Feelings (2007), Sianne Ngai characterizes disgust 
as the opposite of both Kantian beauty and the emotion of pity.77 Throughout Pale Fire, Kinbote 
fixates upon Gradus in this manner. Kinbote reminds us that he has ‘staggered’ Gradus’s 
characterizing details throughout the novel so that the first is ‘the vaguest while those that will 
follow become gradually clearer as gradual Gradus approaches in space and time’ (p.123), 
culminating in the final word of the entire commentary with a description that echoes the syntax 
of Disa’s dream-world collapse: 
 
Somebody has already set out, somebody still rather far away is buying a ticket, is 
boarding a bus, a ship, a plane, has landed, is walking towards a million photographers, 
and presently he will ring at my door – a bigger, more respectable, more competent 
Gradus (p. 236) 
 
The end of the text does indeed present a more ‘competent’ Gradus insomuch as the assassin 
has killed the King; indeed, Kinbote has killed himself by destroying any surety as to his own 
stable existence. However, this metafictional suicide seems cruel and callous as Kinbote has 
become this aforementioned character type who works against the reader’s emotional 
investment in the narrative as opposed to what might be seen to be a more sympathetic portrayal 
in Kinbote’s inability to sustain his dream-love for his wife Disa. Patricia Waugh briefly 
addresses Pale Fire in her work Metafiction (1984), claiming that ‘the possibility soon emerges 
that Kinbote’s ‘pursuer’ may be his mad self whose projections are both the basis of, and 
inimical to, artistic invention, and which therefore destroy the poetic Shade’.78 The narrative of 
Pale Fire establishes this ‘inimical’ relation to artistic relation through its repeated probing of 
the external gestures and visible signs of Gradus’s character, revealing his interiority to be ill-
defined and barely existent; unlike the dream worlds and desires of other characters, Gradus has 
only ‘general ideas’ (p. 123).  
 
Kinbote implicates the reader in this ‘gradual’ elaboration of Gradus’s character earlier in the 
narrative, with the dual ‘we’ alternating from past characterisation to the present moment: 
 
We know already some of his gestures, we know the chimpanzee slouch of his broad 
body and short hindlegs. We have heard enough about his creased suit. We can at last 
describe his tie, an Easter gift from a dressy butcher, his brother-in-law in Onhava. (p. 
218) 
 
Do we know these things, however? The reader has heard Gradus described mostly in 
allegorical terms up to this point, as a man of ‘general’ ideas suspicious of all those he perceives 
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to be above him. Asserting that ‘we know’ these things equalizes these more mental aspects of 
Gradus’s character with physical, animalized features, a chimera of primate – ‘chimpanzee’ – 
and an anonymous other animal with ‘hindlegs’. In a similar manner to how readers have to 
temporarily accept the authority of The Unfortunates’ depiction of women in order to 
understand that novel’s narrative, ‘We know’ here has ontological force insomuch as it grants us 
this knowledge of Gradus at the same time we are told we already have it. Shifting onto ‘creased 
suit’ at this point seems to elide anatomy with clothing, giving a sense almost of creased skin, of 
someone whose appearance is not quite right. Even his ‘tie’, ‘at last’ described by the dual ‘we’ 
as if it were the climax of the story reserved for this moment, is from a ‘dressy butcher’. This 
‘dressy butcher’ is in turn a pun referring both to a potential assassin like Gradus and a meat 
vendor, fitting in with the concentration on physical features of the body in the previous few 
sentences and in the rest of the passage that follows. Indeed, this emphasis upon the reader’s 
tactile engagement with Gradus’s character develops towards a metaphysical depiction of both 
Kinbote and reader passing through Gradus’s body: ‘phantom-like, we pass through him […] 
his magenta and mulberry insides’ (p.2 18), likely evoking a sense of disgust at bodily and food-
based entanglement.  
 
Why might undulating in a man’s entrails disgust us? It does not necessarily have to do so – we 
can conceive of a real reader for whom this back and forth movement through a body associated 
with various animals, with a ‘creased’ and synthetic texture, and edible meat and fruit might be 
fine, even pleasurable. Indeed, even in disgusted responses there might be some element of 
pleasure -- Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror (1980) uses an example of food as abject, as 
desired but rejected.79 In order to understand the nature of these ‘mulberry insides’ into which 
we are invited to ‘undulate’, we have to characterize this form briefly as food even if we resolve 
it to metaphorical status and thereby engage in a kind of cannibalistic taboo. Entrails summon a 
sense of mortality, invoking the human being as an animal body within which we might die. It 
invites a blurring between a person’s mind and a body, something which may repel many. We 
can however imagine many of those less likely to be disgusted by entrails – a butcher, for 
example – as dealing with such body parts as their trade demands on a regular basis, considering 
them more as objects to be utilised than as this abject space we are aware to be a part of us but 
which many are not quite willing to accept as equalling their subjecthood. It is not that readers 
do not empathise with and attempt to construct abjected characters – they must logically do so 
in order to read a text – but such processes can involve a simultaneous expulsion of the taboo 
and disgusting object, as I explore in relation to the incest taboo’s operation in Bioshock Infinite 
and Oldboy in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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Kinbote goes on to further insist upon Gradus’s abject nature: 
 
Spiritually [Gradus] did not exist. Morally he was a dummy pursuing another dummy. 
The fact that his weapon was a real one, and his quarry a highly developed human 
being, this fact belonged to our world of events; in his, it had no meaning. (p. 218) 
 
The reader is led to feel disgust towards a despiritualised character with ‘dummy’ morals as 
opposed to the united perception of ‘our world of events’, Kinbote and the reader’s. Of course, 
considering the ending of this novel will reveal explicitly metafictional possibilities for these 
characters – ‘figments’ in a ‘stage play’ (p. 236) – these statements also have literal value. 
Spiritually, Gradus does not exist at all. He is a dummy, a character, a mannequin, albeit an 
inferior character to one who is ‘highly developed’ and who has accrued a greater sense of 
spiritual reality, albeit in mock. We are told, in a nice echo of a ‘highly developed human being’ 
as Gradus’s hunted ‘quarry’, that no ‘motive hunting or rational inquiry’ can explain Gradus’s 
attempt to murder (p. 219), ironically for those critics who have tried to do so, and Kinbote 
concludes that: 
 
If his human incompleteness be deemed insufficient to explain his idiotic journey across 
the Atlantic just to empty the magazine of his gun, we may concede, doctor, that our 
half-man was also half-mad. (p. 219) 
 
And in one version of events revealed just before the man’s suicide later in the novel, Gradus is 
indeed mad, not intending to kill Shade or Kinbote at all but is instead an escaped mental patient 
whom the equally mad Kinbote elevates to the status of Marxist assassin. At this moment of 
possible revelation we are told he died not as ‘a feeble splutter of the clockwork’ but in a 
‘gesture of humanoid despair’, something resembling a human, something still slight and an 
object of partial disgust – a ‘gesture’ like those we have come to associate with Gradus, 
replacing a ‘splutter’ suggesting liquid movement. Here, Gradus is no longer purely abject and 
inhuman; he did not die ‘because having played his part in the story he saw no point in existing 
any longer’ but out of some human feeling (p. 235). Kinbote uses theatrical language at this 
point to dismiss Gradus and maintain his authority as possible director of events, proclaiming 
‘Enough of this. Exit Jack Grey’ (p. 235). 
 
This dismissal of Gradus occurs just before the reader’s apparent identification of Kinbote with 
the King of Zembla (if indeed the reader has made and still retains this identification of 
synonymy) falls apart in a multitude of unstable possibilities as to ‘what happened’. It is 
significant therefore that Kinbote forcibly attempts to distinguish both himself and the reader 
from Gradus throughout the novel in this ‘we’, as in the ‘undulating his entrails’ passage; the 




examine Gradus’s interiority like no other character in the novel. Ngai writes that even as the 
disgusting seems to impose itself as ‘something to be mingled with and perhaps even enjoyed’, 
yet potentially ‘contaminating’, it ‘strengthens and polices this boundary’ between subject and 
object in a ‘fairly definite response’ preventing sympathetic response whilst creating a kind of 
sympathy between those disgusted by the object.80 Indeed, Ngai claims that disgust ‘expects 
concurrence’,81 often uniting several subjects to repel the disgusting object together.  
 
Just before Gradus shoots Shade, Kinbote posits a thought experiment to the reader reminiscent 
of Nabokov’s own views on art and the interpretation of fiction, asking ‘What if we awoke one 
day, all of us, and found ourselves utterly unable to read? I wish you to gasp not only at what 
you read but at the miracle of its being readable’ (p. 227). He implores the reader to appreciate 
what is happening when they read characters with full knowledge of this ‘miracle’, suggesting 
that: 
 
We are absurdly accustomed to the miracle of a few written signs being able to contain 
immortal imagery, involutions of thought, new worlds with live people, speaking, 
weeping, laughing. We take it for granted so simply that in a sense, by the very act of 
brutish routine acceptance, we undo the work of the ages, the history of the gradual 
elaboration of poetical description and construction from the treeman to Browning, 
from the caveman to Keats. (p. 227) 
 
This idea of the ‘gradual elaboration of poetical description and construction’ recalls Gradus, 
who upon his first appearance in the text is linked in a footnote to the word ‘gradual’; indeed, 
‘Browning’ is the model of gun with which Gradus will shoot John Shade a few pages later 
whilst ‘caveman’ recalls not only Gradus’s savagery but his sense of grotesqueness -- ‘grotto’, 
hollow, cave – as opposed to the ‘highly developed’ alternative, the ‘miracle’ of these semiotic 
signs containing these ‘live people, speaking, weeping, laughing’, a tricolon that may highlight 
a spectrum of affective response with neutral, tragic, and comic emotions, but which has a sense 
of simplification in comparison to Nabokov’s usually virtuoso wordplay, a sense of routine 
characterisation in itself. We must not mistake this paragraph for a suggestion that we should 
accept these as ‘live people’ directly, as this would be the same error those who are ‘absurdly 
accustomed’ to characterisation might make. Instead, we are being asked to respond to them as 
real people whilst maintaining overall awareness of what fiction is, its status as ‘text and 
texture’. The state of the ‘treeman’ and the ‘caveman’, individuals without developed culture, is 
the state to which one returns when this miracle is not understood as such and/or when the 
author has not developed the character as such. 
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Gradus cannot feel pity but paradoxically we cannot feel pity for him, for there is nothing there 
until the final glimmer of his ‘gesture of humanoid despair’ (p. 235). Creative, mad Kinbote 
seems to represent an alternative to men such as the gradual and half-mad Gradus; at least, 
Kinbote seems to represent such an alternative before Kinbote himself, in his ‘suicidal’ 
Gradusian manoeuvre, reveals his lies and destroys any possible reality until there are only 
mutually exclusive delusions and half-truths. As in The Unfortunates¸ we are tricked by our 
own inference of authority, a possibility that seems to be confirmed and made overt in the text’s 
conclusion. We are tricked by means of encountering a ridiculous reader of brute acceptance 
and anti-spirituality, into wanting to believe in the existence and highly-developed, beautiful, 
pitiful nature of other characters, only to be shown our arbitrary acceptance of all of these 
approaches – that art is itself arbitrary, that the ‘beauty’ of the narrative must die with its 
ending, and to show us what is lost without hope of recovery. Moreover, we are tricked 
specifically through use of a target, by insisting that we judge other people such as the ‘half-
man’ Gradus. 
 
Nabokov wrote that a ‘sophisticated’ solver of a certain kind of chess problem would ‘start by 
falling for an illusory pattern’: what he calls an ‘antithetic’ inferno.82 The player then becomes 
an ‘ultrasophisticated solver’ in arriving at what an ‘unsophisticated’ player would have found 
simple. This is likened to the way ‘somebody on a wild goose chase might go from Albany to 
New York by way of Vancouver, Eurasia and the Azores.’ In this sense, in trying to understand 
and sympathise with Gradus, we become temporarily unsophisticated in encountering the 
unsophisticated, rising above it to the preferable illusion, only to realize what the 
‘unsophisticated’, ‘brute’ reader might have known all along. Nabokov claimed that 
identification with characters is indicative of the ‘worst’ impulse of a reader -- here, we are 
invited to identify only for the results of this impulse to be destroyed in relation to Kinbote. 
 
And, as with The Unfortunates, the only character who fully survives this process is the inferred 
authority of Nabokov himself – yet unlike The Unfortunates, where readers are unlikely to fully 
develop individuals other than Johnson, this text’s distortion of stable identification with any of 
its characters has tragic implications in that Kinbote was potentially developed only for our 
stable assumption of unity in our understanding of his character to be taken away from us. 
Kinbote’s downfall occurred due to the flaw of his illusory nature, that we suspended our 
disbelief, an unavoidable reminder in the process of accepting these details temporarily as ‘real’ 
that these details are not in fact real, of a ‘brilliant invention’, of a Zembla. 
 
                                                          




As highlighted in this chapter’s introduction, and as has defined many discussions relating to 
reader construction of character, the fictional nature of characters leads readers to respond in a 
manner different to that which they might in real-life social interactions. As I have demonstrated 
in my arguments regarding The Unfortunates and Pale Fire, the ontologically synthetic reality 
of characters is often overlooked when it is their unreal fictional nature and construction by the 
reader that leads to the greatest potential for an ethics of narrative empathy. Richard Walsh’s 
argument that readers feel emotion for the values and phrases associated with a character is 
useful here in relation to Pale Fire. Walsh hypothesises readers have emotional responses to 
characters due to their values rather than mimetic concerns, and here we have a character 
without mimetic unity. As I discussed in the introduction to this thesis, one of Walsh’s 
arguments relates to popular affective response to non-mimetic characterisations, such as in 
Walsh’s example of the sentimental outcry over Little Nell’s death in Charles Dickens’ The Old 
Curiosity Shop. In this model, readers may form emotional responses to each element of the 
web of values relating to innocence, grieving, and contemporary sentimentality that forms under 
the cohesive unity of Little Nell. The reader’s feeling that he or she may feel emotion for an 
individual rather than in response to values associated within an individual emerges as a by-
product of interpretation, not as the beginning of the interpretive chain. However, as I contended 
in my thesis’s introduction, the reader’s belief that they are responding to individuals is not so 
easily discarded. Considering the partial similarity of Walsh’s arguments with Nabokov’s own 
statements on characterisation and the reading process in Pale Fire and in his lectures as 
discussed throughout this chapter, Walsh’s theory is quite significant here as a point of 
connection between Nabokov’s ideas and my own. We could argue that this tendency of readers 
can be used to account for the ability of fictional arguments to achieve reader agreement and 
investment to a greater degree than factual arguments. Even if we do differentiate between what 
is actually happening in our experiences with narrative and what readers think happens as the 
product of narrative experiences, the fact that readers think certain things occur in the narrative 
experience can still be indicative of important parts of fictional stories’ effects.  
 
If we assume that most readers believe in the authority of a text’s sequence in addition to this 
belief in a unity of character – that, for example, in many western prose novels one must begin 
on page 1 and read from left to right on each new line until the last page of the text – then that 
sequence can be assumed to have an impact on the idea of the character created in the reader’s 
mind throughout the reading process, but so too can sequence be assumed to have an impact 
upon the reader’s guesswork. To return once more to Iser, ‘the written text imposes certain 
limits on its unwritten implications.’83 Here, the inferred authority of a text’s sequence – 
combined with the material facticity of that text – imposes ‘limits’ upon the reader’s guesswork, 
                                                          




however permeable or likely to collapse such limits might be. Again, radical scepticism as to the 
potential for various readings to ‘cohere’ is unhelpful here; in so-and-so edition of a text, 
regardless of the individual copy, x word comes after y word, and ‘x’ and ‘y’ most probably 
have a roughly agreed upon meaning in the interpretive community, regardless of individual 
variation upon that meaning. The variant sequences of Composition No 1, The Unfortunates, 
and Pale Fire have all demonstrated the ways in which sequence cannot be understood as 
arbitrary, whether on the macro-level of events or micro-level of word choice and style. 
However, what Pale Fire demonstrates more than these other texts is an emotional investment 
and the trust placed in such sequential authorities, and the sense of betrayal that might emerge 
once such trust is broken – the fear that a narrative might have just been all a dream, that those 
you have constructed are what you knew they always were, fiction. 
 
Another suggestion that emerges from this chapter’s discussion of The Unfortunates and Pale 
Fire is the idea that following a particular narrator’s sense of his or her world could lead to the 
temporary adoption of values and ethics that might be contrary to the reader’s own. In this 
regard, what is most paradoxical, ethically speaking, is the sense of betrayal that emerges from 
the ‘lies’ of sequential authorities that create twists in which we were never lied to at all, when 
readers just assumed a state of affairs. Readers might feel so strongly in their responses to such 
deception because they themselves are responsible for generating much of the authority they 
feel they have been following throughout novels, and have deceived themselves using the 
patterns of the text. It is not so simple to say that the inferred authority of the text is something 
the reader temporarily adopts, as with Johnson’s potential misogyny in The Unfortunates or 
Kinbote’s worldview where he is king and Gradus is an assassin. Instead, it must be emphasised 
that the reader has enacted, generated, and given life to this sense of authority via their attempt 
to understand the text, via what he or she might believe to be compliance. The reader is his or 
her own victim as a result, with important implications for ethical situations facing readers of 
literature who do not necessarily always encounter twists but who always face the implicit 





4. The Ethics of the Fictional in Hopscotch 
 
My analysis of Composition No 1, The Unfortunates, and Pale Fire has gestured towards the 
importance of the contingency of sequence upon the eventual characters formed in readers’ 




to the ontological nature of such characters as fictional and synthetic, lacking all coherency and 
reality apart from that unity which the reader grants them. As explored by Richard Walsh’s 
theory of fictionality, readers may feel great emotion in response to texts due to the web of 
values, emotions, and ideas encountered, with the impression that they are responding to people 
when really this unity is an illusion that emerges out of the reading process. This thesis has 
argued, however, that this sense of unity and character reality is still an important part of reader 
construction of character, especially considering the way in which readers grant a sense of 
authority outside of themselves to texts, an authority which ironically emerges from the reader’s 
own inferences rather than anything demanded by the original text. As theorists such as Walsh 
and Keen have shown, readers do not necessarily require fictional people to be entirely like real-
life humans, but regardless we could say that fictional characters are often treated by readers as 
if they were ethical agents capable of decision-making and possessing a personality. Readers 
can therefore be said to respond to fictions ontologically dissimilar to ‘real life’ humans, but 
still to respond to such fictions as if they are real in part. The ethics of this negotiation – the 
simultaneous reality and unreality of fictional characters in different senses – is rarely explored 
in its full implications. Few theorists account for the ethics of the specifically fictional situation, 
instead considering that this fictionality renders the situation at least partially outside of ethics 
as in Keen’s arguments or that fictionality allows the reader to be ‘trained’ in a safe space 
separate from real ethical importance, as in Zunshine’s work.84  
 
There is a similar tradition in video games studies of viewing the player’s activity as occurring 
in what Johan Huizinga termed the ‘magic circle’, a protected area for play separated from real-
world activity.85 In his ‘Freud Lives’ argument, Slavoj Žižek considers this protected space free 
of real-world consequences not just in terms of play, but of how we might view player 
behaviour in partially narrative-driven games where our real-world ethics might stand revealed:  
 
In our ‘society of the spectacle’, in which what we experience as everyday reality more 
and more takes the form of the lie made real, Freud’s insights show their true value. 
Consider the interactive computer games some of us play compulsively, games which 
enable a neurotic weakling to adopt the screen persona of a macho aggressor, beating up 
other men and violently enjoying women. It’s all too easy to assume that this weakling 
takes refuge in cyberspace in order to escape from a dull, impotent reality. But perhaps 
the games are more telling than that. What if, in playing them, I articulate the perverse 
core of my personality which, because of ethico-social constraints, I am not able to act 
out in real life? Isn’t my virtual persona in a way ‘more real than reality’? Isn’t it 
precisely because I am aware that this is ‘just a game’ that in it I can do what I would 
never be able to in the real world? In this precise sense, as Lacan put it, the Truth has 
                                                          
84 Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006), 
p. 162, passim. 






the structure of a fiction: what appears in the guise of dreaming, or even daydreaming, 
is sometimes the truth on whose repression social reality itself is founded. Therein 
resides the ultimate lesson of The Interpretation of Dreams: reality is for those who 
cannot sustain the dream.86 
 
Much of Žižek’s argument here relates to the specifically immersive nature of a video game, in 
which the player can control the fictional character (or ‘avatar’) and act through him or her. This 
thesis will, throughout later chapters, return to this ethical interpretation of the video game 
player and the specific affordances that video games allow in contrast to prose novels in order to 
mount larger arguments about the nature of reader construction of fictional characters and 
narrative empathy, particularly with regards to Žižek’s gender assumptions. However, for now, 
this chapter will restrict itself to interpreting the relevance of Žižek’s argument in analogous 
relation to prose-based fictional characters in order to lay the groundwork for later arguments in 
this thesis. As I have demonstrated thus far, readers are highly complicit in and responsible for 
much of their own responses to novels and fictional characters; even if those own responses 
may not be radically different from the responses of other readers, inferring authority from a 
given sequence still involves reader guesswork and compliance with something that is not really 
‘real’ beyond the power it is given by that reader. To rephrase a question asked several times 
throughout this thesis, if Keen suggests that we do not necessarily become altruistic in the real 
world after reading fiction due to its fictionality, then could readers actively respond in ethically 
problematic ways within that fictional construction due to the lack of real world consequences 
for their actions? Could novels be seen as acting like games to provide an outlet for desires that 
cannot be enacted without censure in ‘real world’ social systems or which the reader might be 
curious about attempting, allowing the ‘trying out’ a theory of mind in a similar manner to that 
which Zunshine describes?  
 
Another way of looking at this question is through Jean Paul Sartre’s concept of the ‘look’ and 
the importance of inference in interpersonal relationships. In his play No Exit (1944), Sartre 
writes ‘L’enfer, c’est les autres’, translated variously as the famous ‘Hell is other people’, ‘Hell 
is just — other people’, and ‘Hell is the Other’, suggesting in the preface to the text that: 
 
[…] other people are basically the most important means we have in ourselves for our 
own knowledge of ourselves. When we think about ourselves, when we try to know 
ourselves, basically we use the knowledge of us which other people already have. We 
judge ourselves with the means other people have and have given us for judging 
ourselves. Into whatever I say about myself someone else’s judgement always enters. 
Into whatever I feel within myself someone else’s judgement enters.87  
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Sartre’s formulation shows how humans exist in a social world and how human identities are 
negotiated on an ongoing basis in response not only to the gaze of others but more importantly 
in response to what one thinks others think. Sartre’s theory provides a philosophical support for 
my concept of inferred authority when applied to fictional others. Even if human identity is 
incoherent as deconstructionists have suggested, formed from within and without through 
innumerable contexts, the primacy of personal subjectivity in this process — the role of 
inference — cannot be underplayed. For reader response to fictional characters, Sartre’s ‘look’ 
might be seen as operating in a particularly vivid manner. Readers encounter a stream of other 
people, in part reflecting on themselves and their own potential object status in response to the 
presence of these other people whilst realising the subjectivity of these other lives, much like 
real interpersonal relation.  
 
The difference here between Sartre’s ideas as to interpersonal relation and how we identify with 
fictional characters is that in the fictional encounter the subjectivity of these ‘others’ is already 
defined and infected by their construction via the reading process. Characters are already 
ontologically staged through the reader’s identification at the point of being ‘responded’ to, 
something which can be manipulated via a text’s sequence and levels of diegesis as this 
chapter’s analysis of Pale Fire has demonstrated, and which will be explored more explicitly in 
relation to what I term ‘reader causality’ in Chapter Four of this thesis. Fiction can give us 
knowledge of ourselves and our ethics in the way we look at and judge our own re-creations of 
fictional characters, but with a certain unconscious and solipsistic circularity. To identify as I 
define it here is to create identities from fragments; to identify ‘with’ is to describe the way we 
feel about such characters, our affective allegiance with them. The ‘individual’ with whom we 
experience this allegiance alludes to the facticity of the text – our response has something to do 
with the words on the page – yet ultimately such characters we experience feelings towards are, 
as has been discussed, subjective mental creations of the reader. We therefore experience 
emotion towards a kind of self within ourselves.  
 
If characters are a ‘self within ourselves’, our own subjective mental creations, what does it 
mean that such depths of emotion have been reported in response to fictional characters? Why 
has the human race, in Plato’s own phrasing, treated fiction as so integral to our everyday 
existence as to call it a ‘lover’? The ethical situations discussed thus far during this chapter have 
related, for the most part, to various category-based actions such as misogyny and how these 
can be manipulated via the sequencing of a text, with the sequence-dependent ambiguity of the 
rape in Composition No 1 standing as a particularly charged example of variant interpretation. 




diegesis and a text’s sequence can lead to certain interpretations being formed of characters; this 
chapter also explored how the way in which certain characters are sequenced can invite an 
exclusionary disgust amounting to abjection. The inevitability of the disgust Pale Fire promotes 
in its reader in constructing the character of Gradus illustrates both the willingness and necessity 
of readers trying to infer a novel’s authority to make sense of a text, and the way in which 
readers are necessarily led into complicity with what the narrative is doing in an ethical manner.  
 
The final text to be analysed in this chapter, Julio Cortázar’s 1963 novel Hopscotch, thematises 
concerns involving gender, narrative empathy, and interpretation to such an extent that the 
author gendered the two different methods of reading his novel’s sequences, and moreover 
presents a narrative depiction of rape that, just as Composition No 1 did, alters slightly 
depending upon the sequence followed. Hopscotch analogises the game of hopscotch’s aim of 
‘heaven’ to its protagonist Horacio’s search for meaning across South America and Europe, and 
his almost ritualistic relationship with the fallen Sophia figure ‘La Maga’, who is repeatedly 
sexually humiliated throughout the text by various figures including Horacio himself until her 
rape as a child by a man of anonymous origins is finally revealed.88 These events are 
contextualized differently depending upon the reader’s initial choice, a difference which 
provides an interesting way of beginning to explore the potential ethical aspect of identification 
and particularly the Gadamerian notion that the interpretation of a text through our own 
prejudices can show us those prejudices like a mirror. Unlike Pale Fire’s implicit and 
unconscious choice, Hopscotch offers a page of instructions at its beginning detailing two 
explicit paths through the text, one of which apparently incorporates the entirety of another 
shorter narrative whilst slotting in additional scenes, quotations from other works, and 
fragments in between the ‘normal’ narrative action of the shorter work. Depending upon the 
choice of route through the novel, different identifications would be formed as each reading 
would involve the exclusion of some pertinent characterizing statements, even the longer text, 
which would exclude the very short chapter 55 but would otherwise maintain all other chapters 
of the shorter text (pp. 323-26).89 This sequential choice differs from Composition No 1, The 
Unfortunates, and Pale Fire, all of which rest upon variant sequence rather than the withholding 
of narrative. Just as the previous texts of this chapter invite responses based on a reader’s genre 
expectations, this ‘longer’ version of Hopscotch offers an obvious temptation for readers trained 
to uncover all relevant information in their pursuit of a coherent response to a text.  
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With the additional and often oblique scenes of the longer path through Hopscotch, the reader is 
invited to become more active in his or her need to pragmatically interpret the often unclear 
context of these fragments and how they relate to the story at hand, as opposed to the more 
straightforward narrative-based first path chapters. This shorter path is not initially characterized 
as inferior as a route to that of the reader who decides to follow the longer path of the 
supposedly more ‘complete’ text, with this page of instructions raising the possibility of the path 
chosen as being a moral issue. Cortázar writes that the shorter text: 
 
[…] can be read in a normal fashion and it ends with Chapter 56, at the close of which 
there are three garish little stars which stand for the words The End. Consequently, the 
reader may ignore what follows with a clean conscience. (‘Table of Instructions’, p. i) 
 
Readers are told that they can ignore the parts of the novel they have not read with ‘a clean 
conscience’. However the very invocation of ‘conscience’ as a concern at all, combined with the 
idea that this shorter read-through is associated with ‘garish’ devices likely going against the 
grain of readers attempting to finish the novel as they might normally, may lead the reader to 
infer that the hypothetical ‘normal’ reader might somehow be ethically inferior to the more 
ambitious reader. Indeed, this suggest of inferiority has been the stance of many reviews of the 
novel, dismissing the shorter route through the text either as the province of bad readers or as a 
route few if any are likely to take at all.90 Likewise, the text itself, particularly in its longer form, 
seems to stress the apparent superiority of the ‘active’ reader who acts as an ‘accomplice’ to the 
author in constructing a certain kind of text as opposed to the ‘passive’ reader who is blindly led 
along by set narratives (p. 439). 
 
It is important to note here that if readers infer that one route is better than the other, they are 
responsible for this evaluation in their inference of authority, as there is nothing essentially 
superior about one text above the other (even if the texts contain diegetic statements about their 
own superiority, this does not make it true) -- such judgements depend upon one’s evaluative 
criteria. Readers are caught between traditional authoritative inferences, to read a book in 
traditional page-to-next-page order without flicking back and forth between fragments of a text 
(the shorter route) and to read everything within the covers of the book (the longer route). This 
notion of responsibility is important when the gendering of each route is considered, particularly 
as any reader choice to comply with a particular inferred authority is perhaps more explicit and 
conscious here than previous examples of inferring authority in The Unfortunates and Pale Fire 
due to the Hopscotch’s explicit statements regarding choice not only during the opening 
instructions but throughout. 
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These different reader types are referred to within Hopscotch as passive ‘female’ readers and 
active ‘male’ readers respectively (p. 439), a gender attribution which many, including 
eventually an apologetic extra-textual Cortázar himself, have had difficulty in coming to terms 
with.91 However, as my analysis will demonstrate, the inferred authority identifiable from this 
text appears to have no such qualms about linking the feminine to this reader type in the figure 
of La Maga. The ambitious reader is considered as such not for their willingness to turn pages in 
an unusual sequence, but due to the more difficult material they will encounter in the longer 
text; as Garfield claims, this is just a matter of extent, of greater difficulty than the ‘normal’ text 
rather than something qualitatively distinct.92 In his brief analysis of the movement between 
sequences 15-120-16 and 14-114-117, Sharkey demonstrates these extra chapters ‘often break 
the novelistic progression of the plot and comment on the actions and thoughts from another 
perspective’93 -- a perspective Garfield shows to centre around Horacio, with other characters 
‘serv[ing] to explain’ him, that they are ‘shadows of [his] possibilities’ as a man.94 This text can 
be seen to thematise its own problems of identification just as The Unfortunates and Pale Fire 
did through solipsistic focus upon the protagonist as source of all meaning.  
 
To take Sharkey’s sequence as a starting point for close reading, Chapter 14 (which readers of 
both short and long textual sequences will encounter) describes how photographs of torture are 
judged aesthetically by Wong and Horacio. Wong claims that ‘the other pictures […] were 
rather disappointing’ (p. 55), with some of the images depicting rape and individuals in 
excruciating amounts of pain. Eventually, Wong judges these documents to be barbaric and 
uncivilized only for the sense to emerge gradually that he means this description as an attack on 
the sophistication of the torture depicted, rather than the use of torture itself: ‘Of course, Peking 
is not what it used to be. I’m sorry I showed you something so primitive, but one cannot carry 
certain other documents in his billfold, there have to be explanations, an initiation…’ (p. 56). 
This ‘explanatory’ quality that prohibits us from seeing the ‘certain other documents’ is made 
sacred through this word choice of ‘initiation’ and in the narrative description of Wong’s voice 
that accompanies this, ‘His voice came from so far away it seemed to be a prolongation of the 
images, the gloss of a ceremonious scholar’ (p. 56). 
 
If readers move directly onto Chapter 15, they would see Horacio remember a night where he 
was paid to watch a film revolving around an Axis surgeon, with the initial line ‘it was so 
natural for him to remember then that night’ (p. 57). ‘Then’ seems to refer to the end of Chapter 
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14, so the interruption here occurs at a specific temporal moment. As with Chapter 14, the 
torture on screen is aesthetically judged – ‘the photography was excellent’ (p. 57). Horacio’s 
response to this film explores both his own identification and empathy with the victims depicted 
but also his simultaneous over-aestheticisation of this process: 
 
He had had time to imagine the scene and put himself as always on the side of the 
victim. There was no reason to waste words on the hanging of whoever-he-was, but if 
that somebody had known (and the refinement could have been precisely in telling him 
so) that a camera was going to record every moment of his grimaces and twistings for 
the pleasure of future dilettantes… (p. 57) 
 
Horacio goes on to exclaim ‘What poor tools we have to find a way out of this dungeon’ (p. 57), 
claiming that their philosophical searching throughout the novel has given them the capability to 
lambast non-philosophers for feeling pity over a single known individual when thousands of 
abstract unknown individuals are dying elsewhere. Horacio says that ‘what it really comes down 
to is a case of eyes that can’t see’ (p. 58). 
 
In this more direct reading route from Chapter 14 to 15, after raising numerous concerns relating 
to identification and the depiction of torture and rape, these issues recur in the present with 
Horacio’s lover La Maga. Another man, Gregorovius, asks if he can know about La Maga’s past 
so that she’ll no longer be ‘all front, no substance’ (p. 60); this suggestion of a lack of depth in 
La Maga’s character is reminiscent of both The Unfortunates’ and Pale Fire’s interrogation of 
the external versus internal markers of characterisation. In response to Gregorovius, La Maga 
claims that this suggestion that she lacks depth is nonsense. She reveals that she was spanked by 
her father, sexualized through juxtaposition with a hint that another resident of her building was 
masturbating to this action, a man who went on to rape her (pp. 60-62). The description of the 
rape itself is highly charged, stressing the ‘Negro smell’ of the rapist and talking about the man 
as if he were an animal (p. 61). This description immediately raises an ethical issue, even for 
any time period where such language might be considered acceptable; if the reader does not 
know what a ‘Negro smell’ is, or rejects the notion of a characteristic ‘Negro smell’ as having a 
real referent that might be found in real life and therefore an offensive comment, the reader still 
needs to infer what the character identified means by this remark to make sense of it, such that 
the reader becomes complicit in the statement. The utterance is performative, it brings into 
existence such a smell, and in order to conceive of it, the reader must extrapolate from real-life 
in guesswork. Here, readers are complicit with the text in summoning their own real life values 
and experience to make sense of the novel, temporarily bringing themselves in line with the 






La Maga then notices Horacio looking at her in a strange way: 
 
‘Why are you looking at me like that, Horacio? I’m telling how the Negro in the 
tenement raped me, Gregorovius did so want to know how I lived in Uruguay.’ 
‘Don’t spare us any details,’ said Oliveria. 
‘Oh, a general idea is enough,’ said Gregorovius. 
‘There’s no such thing as a general idea,’ Oliveira said. (p. 62) 
 
With this statement, chapter 15 ends. 
 
Now, if readers do not go directly from Chapter 14 to 15, they would encounter two additional 
chapters, 114 and 117. Chapter 114 features little snippet extracts from an Associated Press 
Report from May 4th, 195- (the last digit of the date is left blank) (p. 477). In this report a man 
called Lou Vincent is executed by gas chamber and is observed by ‘53 witnesses watch[ing] 
through small windows’ (p. 477). The dispassionate news style does not make a judgement 
upon their viewing, nor does it aestheticize the death beyond recounting its various stages and 
how long they lasted, contrasting greatly with Chapter 14’s heavy aestheticisation of almost 
mystical death and pain. Chapter 117 then features a quotation from Clarence Darrow’s Defence 
of Leopold and Loeb, a famous American court case (1924) where Darrow defended two boys 
who pleaded guilty to murder with their reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy used as a defence, 
that the philosopher taught them to do it (p. 481). The quotation in Chapter 117 does not provide 
this specific context (something which would rely upon extra-textual knowledge, as certain 
possibilities in Pale Fire do), but does explore issues of responsibility and ethics pertinent to 
that case, the issue of whether someone in a given place and time knew the difference between 
right and wrong. 
 
Readers infer how they are supposed to relate these passages to the chapters around them, but 
due to the difficulty and oblique nature of these passages this inference is more stretched and 
open to idiosyncrasy of interpretation. Readers have no authoritative statements explicitly 
relating Leopold and Loeb to the torture discussed by Wong’s passage; we must guess as to 
their relation. The attempt by readers to infer what the novel is asking them to do here therefore 
forces readers to engage in the text’s procedures with a greater degree of difficulty and effort 
than they might elsewhere. However as readers still infer purpose behind these extra passages – 
that the inferred authority has given the reader ‘more’ of the novel in between the chapters of 
the shorter text – it is little wonder that many readers assume the longer text is superior, due to 
their need to understand the text and their veneration of the inferred authority as source of 
meaning. To refuse to read the inferred authority’s whole text would be to reject that authority’s 
power, to fail to piece together all the ‘parts’ we infer we are being asked to read and put 




not act like we really ‘knew’ the characters fully due to not having encountered all pertinent 
details. 
 
A hypothetical reader might judge, for example, that the addition of Chapters 114 and 117 
between Chapters 14 and 15 provides two additional, non-aestheticized accounts of murder but 
which hint at the idea of such violence as a spectacle, potentially indicating how ingrained the 
apparently outrageous nature of Wong’s appreciation of torture is in Chapters 14 and 15. In 
addition, the critique of philosophy as a potentially corrupting influence in Chapter 117 
provides additional preparatory context for Chapter 15’s attack on philosophers who cannot 
understand pity for an individual at the expense of abstract thousands (p. 58). Furthermore, the 
addition of two other accounts of violence builds a cumulative catalogue of violent actions 
leading into La Maga’s account of rape in Chapter 15, inviting the reader to juxtapose 
Gregorovius and Horacio’s responses to that account with the critique of those who observe 
violence in those preceding stories in a variety of cultures. 
 
Likewise, it is possible for readers to go to the interim Chapter 120 after reading Chapter 15’s 
account of both Horacio’s response to a torture film and La Maga’s rape. If readers choose this 
path, they would encounter a very dark story about a boy called Ireneo who gets a grub, leaves it 
for ants, and watches them torture the grub; the boy plans events so that it would be difficult for 
the grub to escape a hole that is not big enough for it, and further imagines himself as the grub in 
an act of mental self-torture (pp. 119-20). This echoes Horacio’s attempt to imagine himself the 
victim earlier in the previous chapter, extremely problematically here as this Ireneo is the very 
same individual who will later in life go on to rape La Maga. Repeatedly throughout the novel 
Horacio mistreats La Maga and sexually humiliates her, the narrative describing him as a priest 
and her as a supplicant to be ritually abused both in the dynamics of their relationship and in 
sexual matters (p. 29). Reading this note here, particularly in the context of previous notes that 
appear to make torture in some sense ‘sacred’, heightens the link between Ireneo and Horacio. 
Reading this passage before Chapter 16 will also link Gregorovius to this rapist figure, by the 
way Ireneo extends the grub’s suffering. 
 
Chapter 16 begins with La Maga stating in reference to her rapist that ‘When he left my room it 
was almost dawn and I didn’t even know how to cry any more’ (p. 63). As opposed to what the 
reader might expect in terms of a sympathetic response from her friends and those who listen, 
only a very few characters present respond in such a way; the majority of onlookers just 





The only funny thing, as always, is the diabolical separation of form and content. 
Everything you’ve said is exactly the same as what happens between lovers, except the 
slight resistance and the probably stronger aggression. (p. 63)  
 
Gregorovius responds that the rape is ‘not a subject for jokes’ only for Horacio to retort ‘You 
were the one who dragged it out, friend’ (p. 63). La Maga herself latches on to this judgement of 
Gregorovius as the figure who most wanted to know the narrative facts of La Maga’s rape, 
repeating ‘He dragged it out […] Now he’ll start saying how he didn’t enjoy it’ (p.63). There is 
a sense of schadenfreude in wanting to know more about La Maga’s character, about this rape, 
linked by the story to the act of rape itself, of placing yourself in the part of victim, of in some 
sense enjoying the depiction of pain. Moreover, both Horacio and La Maga evoke the figure of 
the reader who might decide to read the ‘longer’ narrative in their condemnation of Gregorovius 
as ‘dragg[ing] it out’. 
 
Cortázar’s binary opposition of the female/male passive/active reader – foregrounded here for 
its association with the most infamous example of such an opposition in gender difference – is 
itself false, not just for reasons of gender equality but due to the instability of ‘activity’ and 
control as categories in narrative (discussed in greater depth in Chapter Two of this thesis). 
Readers of the longer text are no more in control of the text’s construction than they would be in 
the shorter text; they just have more content to juxtapose and alter their identifications, different 
information to inflect their readings, not more. And due to the path taken, they are immediately 
aligned with Horacio himself, a figure so identified with the ‘active’ reader that Cortázar 
himself claimed he identified with the character,95 that Horacio almost possesses partial inferred 
authority status in that readers are likely to infer his quest to be aligned with that of the text as a 
whole. Gregorovius is the kind of reader to be disgusted with, the kind who prizes narratives 
and plots at the expense of the transcendent. This disgust can easily be self-reflected back upon 
completionist readers for their wish to get full meaning from a text however difficult, which is 
different from Gregorovius ‘dragg[ing] it out’ only by the matter of its extent and our apparent 
diegetic place outside of the narrative. By drawing that kind of reader into this self-awareness, 
the ‘clean conscience’ of such readers is indeed blotted; they are not superior to readers of the 
shorter text who may lack self-awareness of what they are doing to a greater extent but might 
still exercise restraint in restricting themselves to the ‘straightforward’ narrative and defying any 
inference that the ‘longer’ text is better. The way the reader feels about what he or she is doing – 
his or her sense of responsibility – will become crucial in subsequent chapters and so such 
reader self-awareness is important for our understanding of the ethics of identification going 
forward. Moreover, the instability of the ‘passive’ versus active reader distinction here has 
                                                          




broad implications not only for novels but, perhaps surprisingly, control-based video games, a 
subject explored in the next chapter. 
 
Although the ‘real’ Cortázar apologised for his attribution of ‘female’ to the passive reader and 
claimed it was just an adoption of terminology received from elsewhere,96 the inferred authority 
implied by this text seems to frame La Maga as representing that ‘female’ side of the binary in 
the narrative of Hopscotch. In responding to La Maga as we do, in trying to learn more about 
her character, we are fulfilling the function of reading itself and cannot be said to be engaging in 
an actual crime against a real human being, against real suffering. La Maga is not a real specific 
woman ‘affected’ by her depiction due to the fact that La Maga exists only as a synthetic 
depiction. However, the aesthetic implications of the reader’s search to ‘discover’ La Maga’s 
history and interiority can be said to make explicit the problems inherent in certain kinds of 
reading practices; the reader’s attempt to extract all relevant information, feel a variety of 
emotions, and to implicitly accept the text’s typifying of various groups with phrases such as 
‘female reader’ and ‘Negro smell’ cannot help but have implications for the ethics of reader 
construction of character. 
 
For example, in Gayatri Spivak’s analysis of another rape victim, the fictional character Lucy 
from J.M Coatzee’s Disgrace (1999), she begins one of her claims in the following manner: 
 
‘Insofar as Lucy is a figure that makes visible the rational kernel of the institution of 
marriage — rape, social security, property, human-continuity’…97 
 
Spivak makes explicit the extent to which her claim will work ‘insofar’ as a fictional character 
can be considered to have ethical importance and relation to the real world as if they were a real 
human being. The nature of this ‘insofar’ — this limited extent of a character’s ability to be 
interpreted as real and relevant to the real world — is not examined by Spivak, and this is a 
limitation in much of her discussion of identification and the wider attempt by theorists to 
consider response to interpersonal alterity through the use of fictional examples. For example, 
Spivak warns against the colonizing powers of identification and argues that we should 
apprehend the Other as Other without judgement or invasion, rather than attempting to locate 
ourselves within him or her. In this argument, Spivak reverses the liberal humanist assumption 
that entering into another’s self might be ethically valuable and that same appreciation of 
otherness that characterized much of reader response and reception theory’s ethical turn. 
However, the warning may prove undesirable, as Bart Moore-Gilbert writes: 
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An insistence on the irreducible alterity and muteness of the subaltern, one might argue, 
paralyzes not just the subaltern, but the would-be ally of the subaltern – who is left in 
the double-bind of being required to show solidarity without in any way “selfing” that 
Other or “assimilating” her to the degree that solidarity perhaps inevitably demands […] 
if its account of subaltern alterity and muteness were true, then there would be nothing 
but the West (and the native elite, perhaps) to write about.98  
 
If we consider that Spivak applies such ethics to our response to fictional characters in her 
theories as well as real individuals, as in the aforementioned example of Lucy from Disgrace, 
the situation becomes even stranger. When authors construct characters and readers infer those 
characters’ attributes, we simultaneously use ‘real’ individuals as frames of reference (and 
therefore these individuals can be analysed in subaltern studies and such ethics can be applied to 
either the writer or the reader’s act) but they are simultaneously not real individuals, and 
therefore there is no real individual’s ‘Otherness’ being invaded. We are identifying something 
that mimics real-life Others, but is fundamentally not a ‘real’ person insomuch as it is just a 
character.  
 
The distinction between the mimetic and synthetic aspects of character is important to maintain 
theoretically even if it does not in fact occur purely in any real identification, and we cannot 
therefore evade the synthetic nature of character when discussing the ethics of these processes. 
The character is both person and ‘unperson’, mimetic and synthetic, real and unreal. A character 
is simultaneously treated as a person and not a person at all, these two aspects inseparable by 
definition (for if it is considered purely as if it were not a person or not pertaining to an entity, 
then it would not be a character at all; and if it were considered purely as a person, it would 
supersede the status of a character). Fictional characters are not human (only existing in the 
reader’s mind) and yet are representative of real humans, even insomuch as they reference 
generic traits, emotions, and experiences. So, therefore, is the reader reconstruction of a rape an 
ethical matter, if no rape actually occurred and a description of a fictional iteration of the action 
is just interpreted by the reader? This is the paradox: yes, of course it is ethical (the depiction 
relies upon the act having occurred in the real world), and, at a technical, fastidious, inhuman 
level, it does not seem to be an ethical matter at all (the act did not occur, and words on a page 
are not people). Ironically, this is where Spivak commits a partial version of the same acts of 
colonization and reducing of alterity she warns against – the statement “insofar as Lucy is a 
figure that makes visible the rational kernel of the institution of marriage […]” reduces Lucy in 
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part to the categories she possesses membership of and thereby demonstrates ala Richard Walsh 
that Lucy is just reducible to such values.  
 
However, as I have also argued, reader belief in the unity of characters and the reader’s 
inference as to a text’s authority do matter in the interpretation of fiction. In his chapter I have 
shown how such beliefs and trust in authority emerge from and are shaped by the sequences of 
texts. In the next chapter I will move beyond this to show how such engagement with sequences 
leads to a sense of control, not just for players of video games but also for readers of prose 
novels. In grappling with the process whereby reader emotional investment can bias the 
interpretation of narrative, I will begin to build an alternative theory of identification that more 





CHAPTER TWO: Control in Cormac McCarthy’s The Road and 





In Chapter One, I argued that prose novels invite readers to perpetuate the ethical situations 
found within their narratives; if a character in a novel is misogynist, for example, the novel’s 
readers must perpetuate the character’s misogyny in constructing such details from the novel’s 
sequence if they wish to read the novel. Likewise, in their construction of fictional characters, 
readers are not necessarily just motivated by a wish to understand the text (a priori, a reader 
wants to read) but likely by their emotional and aesthetic engagement. A paedophile such as 
Charles Kinbote from Pale Fire is quite capable of inviting sympathy and reader allegiance not 
just when he presents himself in a dream as seeking amends but in the humour, interest, and 
excitement of his narrated life, regardless of his ethics that might in a real-world sense lead to 
another’s disgust with him. Emotional engagement is a powerful force in driving reader 
construction of character, but with regard to fiction the bias such engagement might produce has 
not been examined in its full implications for the ontological and ethical status of the characters 
produced. Video games provide an ideal point of comparison and contrast with novels here, as 
the player’s emotional engagement in a game can affect decision-making regarding the 
bifurcation of the diegesis into multiple paths; the explicit nature of such engagement thereby 
provides a tangible version of what might be implicit and less obvious processes of 
identification operating in novel reading.99  
 
Narrative video games seem to provide adequate source material for a study of control, with 
their choices, multiple endings, and explicit control of avatars, but as I will argue in this chapter, 
such categories as choice and control are unstable in video games with fascinating implications 
for novels in comparison. Games and novels are not mutually exclusive narrative types with 
radically different affordances as many have claimed, yet neither are they close to being 
identical in the experiences they offer to readers and players. Only once we acknowledge the 
similarities between these mediums, however, will their differences become instructive in a way 
                                                          
99 Texts that require ‘non-trivial’ effort by readers or players have frequently been termed ‘ergodic’, a phrase 
popularised in Espen J. Aarseth, Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1997). This term is frequently applied not only to video games but texts such as The Unfortunates. However, 
the term tells us little about either text type, as shown in Newman’s argument that even video games are not 
ergodic in their totality due to their ‘punctuat[ion]’ by non-gameplay non-interactive sequences, preferring instead 
to view an ‘ergodic continuum’ as existing in video games. This thesis takes the opposite approach to Aarseth and 
asks how so-called ‘non-triviality’ might be a function of all texts to some extent, comparing video games back to 




that will not only benefit video games criticism but also assist with theories of identification. 
Whether video games are narratives at all is often under question in the ‘narratology vs 
ludology’ debate as discussed by this chapter, and even those theories that do attend to 
narratives in games often focus upon abstract gameplay mechanics more than they examine 
narrative elements. This chapter will intervene in these concerns and explore the instability of 
control in video games, comparing two texts that both experiment with their respective 
medium’s affordances for identification and ethical choice and both with a similar post-
apocalyptic setting and parent-child theme: Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006) and the 
Bioshock video game series (2007-13).  
 
 
2. Control and Procedural Rhetoric in Video Games and Prose Novels 
  
Video games represent a tangible form of the synonymy between character and reader so often 
implied by theories of literary identification, immersion, and empathy. The player of a video 
game directly alters some aspect of a character’s life, usually but not always piloting the 
physical movements of a character and likewise sometimes controlling that character’s decision-
making power in deciding what actions he or she performs within the diegesis of the video 
game. This can be seen, for example, in Bioshock (2007) where the player can choose to save or 
murder young girls who hold a potential source of gameplay-beneficial power, or in the role-
playing games created by the company Bioware, which often allow the player a large amount of 
choices regarding the protagonist’s moral actions. There is a spectrum of video games that allow 
players selective control over the fictional characters depicted, but not always in the same ways. 
‘Quick Time Events’ (QTEs), movement options in games where the player impacts slightly 
upon cut-scenes by pressing certain buttons in time to the prompts on screen, are considered by 
many critics to represent little more than film-like texts where you can move a character from 
side to side but otherwise have little impact upon the course of diegetic events; criticism of The 
Order: 1886 (2015) focussed in this regard upon a cinematic, linear quality as a strong negative 
factor in evaluations of the game.100  
 
This approach does not always lead to negative criticism, however, as long as the game play is 
sufficiently developed to offer a mechanical challenge (something many reviewers judged as 
being poor in The Order), as often reviewers will praise the power of video game narratives 
where much emotion is found in non-interactive film-like cut-scenes such as The Last of Us 
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(2013) (which I analyse in Chapter Four).101 This suggests that being able to alter the diegetic 
events of a game is not a requirement for strong feelings of immersion and narrative empathy, 
something evident from responses to novels and films. The extent to which we can control 
diegetic events in a game is mechanically medium-specific, but much video games criticism to 
date has focussed more upon the abstractions these control schemes relate to and indeed games 
that prioritize mechanics rather than considering the implications of choice-making for character 
construction and narrative empathy. Ironically, in an attempt to differentiate video games from 
prior forms, such theories do not fully account for those features of some video games which 
most excite and interest many players, unnecessarily simplifying control schemes of games to 
focus on physical control of avatars and often side-lining other narratively significant 
possibilities.  
 
There are indeed clearly many video games where although it might be possible to discuss 
narrative at the most basic of levels, these games simply do not even have a meaningfully 
enough developed narrative element to be discussed in such a way. Such games either represent 
mechanics (such as Tetris (1984) or Pong (1972))102 or hold a thin layer of narrative to roughly 
contextualize mechanical actions but where this narrative is for the most part irrelevant to the 
experience (many repetitive mobile games such as Candy Crush Saga (2012) would fit within 
this category).103 These games are considered by theorists such as Jesper Juul as ‘abstract’ 
games as opposed to the more narrative-driven games referenced above such as Bioshock where 
narrative contextualisation of events is considered more important to the experience of the 
game.104 
 
There has been a bias in much theorisation of video games towards more abstract elements of 
games at the expense of their narratively significant components. For example, in his book Half-
Real (2005) Juul divides games into a scale ‘between emergence and progression’, the former 
defined as a strategic type of game where the rules lead to emergent behaviour on the part of 
players and the latter defined as a step-by-step game with a predetermined way of playing it.105 
Two commonly used metaphors in video games criticism and reviewing are that of the 
‘sandbox’ game – the emergent game where a world is created for the player to explore and 
create his or her own story, such as many titles in the Grand Theft Auto series or Minecraft 
(2009)106 – and the ‘theme park’ game – the progression game where players are given a guided, 
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curated experience where they follow the steps provided for them to a large extent. However, as 
Joris Dormans writes in his review of Half-Real, Juul appears to evaluate ‘games of pure 
progression [as] poorly designed, finite and ultimately boring […] the contrast between 
emergence and progression is a valid one, but with the poor development of the latter type, such 
games can hardly compete with games of emergence’.107  
 
The problem, however, may be with the games studies field itself in so frequently attempting to 
develop these ‘theories of everything’, accounting for such a large range of experiences and 
genre types that they frequently fail to represent each category under discussion or show clear 
bias for those games that seem most different from the experiences presented by prior media. 
Games criticism often de-emphasises the importance of narrative in narrative-driven games 
when narrative is clearly important in said titles. For example, when Jesper Juul analyses the 
ethical choice-driven Deus Ex (2000)108 his analysis is limited to brief mentions of its abstract 
emergent elements, such as the number of ways proximity mines could be deployed or a stealth 
mission could be completed.109 Such components are important to understanding gameplay, but 
considering much of the rest of Juul’s work de-emphasises narrative, it seems a missed 
opportunity for analysis.The protestations of the ludology versus narratology debate that games 
are frequently inappropriately considered narrative are not without merit; some games do resist 
such analysis. However, it could be argued in return that not every theory of games has to 
address all kinds of game. Some games demand this kind of strong narrative focus in our 
analysis of them, as I would argue Deus Ex does in part; it would be impossible to properly 
understand The Last of Us (2013) or Bioshock (2007) without considering their stories and 
characters as much as their moment-by-moment shooting mechanics. There are limit cases of 
course, such as World of Warcraft (2004), a game that frequently presents characters and pre-
determined narrative situations created by the game's writers; however, in these limit cases the 
moment-by-moment experience for the majority of players may be more concerned with the 
intricacies of multiplayer competition, cooperation, and advancement with this narrative as a 
pleasing contextualising backdrop for play as opposed to a core motivator for player emotion as 
it most likely is in a game such as The Last of Us.  
  
However, the problem is that game studies frequently uses such limit cases as prime examples 
in its attempt to create its universal theories of gaming; titles such as World of Warcraft, aided 
by their mass appeal and pop cultural relevancy, frequently find themselves taking pride of 
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place whenever narrative is mentioned in the works of theorists such as Alexander Gallaway. 
Indeed, Gallaway intends for his work to cover the totality of gaming: 
  
The superimposition of these two orthogonal axes—machine and operator, diegetic and 
nondiegetic—is a deliberate attempt to embrace a broad theory of gamic action. I wish 
to make room here for the entire medium of the video game.110 
  
When diegesis is explored in terms of player-action, Gallaway argues that: 
  
Diegetic operator acts appear as either move acts or expressive acts (two categories that 
are more variations on a theme than mutually exclusive). Simply put, move acts change 
the physical position or orientation of the game environment. [… Expressive acts] are 
actions such as select, pick, get, rotate, unlock, open, talk, examine, use, fire, attack, 
cast, apply, type, emote. Expressive acts can be rather one-dimensional in certain game 
genres (the expressive act of firing in Quake or Unreal, for example), or highly 
complex, as in the case of object selection and combination in strategy or adventure 
games.111 
 
His prime examples of diegetic actions in games involve such acts as moving character position 
in a game world, rotation, or expressive acts such as firing a weapon; for such ‘expressive acts’, 
he does include ‘select’, ‘talk’, and ‘emote’ in his list of possibilities in such a way as might 
correspond to a narratively significant action, but they are found amongst a longer list of 
otherwise physical manual actions. Although Gallaway's model does not exclude the possibility 
of such diegetic actions as choosing to save a friend or doom a romance in his model of player 
choice, these types of texts and game are barely discussed in Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic 
Culture, quite simply because in the attempt to create universal theories of gaming such texts 
would clearly be outliers that would complicate Gallaway's argument in a way that would 
misrepresent the majority of the kind of games he clearly wishes to focus upon. Movement 
gameplay is frequently irrelevant to meaningful narrative, however, and so marrying ‘diegesis’ 
as a term to such gameplay is misleading. For example, consider the comedian Dara Ó Briain’s 
joke about the elite soldier Solid Snake in Metal Gear Solid (1998) crouching around the 
battlefield and repeatedly pausing in combat situations to check menus under Briain's inept 
guidance;112 no reasonable player would then attempt to reconcile the game narrative's depiction 
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of Solid Snake as an elite soldier with insignificant or inept player control, hence the basis of 
Briain’s joke involving the mock question as to what Snake’s superiors must think of these 
questionable ‘erratic at best’ movements around the battlefield. Not everything that occurs 
under player guidance in a game world necessarily has to be associated by players with their co-
created story of 'what happened' in that game's narrative, but equally this does not mean that 
narrative elements of games are somehow completely separate and un-gamelike compared to 
other components. A nuanced middle ground attentive to the specifities of text and sub-genre is 
required to navigate this complex field. 
 
It is therefore important to make clear at the outset of this thesis's discussion of games that there 
is no attempt here to provide a theory of video games that somehow covers all types of game, 
and therefore no attempt to resolve debates of whether we should use ludological or narrative 
frameworks for our analysis of games, quite simply because this thesis only concerns itself with 
narrative-driven games and therefore to avoid a consideration of this element would be absurd 
(in a way it might not be if, say, Mario and Tetris were introduced to the analysis, therefore 
rendering the relevance of narrative to the entire set of all games as obviously less relevant than 
it is if we analyse a certain narrative subset of games in isolation). Moreover, in my comparison 
between games and novels, I am not attempting to repeat the mistakes of past criticism in 
claiming that video games are just like novels or films, bur quite the opposite; I am attempting 
to see whether novels are in some sense like video games, a direction of intent that tries to 
revive a sense of the strangeness and strategy with which we encounter novels rather than 
focussing too much upon the newness of video games. 
 
For example, games have rules and request explicit player input, two affordances we rarely 
associate with novels and other non-game narratives. Juul argues that the answer to the question 
of whether games present narratives is dependent upon the definition given to the word, of 
which Juul suggests several have been used by games theorists.113 For Juul, the importance of 
rules in games partially discounts them from being considered totally narrative, and moreover 
the definitional criterion from prior media of ‘narrative as the presentation of events’ is not 
fulfilled for Juul in video games as ‘games are not just representations of events, they are 
events’.114 In order to account for this notion of games as events, Juul proposes the concept of 
‘half-reality’ as explaining the ontology of video game characters and player actions, writing 
that ‘a statement about a fictional character in a game is half-real, since it may describe both a 
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fictional entity and the actual rules of the game’,115 and describes a hermeneutic circle whereby 
fiction and rule systems in games cue each other into being in the player’s mind:  
 
The way a given object or character behaves will characterize it as a fictional object; 
the rules that the player deducts from the fiction and from the experience of the playing 
of the game will also cue him or her into imagining a fictional world.116  
 
Juul demonstrates that there are various degrees of abstraction in video game control systems – 
for example, kicking a football on screen requires very different action to an embodied version 
of the same experience in real life – and considers simultaneous real world and fictional world 
activity:  
 
In Tomb Raider (Core Design Ltd. 1996), we click the keys on the keyboard, but we are 
also moving Lara Croft. In these examples, the actions that we perform have the duality 
of being real events and being assigned another meaning in a fictional world. 
Additionally, since our actions take place in time, that time shares the duality of being 
both real time and fictional world time.117 
 
This simultaneous presence in the real world and in a fictional world is often called ‘immersion’ 
and ‘presence’, two terms that are shown by Gordon Calleja to have originally emerged from 
hypotheses regarding virtual reality experiences but to have been gradually extended to both 
traditional on-screen video games and even other art forms such as prose novels and films.118  
 
As with Juul’s comments on narrative theory and video games, Calleja believes this use of the 
word ‘immersion’ in relation to novels and films to be an over-application of the term, claiming 
that ‘even if we argue that certain qualities of the medium and text in question afford such an 
experience, the phenomenon remains within the domain of subjective imagination’, and that 
‘the essential quality of [presence] lies within the ability of the system to recognize and react to 
the user’s actions and spatial location’.119 For Calleja, the processes of ‘recognition’ and 
‘reaction’ by the system do not occur when reading novels, and he describes this exclusion 
further in one of the more complete contrasts between video game and novelistic immersion in 
extant criticism: 
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[There is] a distinction between simply imagining one is present in a scene and the 
considerably different phenomenon of having one’s specific location and presence 
within a virtual world acknowledged by the system itself. In an imagined scene, 
whatever happens is simply willed by the imaginer, who usually knows that she is 
directing the composition and events of the scene. In the case of a game, we can think 
of the player as being anchored, via her avatar, in the game world, allowing the game’s 
environment and entities to react to her. This aspect of games fundamentally alters how 
the player perceives herself within the world, and is not present in literature, films, or 
personal imagining. When we identify with a character in a movie or book, or imagine 
we are in the same room as the protagonist, we have no way of altering the course of 
events, no way of exerting agency. Likewise, the environments and characters 
represented in these media have no way of reacting to our presence, no matter how 
strongly we identify with them.120 
 
Much of his argument in the above extract relates primarily to what Calleja terms elsewhere in 
his book ‘kinesthetic involvement’, the ability for one’s anchored avatar to tangibly interact 
with objects in the game world or physically navigate throughout defined spaces – whether 
being in ‘the same room’, a ‘specific location’, physically ‘anchored’, or having actual 
‘presence’ in the on-screen environment.121 The majority of video games do indeed feature such 
movement, from simple abstract games such as the Super Mario series where Mario can 
traverse a two-dimensional environment or Mirror’s Edge (2008) where the player can engage 
in first-person parkour across rooftops.122 Calleja’s central theory of ‘incorporation’ (a term 
Calleja believes to be more accurate than ‘immersion’) is likewise built upon a heavily 
kinesthetic basis, and Calleja defines incorporation as ‘the absorption of a virtual environment 
into consciousness, yielding a sense of habitation, which is supported by the systemically 
upheld embodiment of the player in a single location, as represented by the avatar’. Moreover, 
Calleja argues that ‘two particular dimensions – spatial and kinesthetic – form the cornerstone 
of the incorporation experience’.123 In many ways, Calleja’s attention to simultaneous presence 
in the worlds outside and within the game repeats Juul’s notion of ‘half-reality’, but with a 
greater focus upon kinesthetic involvement and physical presence.  
 
Although Calleja suggests a binary distinction between novels and games, many video game 
examples problematize Calleja’s ideas, particularly with regard to his focus on movement and 
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kinesthetic control. For example, some games might involve text-based decisions, such as early 
text-based adventures like ZORK (1977) or elements of modern role playing games where 
decisions must be selected from text-based narrative, such as The Banner Saga (2014).124 An 
argument could be made that text-based games still rely upon a degree of kinesthetic 
involvement – the textual descriptions of environments in games cue the reader to spatially 
locate what is happening in terms of movement and space in a given scene, and in later games 
such as The Banner Saga other visual elements, such as trees and grassland around the text 
window, further assist in the player’s imaginative efforts. These text-based game narratives do 
not represent Calleja’s tangible ‘anchoring’, however, and so it could be argued that this is not 
true incorporation as defined by Calleja, just as he argues that prose novels do not represent true 
immersion.125  
 
However, it can be argued that here is no such thing as a stable instance of what Calleja terms 
incorporation. There is a spectrum of involvement and control between games which have direct 
control of avatars and games which represent that movement via text prompts or even button 
prompts. There are multiple examples of games that varyingly require different types of control, 
such as the aforementioned game The Banner Saga where at various points players control the 
movement of their characters on a chess-type board and also many role-playing games such as 
Dragon Age: Inquisition (2014), which varies between direct control of the avatar during 
exploration and combat, but with control of a text-based menu overlaid upon this character 
when engaging in dialogue.126 Dragon Age: Inquisition moreover offers the player a choice 
between multiple methods of character control even in movement-based kinesthetic sections, 
allowing switching between direct control (moving the WASD keys on a keyboard or a 
controller’s analogue stick will move a character accordingly) and a tactical camera where 
characters can be ordered to go to various locations clicked upon but where the game fulfils this 
movement for the player.  
 
Models of video game analysis often unnecessarily simplify the complexity of control models 
and immersive control of video game avatars upon abstract models that do not truly represent 
the actual systems of a given game, particularly as developing technology and programmer skill 
in the medium present possibilities as yet untheorized in their full implications. Many of these 
games analysis models do not consider recent developments in player input, such as Nintendo’s 
Wii remote which allows the player to move a controller in real space to perform actions on 
screen (so swinging it like a golf club would cause a golf club on screen to similarly move), 
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Microsoft’s Kinect camera sensor which aims to provide similar immersion in a game but using 
a player’s entire body and hands to perform actions in the on-screen environment, and Sony’s 
PlayStation Move which provides a combination of both a Wii-style remote and a Kinect-style 
camera to track more accurately. All of these devices allow physical kinesthetic incorporation in 
a way that traditional controllers can merely abstractly represent. It is highly interesting that 
very few violent games exist for these devices, often involving cartoon or non-bloody versions 
of fighting, perhaps due to the ethical implications for the similarity of performing a physical 
action with an intent to harm in an actual embodied sense with that which might harm a real 
living individual.  
 
Beyond these motion controllers, as of their September 2015 incarnations virtual reality devices 
such as the Oculus Rift, Samsung Gear VR, HTC Vive, and Sony’s PlayStation VR all allow the 
player an even greater sense of incorporation, with accurate head-tracking and positional-
tracking meaning that if the player turns his or her head in real life, the display they see before 
their eyes will alter, and so, combined with cinema-style 3D depth, the player’s mind is tricked 
into a sense of actual inhabitation of the environment depicted, as almost all accounts of VR 
devices attest. However, even here, abstraction and complexity in kinesthetic incorporation 
complicates matters. The Oculus Rift, for example, allows positional-tracking, meaning that if 
the player bends forwards or away from the computer to which the device is tethered, then they 
will move closer or further away from the object in real space; Samsung’s Gear VR headset 
does not allow this affordance. HTC Vive’s VR system involves the use of a ‘lighthouse’ laser-
emitting base station somewhere within the area where the player is using the headset. This 
‘lighthouse’ device tracks players as they walk around any small environment with two 
PlayStation Move-style controllers to actually touch and interact with objects in the VR 
environment, allowing a very different style of incorporation to the Oculus Rift’s seated 
experience. As this technology is in its infancy in 2015, even more products are being 
developed, such as treadmills, rotating chairs, eye tracking, and more, all of which promise to 
introduce even more methods to enhance the VR experience but which each still involve a 
degree of complication and sacrifices to achieve their particular aim and which may therefore 
render their expensive promises moribund. Even if we argue that VR represents an extreme end 
of a spectrum of immersion, with prose novels on the other end of this spectrum, it is not clear 
that this spectrum could be plotted on a single line. Each medium only partially creates a sense 
of actual presence, and even within each medium there are varying degrees of presence invited 
by texts such as the examples above of multiple control schemes in Dragon Age: Inquisition and 
Banner Saga, switching between different ways of interaction for various kinesthetic effects. 




the whole medium, and not a straightforward and linear spectrum from control to a lack of 
control. 
 
Both Juul and Calleja insist that there is a radical difference between prose novels and video 
games on the basis that video games allow actual performance of action and that video games 
provide recognition of player input and presence in a rule-based system. Not only are these 
systems more complicated that their definitions in these theorists’ work might suggest as I have 
demonstrated, but prose novels can in fact share some of the elements we might more normally 
associate with video games, even if these elements work in medium-specific ways. Games are 
not actually altered by choices; the software generates games states that may alter during a play 
through but the base game is not usually rewritten or changed forever in a material sense by a 
player’s actions, always re-startable or available for a new player. In many senses, this is a 
tangible metaphor for how readers mentally generate characters and interpretations from 
sequences in material texts, emerging from the device but temporary and distinct from the 
original. In this manner, a form of kinesthetic incorporation and an acknowledgement of the 
player’s presence within the diegesis of a text occurs in relation to every single text analysed in 
Chapter One of this thesis. Interpretation, character construction, narrative empathy, and even 
various diegetic facts for individual readers are determined in each text by the sequence in 
which sections are read; by opening the box in The Unfortunates and Composition No 1, or by 
opening the covers in Hopscotch and Pale Fire, the reader’s physical presence in relation to the 
artefact is made more explicit than it might be if a reader were just turning pages in a bound 
codex or clicking the ‘next page’ input on a Kindle e-book reader. More than this, the reader’s 
physical actions actually have an effect upon the presentation of a story in a way sanctioned and 
made necessary by the system. In Hopscotch, the reader is presented with two paths which 
further make explicit the role of page-turning as a kinesthetic ‘playing’ with a text, with rules 
and an ethical outcome, whilst as Simon Rowberry’s map of all the links between sections in 
Pale Fire demonstrates, an extensive amount of page turning and reader movement around the 
pages of the text is invited by Pale Fire.127 
 
All of these choices may not involve directly acting as a specific character in the diegetic world 
of the story, but neither do the decisions in many of the above games. In many games, the player 
can choose which areas to visit first and this sequence may affect various diegetic elements. An 
example of such a situation can be found in the Mass Effect (2007-12) series of games where the 
character of Legion is added to the player’s team of selectable companions late in the 
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overarching narrative.128 If the player has purposefully delayed certain events in the game that 
were made available much earlier on, Legion will have narratively significant interactions with 
the characters of those earlier events played out of the usual sequence, such as boarding a ship 
composed of his racial enemies who will wish to either experiment upon or kill him. The 
player’s choice to follow a certain sequence can certainly be considered part of the medium-
specific video game experience here, but this is functionally little different to choosing a 
particular route through Hopscotch, encountering sequences differently in Composition No 1, or 
following various lines of narrative through Pale Fire. It is not enough to differentiate games 
entirely from novels by saying any reactivity or acknowledgement that readers might feel by the 
system is entirely imaginary (as critics have done so). Readers have to infer meaning from prose 
novels by stringing together impressions and details from throughout a text as prose narratives 
would be meaningless without this way of reading. Therefore it makes little sense to say that 
reader inferences as to sequence are ‘imaginary’; if such inferences are imaginary, then so is 
every aspect of the interpretation and emotional staging of prose novels.  
 
There is another manner in which some prose novels invite an indisputable sense of physical 
presence on the part of readers. Pale Fire also exists as a ‘found document’, a novel with a 
preface, poem, commentary, and index by two fictional authors which assumes the reader 
likewise exists in this same diegetic world as if he or she has purchased a book composed by 
this ‘real’ commentator Kinbote. The reader is referenced by Kinbote throughout his narrative, 
as Chapter One demonstrated, and even in the metafictional destruction of the reader’s 
assurances as to Kinbote’s reliability, the reader’s action in the ‘miracle’ of reconstructing 
fictional characters from the book is foregrounded. The system acknowledges and foregrounds 
the reader’s presence in the real-world in an incorporated sense, and in this way Pale Fire could 
be seen to be comparable to Christine Love’s game Digital: A Love Story (2010),129 which 
features a fictional but mimetically accurate MS-DOS style environment with the player 
diegetically interacting with a computer just as they play the game on a computer in real life, or 
Simon Barlow’s Her Story (2015),130 a game depicting a searchable police computer featuring 
interviews with a woman whose husband has disappeared.  
 
Although in none of these novels do readers physically control characters, their physical activity 
in reading the novels acts as part of the system through sequence, suggesting that Calleja’s 
exclusion of novels from incorporation may be justifiable but that the distinction is not entirely 
stable. Moreover, as this chapter’s analysis of control schemes and virtual reality has 
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demonstrated thus far, every single instance of video game immersion and incorporation that 
exists involves some level of metaphor for presence, even if virtual reality does invite a sense of 
presence better than many other mediums. Prior theory has focussed more upon abstract 
emergent mechanics in video games than the implications of such systems and control schemes 
for player construction of the fictional characters they control, attempting to fight a battle that 
overly simplifies binary oppositions between narrative and gameplay in a way that reverses 
post-structuralist attentions to fuzzy sets and blurred definitions. Video games are capable of a 
great many experiences, many which are likely not yet created, and to therefore defensively 
insist upon the radical difference between video games and prose novels is pre-emptive and 
does not even account for limit cases such as The Unfortunates, Composition No 1, Hopscotch, 
and Pale Fire which implement some systems quite similar to various elements we might 
consider integral to video games. Prose novels such as these even have a rule-based element to 
them, and although it is a medium-specific kind of rule system quite different in kind to the very 
tangible rule systems of video games, it is worth noting that players are not usually aware of all 
rules in video games. Emergent combinations of rules in video games suggest that such systems 
are highly complex and partially idiosyncratic in how an individual player interprets and works 
with them, involving an imaginative basis that could be compared to the imagined ‘inferred 
authority’ of correct and incorrect interpretation a reader might engage in within a novel reading 
experience.  
 
A key analogue to this argument can be found in Ian Bogost’s concept of procedural rhetoric in 
video games studies, which serves to demonstrate a crucial narrative affordance of the video 
games medium.131 Procedural rhetoric accounts for the way in which rule systems of various 
games encourage certain kinds of behaviour from players in order to succeed, therefore inviting 
players to run through the steps of a rhetorical argument through the actions of a game and 
understand how systems work, making arguments about a range of processes including moral 
and political claims.132 Conversely, as mentioned last chapter, Slavoj Žižek considers the way in 
which video games might not necessary represent a positive social force but might reveal an 
arena to explore ethics precisely due to the combination of explicit action with a lack of real-life 
consequences: 
 
Consider the interactive computer games some of us play compulsively, games which 
enable a neurotic weakling to adopt the screen persona of a macho aggressor, beating up 
other men and violently enjoying women. It’s all too easy to assume that this weakling 
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takes refuge in cyberspace in order to escape from a dull, impotent reality. But perhaps 
the games are more telling than that. What if, in playing them, I articulate the perverse 
core of my personality which, because of ethico-social constraints, I am not able to act 
out in real life? Isn’t my virtual persona in a way ‘more real than reality’? Isn’t it 
precisely because I am aware that this is ‘just a game’ that in it I can do what I would 
never be able to in the real world? 
 
Chapter One briefly explored the above quotation in relation to analogous cases of prose-based 
fictional characters and reader complicity in their construction, revealing the kind of person the 
reader might be. In the context of video games analysis, however, it is necessary to re-examine 
Žižek’s remarks here. Although his central principle may or may not be correct – the idea that 
we might act out behaviour in games that we cannot in real-life, revealing ‘the perverse core’ of 
a personality – his hypothetical video gamer is a media-induced stereotype, drifting from ‘some 
of us’ to ‘neurotic weakling’ with a ‘dull, impotent reality’ and composed of a ‘perverse core’ 
which we are told twice in a row will not be ‘able’ to do things in a ‘real’ sense. This reduces 
those who play video games – a 1.2 billion-strong membership engaged in a $10.5 billion dollar 
industry and composed of a 40% female player base with an average age of 34 years133 – to a 
very grotesque and pallid stereotype of a sexually emasculated male. Whilst there are doubtless 
many players who may fit this model, it is important to note that Žižek’s argument is 
unnecessarily weakened by such a narrow image of those who it might apply to. If a sixth of the 
world’s population both male and female might be articulating fantasies and the ‘core’ of their 
personalities in the most financially successful medium of fictional entertainment currently 
available, this has far more fascinating implications for how people construct and engage with 
fictional characters in different ways than if an entire medium were merely some misogynist 
sexual power fantasy as Žižek suggests.  
 
However, this being said, many video games do have problems with misogyny both in diegetic 
depiction and in player response, as Anita Sarkeesian’s Tropes vs. Women in Video Games 
(2013-15) documentary series has demonstrated both in its own claims and in the widespread 
vitriol, hate mail, and death-threats Sarkeesian received from a small but highly active group of 
individuals calling themselves the ‘Gamergate’ movement.134 Moreover, to answer the second 
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contention by Žižek that games often involve ‘the screen persona of a macho aggressor, beating 
up other men and violently enjoying women’, if there is little evidence that series such as Grand 
Theft Auto or Call of Duty might cause murders – if this were the case, the millions of people 
who have played these games would form a global menace. Conversely, however, the 
ubiquitous nature of the trope of a ‘man with a gun’ and the popularity of violence in games in 
general is perhaps troubling when compared with other mediums.  
 
In video game criticism, the player’s decision to kill individuals in a game is an often 
overlooked problem due on the one hand to the histrionics of journalists and lawyers such as 
Jack Thompson who believe several games to be ‘killing simulators’,135 and on the other hand 
due perhaps to fear of censorship if such elements were given direct attention and ethical 
analysis. Killing a character in a video game is, in a sense, not the same as killing someone in 
real life not only due to the ontological distinction between a fictional piece of programming 
code and a real life human being, but also due to the character’s irreplaceability. The human 
being in real life cannot be resurrected, whereas most video games can be reset or replayed with 
that character alive again. In a consequentialist sense, a murder has been committed – even if 
fictional or deemed a ‘deletion’ or act of point scoring and therefore largely unlike a murder of a 
real human, to stretch the term ‘murder’ to its limits an individual has still been erased. 
Likewise, although no decision is apparently involved on the part of a reader, if a character in a 
prose novel dies, the page can just be turned back again and that character will once more live. 
However, there is more at stake in these concepts than mere mechanical replayability; these 
processes also have implications regarding the type of character that is killed. The killing of an 
individual that is fully characterized and personalized by the player, present throughout cut-
scenes, or even perhaps directly controlled throughout a game might carry far greater narrative 
significance within a single play-through of a video game than the killing of a randomly 
generated individual in a given game might. This is the kind of enemy character without a 
personalised history that is spawned by a game to provide a momentary challenge but whose 
absence will soon be filled by another enemy, having no real narrative significance beyond such 
challenge.  
 
As with my analysis in Chapter One of Wendy in The Unfortunates, some characters are 
perceived to have less reality than others; some conform to patterns in a repertoire of 
stereotypes available to a given fictional world, readily replaced by alternate versions of women 
or zombies or militiamen depending upon the narrative’s antagonistic forces, whether a video 
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game or otherwise. Why cry over the death of an unknown soldier in Julius Caesar (c.1599) 
when Brutus’s fall is in contention for narrative significance?136 Would we rather Tony Soprano 
die in The Sopranos (1999-2007) or a random mobster without a great deal of 
characterisation?137 Why spare a moment’s thought for an enemy bemoaning his madness in 
Bioshock when, after his death at the player’s hands, moments later a similar enemy with an 
identical voice actor and characterisation will spawn? None of these alternate characters are 
likely to be important for readers, players, or audiences because such characters are void of 
narrative detail or emotional significance. It is not impossible for emotion to emerge from brief 
characterisation, but there is often a correlation between the depth of knowledge it might be 
possible to hold about a character and a sense of that character’s ‘reality’ and emotional 
potential. The next section of this chapter will apply concerns relating to control, emotional 
engagement, and the ethics of acts of murder so ubiquitous in video games to an acclaimed 
novel first of all instead of a game in order to provide an initial point of comparison in an 




3. Inferred Authority and Allegiance in Cormac McCarthy’s The Road 
 
Can Cormac McCarthy’s The Road save the world? Suzanne Keen’s arguments regarding the 
failed empathy-altruism hypothesis might suggest that the answer to this question should be 
‘no’. Indeed, the many nations where this novel became a critically acclaimed bestseller, 
spawning a genre of descendants in film and video games, have not altered their policies 
regarding the environment since the novel’s publication. Likewise, public ethics have not 
radically changed, suggesting that the historical record might once more show a lack of 
evidence for a novel producing altruistic effects. 
 
However, initial response to the novel was quite optimistic about the novel’s altruistic potential. 
This question of whether The Road could save the world was posed and answered in the 
affirmative by George Monbiot in The Guardian just over a year after the novel’s publication. 
Monbiot claimed that The Road ‘could be the most important environmental book ever’ and that 
the novel might ‘have far more influence in the next 30 years than any number of statistics and 
front line reports’.138 The ‘oppressive, horrifying and poetic’ potential of the text was seen to be 
capable of exercising a superior didactic effect upon its readers than statements of fact, an effect 
                                                          
136 William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, ed. by David Daniell (London: Arden, 2006). 
137 The Sopranos, created by David Chase (HBO, 1999-2007). 
138 George Monbiot and others, ’50 People Who Could Save the Planet’, The Guardian, 5 January 2008 




linked to the success of McCarthy’s characterisation of the protagonists. The novel relates the 
journey of a father and son in a post-apocalyptic scenario where they encounter various sets of 
characters along the road who will usually attempt to attack, capture, or eat the protagonists. 
The majority of reviews and criticism on the novel view the father and son’s ethics as 
representative of what seems to be the old world (seeming recognisable and relevant to many 
readers) and their antagonists’ ethics as representative of the post-apocalyptic (seeming alien 
and cruel to many readers). The reader’s potential ethical allegiance with the protagonists is 
taken to hyperbolic levels throughout many of these responses -- Clive Sinclair, for example, 
claims that ’some deep sympathy’ makes the father and son ‘human and knowable to us, causes 
us to care almost beyond bearing about their fates, and so makes us read on compulsively for 
fear of what might happen to them. And us’.139 
 
The text of The Road is seen by these reviewers as having an imperative power that political 
propagandists might only dream of. Again, perhaps these reviewers were hasty in their 
judgement, as we might determine from the world’s lack of serious action on climate change in 
the years since the novel’s publication. Yet the case is notable for its positivity about how 
readers might respond to the novel’s characters and the potential ethical benefits of this 
‘compulsive’ relationship, a situation which is often viewed more negatively; as I discussed in 
the introduction to this thesis, there has been a fear echoed across hundreds of years of literary 
criticism that certain fictional forms invite an excess of identification, that readers might blur 
the boundaries between their own selves and the characters they read about and mimic their 
actions in reality. Renaissance theatre, the novel, the comic book, the video game – 
contemporary reception of each form feared this response, to the extent that a film’s audiences 
were claimed to be at risk of ‘psychic infection’ from the characters on-screen. But why do 
readers, critics, and literary theorists persist in making arguments on either side of this debate? 
Camus posited that a ‘tradition of humiliated thought’ recurs with religious and other attempts 
to overcome death’s finality; so too is the power of narrative empathy proclaimed endlessly in 
spite of a lack of evidence throughout the literary world, with The Road perhaps this argument’s 
most recent peak. This chapter’s analysis of The Road will treat reader sentiments as to the 
novel’s power as indicative of potential devices within the text which may generate such 
feelings in some readers – that the novel has an almost utopian power -- regardless of whether 
this feeling is really ‘correct’ in a real world sense.  
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As I have demonstrated, control is not consistently offered in all games or even sometimes 
within the same game, with the game’s programming shifting what can be controlled and when. 
In light of these arguments, what is there to be learned from the instability of such control in 
games if in novels there appears to be no such control? Instead, in novels there might seem to be 
something like a procedural rhetoric of fatal inevitability where no matter what the reader wants 
to happen such wishes will not come to pass for no control is possible; in such a formulation, 
readers are slaves to the ‘fear of what might happen to them. And us’ raised by Sinclair. I would 
argue that as with debates over the ethical powers of literature, these questions seek dramatic 
answers and do not consider alternative, even semi-obvious possibilities for a subtle dialogue 
between novels and video games. What if novels are sometimes sequenced by their authors in 
such ways as to vicariously play with the extent to which a reader’s wishes come to pass? 
Indeed, can texts manipulate their readers so that readers are likely to feel what a text wants 
them to feel, whether such texts are games or novels? The idea of a sequence manipulating 
emotion and desire is nothing new, whether in Aristotle’s Poetics (c.335BC) or modern 
advertising;140 the distinction between games and novels lies within what these sequences 
manipulate their readers and players to do, and even then it is a matter of medium affordances 
rather than radically different experiences.  
 
In games, players control avatars; in novels, readers simultaneously apprehend ensembles whilst 
piecing together scraps of individuals in a paradoxical distance combined with intimacy. This 
paradox is created not just through the lack of kinesthetic incorporation of the reader into a 
specific character but through the sequential development of each character in prose fiction via 
sentence upon sentence. The reader is required to recall prior characterising details and fill in 
gaps contextually at a rate not demanded in media that feature a greater range of stimuli such as 
image and sound. In novels, each narrative device whether direct speech, visual description, 
metaphor, simile, and so on, will add to this growing and partially idiosyncratic web created in 
the reader’s mind containing each reconstructed character, a sum greater than its parts. A 
character constructed from a prose novel is a collision of textual facts with reader wishes that 
are already compromised by a novel’s invitations and manipulations of said wishes. 
 
Even if we do differentiate between what is actually happening in our experiences with narrative 
and what readers think happens as the product of narrative experiences, the fact that readers 
think certain things occur in the narrative experience can still be indicative of important parts of 
fictional stories’ effects. To use an analogy, magical thinking arises from the wish fulfilment of 
a baby – a baby cries, someone feeds it, and the baby feels satisfied. For the baby, its 
omnipotent crying has summoned the parent and ended hunger. What is the qualitative 
                                                          




difference here with reader belief in the unity of character and narrative wish fulfilment? If 
readers are invited to want something to happen and it does, is there no subconscious 
affirmation of control? In this manner, I will argue that the dynamic between emotional 
engagement with textual values and our subsequent ongoing recuperation of characterising 
details into unified figures is manipulated in The Road to lead the reader to an agreement with a 
conclusion that does not logically follow from the particulars of the text, but the incoherency of 
which is masked by a more powerful sequential manipulation of reader empathy.  
 
In the first half of The Road, the son, having been shielded from tough ethical choices by his 
father, does not entirely seem to understand the father’s claims that strangers are ‘bad guys’ 
until a series of three encounters early in the novel, and neither, perhaps, does the reader.141 
Readers do not know if other people hold these ‘bad’ values until they see them enacted in the 
narrative. The first cannibal entices the pair to danger: ‘We got a man hurt. It’d be worth your 
while […] I’ll bet that boy is hungry. Why dont you all just come on to the truck? Get 
something to eat. Aint no need to be such a hard-ass’ (p. 67). The father responds to the first 
invitation by asking ‘do I look like an imbecile to you?’ (p. 67). The reader may follow his 
‘seeing’ of the danger and the logic behind his responses, and judge whether allegiance with the 
father’s authority as focaliser is a ‘correct’ or rewarding way of exploring the text. To compare 
the reader’s action here with video games theory, the reader might not necessarily ‘adopt the 
screen persona’ of Žižek’s ‘macho aggressor’ in reading The Road, but in the reader’s attempt to 
infer authority and develop patterns of expectation in response to the novel’s plot, we may 
develop a game-like sense of strategy and opinion about what the characters of the novel should 
do in various situations. This wish for certain things to occur may then attach itself to a trust in 
certain characters not exactly as with an avatar but more as a strategy beneficial to the reader’s 
emotional activity. This activity can in turn lead to ethical consequences as with decision-
making in games. The novel’s system will not necessarily in Calleja’s formulation ‘recognize 
and react to the user’s actions and spatial location’, as for Calleja, even if ‘certain qualities’ of 
novels allow a sense of presence, ‘the phenomenon remains within the domain of subjective 
imagination’.142 However, as demonstrated in Chapter One, texts such as the ‘book in a box’ 
The Unfortunates which presents multiple sequences to the reader demonstrate the contingency 
of reader construction of characters upon a particular sequencing of a text. If the reader can be 
shown to be ethically responsible for inferring authority in stereotyping a female character in a 
given reading of The Unfortunates, then although its sequential contingency might be less 
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obvious, nothing prevents fixed sequence texts such as The Road from being analysed in a 
similar way.  
 
Therefore, to continue with this first cannibal encounter, the reader might follow the father’s 
‘seeing’ of the danger and the logic behind the cannibal’s responses – ‘I’ll bet that boy is 
hungry. Why dont you all just come on to the truck? Get something to eat. Aint no need to be 
such a hard-ass’ (p. 67) -- and may judge whether or not allegiance with the father’s authority as 
focaliser is a ‘correct’ or rewarding way of exploring the text. In order to judge the father’s 
viewpoint as worth of aligning with their own wishes, readers need to verify whether the 
stranger does indeed present danger. We need to know whether the values associated with the 
father allow him to succeed, however we define success in this narrative, in order to assess what 
the text’s rhetorical argument is and how we as readers might passively and even unconsciously 
form strategies as to what we might do regardless of the text’s lack of affordances for control or 
interaction. Upon his shooting of this man and the father’s return to the scene later on, the father 
discovers proof of that group’s cannibalism: ‘Coming back he found the bones and the skin 
piled together with rocks over them. A pool of guts […] They looked to have been boiled’ (pp. 
73-74). The father says of this to the boy, and perhaps to the reader, that: ‘You wanted to know 
what the bad guys looked like. Now you know.’ (p. 80). In his private thoughts on the cannibal, 
the father reflects on humanity: 
 
This was the first human being other than the boy that he’d spoken to in more than a 
year. My brother at last. The reptilian calculations in those cold and shifting eyes. The 
gray and rotting teeth. Claggy with human flesh. Who has made of the world a lie every 
word (p. 79).  
 
The father reads the whole world around him as presenting ‘lies’, with the only source of truth 
his own tentative ethical engagement with his son.  
 
The success of the father’s prediction of the cannibal’s nature and the stakes at play in that 
encounter, may provoke the reader to anticipate other textual encounters as ‘lying’ threats to be 
seen through and to identify with the father’s position. For example, the second encounter with 
cannibals acts as a hyperbolic extension of the first – a ‘phalanx’ of cannibals arrive, dragging 
children and women with them for later rape and consumption for food. This time, the fact of 
their evil is not emphasised, but of how great they are in number, and this emphasis comes from 
the boy, not the father – ‘There’s a lot of them, those bad guys’ (p. 97). The boy -- and the 
reader -- are learning not to trust individuals other than the father, something which is important 
to the rhetorical gambit of the text moving forward into the second half. Even the father cannot 




enter a house that will turn out to contain a larder full of trapped individuals in an episode 
featuring one of the only instances of prolepsis in the entire text: 
 
Piled in a window in one corner of the room was a great heap of clothing. Clothes and 
shoes. Belts. Coats. Blankets and old sleeping bags. He would have ample time later to 
think about that. The boy hung on to his hand. He was terrified. (p. 113) 
 
This prolepsis signals to the reader that the father is not reading his environment correctly and 
that he will think about the meaning of what he sees only later with ‘ample time’. The father is 
no longer as attentive to potential threats – ‘All these things he saw and did not see’ (p. 115) – 
whereas the boy, repeatedly expressing his terror, finally does realise the predicament of this 
world. 
 
This sequence of cannibal encounters, when considered as part of the reader’s early and gradual 
process of establishing an idea of the father’s authenticating role in the narrative, establishes 
certain ‘warning’ predictors and characterizing details that, through repetition and manipulation, 
encourage certain responses towards all non-protagonists in favour of the ‘good guys’. The 
father is right to be cautious and violent without direct evidence in the first half of the text, and 
is proven to be so with subsequent narrative events. Reader pre-emptive categorization of all 
others as ‘cannibals’ proves advantageous and correct as a strategy of constructing characters in 
The Road. A reader who feels allegiance with the father and son might wish for them to flee at 
the appearance of strangers regardless of any comment provided by the father once this pattern 
has been established, inducing a game-like sense of strategy. In all of the above encounters each 
cannibal is utterly replaceable in a narrative sense, acting as ill-defined, almost faceless figures 
of evil and vanished humanity that do not exist beyond the brute facticity of their endless 
numbers. The death of the first cannibal is merely the death of one instance of a respawnable 
and replaceable enemy character, just like a combatant in a video game, whereas the father and 
son -- nameless though they may be – are characterized through interaction, direct speech, 
memory, and focalization via an extensive character space as the only characters featured at all 
for the first sixty pages or so, generating a more comprehensive sense of reality and allegiance 
than the more narratively replaceable cannibals. 
 
However, it is important to distinguish between empathy with these characters due to a sense of 
the protagonists’ goodness and that which might arise merely due to the novel’s in-depth 
characterisation of the protagonists as individuals in a sympathetic and multi-faceted manner. 
Reader disgust and attraction towards textual characters does not necessarily involve any actual 
ethical responsibility towards these characters in the way readers might, for example, judge the 




reader’s response to The Road’s ‘bad guys’ might be found in the film We Are What We Are 
(2010).143 The film depicts a broken family unit of cannibals in the aftermath of their patriarch 
and hunter’s death. This cannibalism is explicitly ritualistic and not out of a want of other food 
sources, although due to their upbringing the family believes it to be an ethical imperative only 
to eat human flesh. This evokes not only The Road’s cannibals but the father’s inverted decision 
not to eat human flesh due to an opposite standard of goodness (p. 136). The eldest son in the 
narrative displays similar virtues of love and self-sacrifice to The Road’s protagonists, biting his 
sister’s neck in order to fool the police into thinking she is a victim of rather than participant in 
their cannibalism, even though this will lead to his own execution by his shocked brother. Prior 
to this apparent ‘redemption’, even when engaged in outright cannibalism the eldest son invites 
audience allegiance, struggling not only with patriarchal expectations of becoming their ‘hunter’ 
but with his potential homosexuality. The moment at which he accepts this potential by kissing 
the boy with whom he has had a long flirtation appears a triumph of western liberal openness. 
As a result, the ethical weight of his subsequent planned cannibalism of this lover for the benefit 
of his family might be placed by the viewer not upon this betrayal but upon the family’s moral 
outrage over the homosexual status of the human they would be eating. The particularities of the 
victim are ignored by the narrative’s inferred preference for the well-being of the eldest son as 
chief focaliser. This control-test example demonstrates the possibility of allegiance with a 
cannibal and sympathy for his family, even when they are ritual murderers rather than acting out 
of starvation. This full visual depiction of their horrific behaviour, something overcome by the 
narrative’s focalization and sympathy for that murderer, is not in itself proof that cannibalism 
does not inherently preclude allegiance. However, this situation does suggest that whatever the 
reader might believe to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviour, these views perhaps have less to do with 
why these ‘bad guys’ incite repulsion than the carefully manipulated focalizations, selective use 
of detail, and affective weight discussed throughout this analysis.  
 
The example of We Are What We Are furthers my conclusion regarding The Unfortunates in 
Chapter One that even experiences of narrative empathy so elementary as to merely involve the 
beginnings of a simple attempt to understand a novel might lead to the temporary establishment 
and acceptance of an ethics contrary to the reader’s own. To reconstruct a mental sense of 
fictional characters and a given text, we must see what it is like to hold the thoughts of these 
characters in order to comprehend or inform an opinion about them, just as to talk about the 
colour red is to imagine that colour. In so doing, even if the reader’s own understanding of 
ethical possibilities will be used to define his or her belief in what the novel is saying -- 
reversing the original temporarily-adopted ethical stance inferred from a text -- the initial 
temporary adoption of those values can still be said to have occurred regardless of any later 
                                                          




aversion. With regard to We Are What We Are, we can see that ‘aversion’ towards a text’s 
depictions of certain behaviours or groups may not always necessarily occur even if the reader 
or viewer believes those behaviours to be despicable, as long as the narrative provides enough 
elements for readers to understand the behaviour of the protagonists and if these characters work 
towards some element the reader might enjoy in the text such as conflict or excitement (as I 
analyse in Chapter Three with regards to Jed Parry versus the narrative foil Clarissa in Ian 
McEwan’s Enduring Love). 
 
The deployment of stylistic effects to alter readers’ wishes and therefore their experience of 
narrative empathy can be seen vividly at the mid-point of The Road where the reader’s prior 
strategy of likely believing all strangers to be dangerous cannibals becomes gradually untenable. 
In the second half of the novel, the same behaviour of caution and violence without evidence or 
personalisation of these strangers on the part of the father leads to moral condemnation by the 
son and emerges as incorrect by the way narrative events unfold. The kind of characterizing 
details associated with the son, often the authenticator of the father’s ‘readings’ in the first set of 
encounters, begins to shift in such a way as to make reader allegiance with the father gradually 
untenable at the same time as engaging with strangers becomes increasingly valued. In turn, 
new avenues of description encourage personalisation responses to strangers which are all the 
more powerful for the text’s breaking with the conventions of its first half. This is a critique not 
just of the father himself but of the novel’s own procedures self-reflexively up until this point, 
procedures which the reader has followed; as the shift is subtle rather than jarring, the reader 
may not necessarily be invited to directly question their own acceptance of the novel’s inferred 
authority up until this point (unlike Bioshock’s central reveal, as will be explored later this 
chapter), but neither is their prior allegiance with the father likely to be entirely forgotten, 
leading to pathos rather than total condemnation of the father’s actions in the second half. 
 
The transformation begins with a comedic reconfiguration of all the values and descriptions of 
the first half into the figure of an old man at the mid-point of the novel, a character who I will 
revisit in Chapter Three in relation to reader mediation between multiple characters. The first 
cannibals were depicted as ‘shuffling’ – this old man is described as ‘shuffling’ at his first 
appearance (p. 171). The father oscillates between curiosity, ‘Well, he said. Who’s this?’ to 
paranoia, ‘it could be a decoy’, only to delay judgement between these two positions, ‘Let’s just 
follow […] if this is an ambush he goes first’ (p. 171-72). The old man similarly moves between 
a comic lack of awareness at potential dangers – ‘The traveller was not one for looking back’ (p. 
171) to sudden fear or petty mistrust: 
 
I dont have anything, he said. You can look if you want. 




He leaned one ear forward. What? he called. 
I said we’re not robbers. 
What are you? 
They’d no way to answer the question (p. 172). 
 
The dialogue between the two acts as a parody of the cross-purposes the father spoke at in his 
first cannibal encounter, unable to usefully communicate with another human being. Here, 
however, the old man becomes unreal and less threatening the more human he becomes, and 
vice versa. The old man collapses and is described as looking ‘like a pile of rags fallen off a 
cart’, a pathetic but warmly objectifying simile somewhere between the awful ‘heap’ of looted 
goods in the cannibal house and the ‘vile rags’ the father forces a thief to place into their cart 
later in the narrative, presumably leading to that thief’s death from the cold (p. 274). The boy 
foreshadows his later reaction to the thief by using the same words in response to this old man’s 
appearance: ‘He’s scared, Papa. The man is scared’ (p. 172). This authenticates the old man’s 
lack of threat, and although the father and son may end up offering assistance to another here, 
the way in which they are described as doing so works to alter the course of the novel’s rhetoric 
argument regarding paranoia and altruism in such a way as to diminish their perceived value 
and authentication by the world of the text.  
 
The lesson learned during the first half of the text – do not trust or engage with others – is being 
rewritten through an appeal to a different standard of characterisation to the comparatively 
mimetic models of the first half of the text. The old man or the later-encountered thief are less 
characterised than the personalised father or son, but are practically unique individuals when 
compared to the cannibals of the first half of the text. When the old man is introduced in this 
moment of transition between the two halves of the text, all characters – even the father and son 
– are rendered comedic. Henri Bergson suggested that comedy emerges from something like flat 
characterisation – ‘the attitudes, gestures, and movements of the human body are laughable in 
the exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine’.144 The father’s initial mistrust 
of the old man continues far beyond the point authenticated by the text, with the boy 
altruistically asking ‘what about a spoon?’ only for the father to reply in an almost Beckettian 
fashion ‘He’s not getting a spoon’ (p. 173). The life-or-death ethical stakes of the father and 
son’s opposing tendencies towards selflessness and selfishness are reduced here to matters of 
politeness. Likewise, humour can be seen as a release valve for tensions prior to this point, 
inviting a temporary suspension of the kinds of strategy the reader might have developed up 
until this point. It is this transition, among others, that can be argued to mask the ethical 
transition of the text’s argument – there is enough continuity of values enough to maintain a 
                                                          
144 Henri Bergson, ‘Laughter’ in Comedy, ed. by Wylie Sypher (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 61-




sense of these characters as apparently coherent across the novel, but the reader’s emotional 
responses to these values and sense of authentication is steadily compromised and shifted via 
the personalisation of non-protagonists combined with the father’s mistakes in authenticating 
threat.  
 
This careful sequencing and masking of the ethical transition of player wishes in The Road 
could be contrasted with a less-sophisticated and potentially unintended manipulation of player 
decision-making in the video game Assassin’s Creed: Unity (2014).145 Here, the player 
assassinates various figures involved in a plot surrounding the French revolution, with the 
majority of killings involving not the main target of each assassination but narratively 
replaceable and template-based guards who often share identical lines of dialogue, uniforms, 
and faces with previously defeated guards. The player’s avatar, Arno, is depicted as morally 
righteous for the most part in his intentions throughout the game is non-controllable cut-scenes 
and ambient dialogue, but at one point due to disagreements with his superiors and his romantic 
interest Elise, Arno is exiled to a town outside of Paris where his descent into alcoholism is 
depicted by the narrative skipping ahead several years. Arno has fallen from the precision, skill, 
and eloquence he once possessed, and the narrative places a great deal of significance upon non-
interactive cut-scenes showing a brawl with a man who steals the player’s watch. In the midst of 
all this, Arno is reduced to thievery in trying to steal wine from an inn. However, the game’s 
designers do not alter the game’s assassination system for this mission, but instead surround the 
wine casket with a variety of guards highly similar to the guards surrounding major 
revolutionary figures throughout the narrative. This means that to steal wine, the player has little 
choice but to murder multiple people due to the placement of these guards, and even more 
bizarrely Arno’s combat skills in a highly inebriated state are exactly the same as they were in 
his prime.  
 
When Arno leaves his exile and returns to Paris as a sober man, the serial killing for wine is 
never remarked upon. A case could be made for this whole sequence showing the depths to 
which Arno has sunk, but the narrative’s constant tools for showing such narrative change 
mainly consist of cut-scenes and dialogue. The assassination missions themselves are treated as 
less narratively significant and more as representations of a pre-set story, as the title’s game 
over ‘desynchronisation’ failure screen suggests when the player normally tries to murder 
civilians, informing the player that the character Arno would not do this. The poorly conceived 
convergence of narrative significance with gameplay mechanics in this wine-theft incident does 
not mean that narrative should be ignored in analysing such mechanics. Rather, this situation 
demonstrates that such departures from a text’s normal style of characterisation and 
                                                          




expectations about what a character may or may not do might lead to breakings of narrative 
empathy and to the player or reader purposefully ignoring contradictory characterising details in 
order to continue to make sense of the text. Some reviewers such as Andrew Webster might 
unify these wine murders as part of a larger picture of Arno’s personality: 
 
Arno has basically no memorable personality traits, aside from the fact that he's a 
sociopathic killer. There's a scene where he kills multiple people just so he can steal 
some wine and have a drink. Afterwards, he doesn't express remorse: he's just mad 
someone stole his watch while he was passed out from drinking. He’s an incredibly 
unlikable lead. Of course, storytelling has never been Assassin's Creed's strong suit.146 
 
However, the narrative suggests repeatedly in cut-scenes and in mission objectives that Arno is 
passionate to a fault and would not harm innocents, emphasised by the way in which the game 
will restart itself if Arno attempts to harm civilians. Considering the narrative context beyond 
this moment and the brevity of this mission, these murders might not be inferred to be a twist 
designed to establish his sociopathy, but rather an example of poorly thought-out games design 
that the player does not necessarily need to associate with other characterising details, as if 
forgetting the embarrassing behaviour of a friend. 
 
As I suggested in Chapter One’s in relation to Pale Fire and narrative twists, plot events that 
heavily contradict the themes, tone, or integral parts of the belief system generated by particular 
readings are often rejected, leading readers to declare certain actions ‘unbelievable’ or 
‘implausible’ for a certain character to be involved in. For example, some readers might claim 
that Bruce Wayne, whose parents were killed by a gunman, ‘wouldn’t’ use a gun despite 
narrative depiction of him doing so. Such claims suggest a higher-level character formed within 
the reader’s mind that is, beyond a certain point, no longer beholden to the inferred authority of 
a text; he or she represents a character that has gained, or exceeded, that status in communities 
of readers. Such situations where readers generate working models of what characters would or 
would not do can be likened to the physics concept of potential energy where exerting force 
upon an object will cause potential energy to be stored based on position only to be released, 
such as drawing a bowstring to release it. So too can reader generation of characters be seen as a 
potential energy version of the control seen in video games, an emotional wish-based 
investment in what characters themselves might choose to do and with the text ‘firing’ or 
‘misfiring’ according to whether later-encountered characterising events succeed in either fitting 
reader expectations or persuading the reader to adopt new expectations or wishes. 
 
                                                          
146 Andrew Webster, ‘”Assassin’s Creed: Unity” review: bigger doesn’t mean better’, The Verge, 14 November 2014 




Based upon the reviews the novel has received and the testimony of real readers, The Road’s 
transition from a first half depicting a world of hostile strangers to a second half suggesting the 
father’s error in not attempting to trust strangers has not led to any rejection of the novel’s 
second half. Rather, these two halves appear to have been easily synthesised by the majority of 
readers into a highly emotional narrative capable of utopian potential in ‘sav[ing] the world’. 
This situation is quite some distance from the ‘incredibly unlikable lead’ of Assassin’s Creed: 
Unity despite both texts sharing a sudden shift in the way their protagonists operate and the 
morality of their actions whilst both texts likewise seem to try to present worlds continuous with 
that presented before the alteration. Earlier, I cited Richard Walsh’s argument that the mimetic 
coherency of characters does not necessarily matter because the reader forms emotional 
responses to characters via a web of values. The reader’s sense that he or she is responding to an 
individual rather than in response to values associated with an individual emerges as a by-
product of interpretation, not as the beginning of the chain. I claimed, however, that the reader’s 
belief that they are responding to individuals is still highly important and worthy of analysis. 
Potential reader construction of characters in The Road demonstrates this belief in action. In The 
Road’s shift between multiple types of characterisation and values, the novel’s use of comedy 
and other devices helps mask the ethical transition of the text’s argument in a way that 
Assassin’s Creed: Unity fails to. The continuity of values and other elements in The Road helps 
the reader maintain coherency of characterisation but with various other elements steadily 
undermined to alter the reader’s sense of strategy as to threats and ethical action within the 
world of the novel.  
 
For example, the boy’s greater presence as an authenticator is initiated in their comedic 
interaction with the old man and is continued throughout the second half, with the father asking 
the boy ‘What do you want to do? […] What do you think?’ (p. 205) ostensibly in order to teach 
him. Yet the father’s old values fail every single time. When the pair encounters a small group, 
the boy recommends ‘I think we should lay in the weeds for them’ as they aimed to do with 
their first encounter, only for this group to be revealed as a family with a pregnant woman in 
their midst (pp. 206-08). When they see evidence of a fire in the distance, the boy asks ‘What if 
it’s an army?’ (p. 210), only for it to transpire that the cannibals (and they were cannibals, as we 
find the body of a baby at their campsite) ‘ran away. They saw we had a gun’. (p. 211). In both 
of these cases, the boy attempts to respond to threats that transpire to be less clear-cut than they 
initially seem, whilst the sense of father and son as potential threat to others is gradually 
emphasised. The boy’s altruism is introduced in the first half of The Road where it is shown to 
be infeasible in relation to the world of cannibals; it is then applied to an unthreatening old man 
and then re-evaluated by the second half of the text. Readers are invited to position the boy 




text and likewise undergo those same trials themselves as readers making potential choices via 
their wishes. 
 
When they are robbed later in the novel, the father and son pursue the thief. When the ‘bent’ 
thief with ‘stinking […] vile rags’ is eventually sighted, his description links him ambiguously 
both to the malicious cannibals and the harmless old man (p. 273-74). The thief brandishes a 
knife like the first cannibal did, but actually responds to the father’s threat and relinquishes it (p. 
274). All of these details indicate that this threat is not quite the same as the others, a sense 
which reaches its crescendo when the thief is briefly allowed to focalize the narrative: ‘The thief 
looked at the child and what he saw was very sobering to him’ (p. 274). In turn, the boy’s 
authenticating role returns in favour of the thief and not his father – ‘Papa please dont kill the 
man’ (p. 274) – with the thief’s response juxtaposed with the boy’s emotion on his behalf: ‘The 
thief’s eyes swung wildly. The boy was crying. / Come on, man. I done what you said. Listen to 
the boy’ (p. 274). The father than steals the man’s clothes, recalling the stripped ‘heap’ within 
the ‘grand house’, even evoking the same pettiness behind the father’s earlier amusing refusal to 
give a spoon away to the old man: ‘The shoes. / Come on, man / The shoes’ (p. 275). The thief 
is then allowed to focalize for a second time, attentive to the emotional wellbeing of the boy: 
‘The thief looked at the boy. The boy had turned away and put his hands over his ears. Okay, he 
said. Okay’ (p. 275). The thief appeals for the father to ‘listen to the kid’, to pay attention to his 
authentication and claiming equal human status, ‘I’m starving, man. You’d have done the same’ 
(p. 275). The father’s retributive action is explicitly irrational, his only response being that ‘you 
took everything’ (p. 275).  
 
Just help him, Papa. Just help him. 
The man looked back up the road. 
He was just hungry, Papa. He’s going to die. 
He’s going to die anyway. 
He’s so scared, Papa. 
The man squatted and looked at him. I’m scared, he said. Do you understand? I’m 
scared. (p. 277) 
 
The father acts in the same manner he has done throughout the novel, as indeed his earlier 
readings of threat were often based upon being ‘scared’, but here his judgment seems misplaced. 
Due to the novel’s manipulation of character, it is no longer enough that the father is ‘scared’, as 
the boy has played a crucial enough role within the text to disrupt and limit likely reader 
agreement with the father’s values at this point through his withdrawal of support. This 
disruption is underscored when the father fires a flare gun at an attacking archer. The father asks 
‘they left you here, didn’t they?’ to a woman he finds nursing the man he has killed, only for the 
‘curs[ing]’ woman to respond ‘I left myself here’ (p. 283). It might not be said that the father 




guesses as to the inhumanity of the house’s inhabitants – are shown to be spurious. In the 
second half of The Road, the enemy is much more like ‘us’ than either the pair or their reader 
might find comfortable, to the extent that the father lies to the boy after this incident and claims 
he did not kill anyone (p. 289). Otherness is valued in a portion of a text that earlier discouraged 
it as dangerous. If the reader feels uncomfortable with this contradiction, it might be due to a 
memory of having believed such violence to be necessary earlier in the novel as opposed to now 
being predicated on a mistaken view of these strangers as inhuman.  
 
Throughout The Road, the text presents standards of characterisation, outcomes in response to 
different situations, and ethical consequences in such a way that would be incoherent if made in 
the form of a standard non-fictional argument, but which succeeds here precisely due to the 
reader creating an idea of these characters as unified human beings and the sequence’s 
manipulations of reader wishes. In The Road, the emotional engagement readers experience is 
manipulated through various emotional peaks and gambits so that the majority of readers will 
not notice the claims of the text’s rhetoric moment by moment have changed – its underlying 
values and ethics have altered – inviting readers to shift their wishes along with it, masked by 
the unity of persons and characters. If it had been a different group of characters to experience 
the events of the narrative’s second half, it would not have had the same rhetorical effect – 
personal history within a prose novel matters, bound by paradoxical apprehension of the 
ensemble and intimacy with individual aspects of characters sentence by sentence. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this analysis, Clive Sinclair claims that ’some deep sympathy’ 
makes the father and son ‘human and knowable to us, causes us to care almost beyond bearing 
about their fates, and so makes us read on compulsively for fear of what might happen to them. 
And us’. This sympathy, this knowability, this caring – it is all a highly effective piece of 
rhetorical trickery, resulting from potential reader ‘acceptance’ of inferred authority and the 
text’s manipulation of the reader’s wish for certain narrative events to occur. Although games in 
contrast seem to offer explicit choices that allow direct control, there are always elements that 
are not controlled, whether the actions of other characters or other parts of the avatar’s 
behaviour. Even in games it could be posited that player’s wishes for certain events to occur 
must often remain wishes rather than be enacted. However, if this is the case, how do player 
‘wishes’ interact with the ways in which players can enact direct control in video games, and 
what might this say about the nature of choice in novels and in video games overall? The 
comparison between wish-making and direct control might produce different results in an 
internal comparison of such elements within a single game than in a hypothetical comparison 
between such different-seeming elements as a video game and a novel, and so the final section 






4. ‘A man chooses, a slave obeys’: Control and Inevitability in the Bioshock series 
 
‘Would you kindly. Powerful phrase. Familiar phrase.’ 
 
With these words, the apparent antagonist of Bioshock (2007), Andrew Ryan, reveals the 
game’s central twist, foreshadowed moments beforehand as the player passes a wall with 
‘Would you kindly’ spray-painted upon it -- a phrase that, for many reasons, may be implicitly 
familiar to the player without perhaps the player consciously knowing exactly why due to the 
subtlety of its usage throughout the narrative of the game.147 The player has, until this point, 
explored the underwater dystopia of Rapture in the year 1960, a city founded by Ryan upon the 
principles of Ayn Rand, fallen into apocalypse after a revolt, and populated by killers in the 
style of The Road who the player must defeat upon the orders of his or her mentor Atlas. 
Andrew Ryan reveals at the game’s midpoint that the phrase ‘Would you kindly’ – a phrase 
which has prefaced every instruction to the player throughout the game – was a linguistic mind 
control trigger designed to compel the player to achieve the instruction-giver Atlas’s will.  
 
As I have showed throughout this chapter, not all games offer control over plot decisions, and 
although Bioshock offers several at various junctures, for the most part the player is given 
instructions over a radio and controls the avatar’s physical movement and use of weapons in 
following these compulsory instructions. The player has up until this point most likely blindly 
followed the game’s commands and objectives, accepting the narrative presented to them as 
transparent and predetermined with no other choice than to kill or to simply stop playing and 
halt further narrative progression. Here, Andrew Ryan himself uses the phrase ‘Would you 
kindly’ – a phrase which ironically suggests choice on the part of the recipient -- to literally 
remove player autonomy. With this command, Ryan turns a game that has until this point 
largely told its story via kinesthetic incorporation and free player movement into a non-
interactive cut-scene, claiming that ‘a man chooses, and a slave obeys’. He commands the 
player, ‘Sit, would you kindly? Stand, would you kindly? Run! Stop! Turn’, with all of these 
played out in front of the player with Ryan asking the question, ‘Was a man sent to kill, or a 
slave?’ Ryan then hands the avatar a golf club and commands the player to kill him, apparently 
enacting Ryan’s own philosophy that a man ‘chooses’ by deciding to end his life on his own 
terms. 
 
                                                          





In a similar manner to Wayne Booth’s concept of ‘coduction’ in literary criticism where prior 
readings of other genres and texts affect reader reception of new texts,148 Miguel Sicart refers to 
the individual gamer’s history as forming his or her expectations and appreciation of the ethics 
of various game titles – someone unfamiliar with shooting enemies might be shocked at mild 
violence, whilst someone who routinely accepts such objectives might give comparatively little 
thought to what he or she is doing.149 This is a concept which this section will explore as 
operating within the text of Bioshock itself, with each encounter internally creating certain 
expectations of the world presented to the player. So too can novels be seen as encouraging 
various strategies or expectations in terms of what readers might wish to happen later in the 
narrative, as discussed throughout this chapter already in relation to The Road. So, for example, 
The Road many invite many readers to operate with video game-like strategies of allying with 
various focalisers and operating with patterns of expectation regarding survival, danger, and 
ethical goodness. Regardless of such strategies of reading, however, and regardless of how a 
reader’s many idiosyncrasies might particularize a given reading experience, the reader cannot 
explicitly choose to alter any plot detail short of crossing out some text or writing a fanfiction, 
neither of which are likely to be sanctioned by any narrative inference as to a text’s authority. 
 
In games, the player is sometimes able to make explicit choices in determining the course of an 
unfolding diegesis, but as I will argue in my analysis of Bioshock and in the later chapters of 
this thesis, novel-like ‘wish’ choices are still crucial to the workings of game narratives. The 
ways in which the player might feel synonymous with their character on screen are crucial to an 
understanding of how video game narrative significance works in this regard. The majority of 
Bioshock’s gameplay involves murdering ‘splicers’, the citizens of the fallen city of Rapture 
who have become addicted to a powerful drug known as ADAM. This drug gives great power 
but also causes grotesque facial growths, inhuman movements, and insanity, leading its addicts 
to act as aggressors to the player and presenting him or her with a kill-or-be-killed choice to 
continue playing the game. Moreover, the characterizing details, faces, and dialogue for these 
splicers are repeated within a set number of splicer archetypes. The game trains the player to 
understand that it is acceptable to kill a splicer on the basis of how its narrative presentation 
works; if the player does so, he or she is not removing anything unique from the world, in 
comparison with the heavily characterized ‘boss’ individuals the player encounters at key 
moments. The splicers are spawned, infinite, largely non-individualised and reducible to 
repeated archetype – their personalities cannot truly ‘die’, as other splicers exactly like them can 
and will emerge again throughout the game no matter how many the player kills, something 
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further accentuated by their frequent usage of masks. As with the cannibals of the first half of 
The Road, they are narratively replaceable, and here quite literally so due to their infinite 
numbers. 
 
Just as the player’s inference as to the necessity of killing splicers is steadily increased with 
each encounter, so too does each encounter with various individualized, unique, irreplaceable, 
and heavily contextualized individuals at key ‘boss encounters’ throughout the game develop 
this logic that even individuals we are invited to view as ‘real people’ must necessarily be 
killed. These individuals are likewise lost to ADAM sickness and also present a kill-or-be-killed 
choice, with the exception of the penultimate character encountered before the climactic 
Andrew Ryan meeting -- Sander Cohen, a man the player does not have to kill at all and from 
whom the player is simply able to walk away. The player does not have to kill Sander Cohen, 
but many do so, and it is in situations such as this where players respond in apparently uninvited 
ways that significance can be found not just with regards to a discussion of novels versus video 
game control but also for the nature of characterisation itself. If games can give a certain kind of 
instruction repeatedly and then remove said instructions only for the player to continue to 
engage in that same behaviour, responses to games that occur in this manner represent strong 
instances of player-inferred authority and are ideal test-cases for exploring identification. 
 
Cohen, a failed artist, uses the abilities granted to him by ADAM to petrify splicers and those he 
once knew into a still-life collection of statues, and asks the player to murder his three disciples 
and take photographs of their corpses using an in-game camera in order to complete a new 
artwork for him; in order to progress, the player must take part in the logic of his madness in 
order to leave and finally meet Andrew Ryan. Insomuch as the player is forced to follow the 
steps of another’s thought, this could be considered to some extent an analogous case to novels 
where readers must temporarily adopt patterns of thought in inferring textual authority without 
choice in order to understand what an author is saying and then to decide whether they accept or 
reject the author’s opinions, as in my analysis of misogyny in The Unfortunates in Chapter One. 
Here, after the player listens to Cohen’s artistic claims and fulfils his artistic objectives in 
murdering the three disciples without choice, Cohen releases the player from his objectives and 
begins to walk away. The player can let him go without killing him. The game does not signal 
in any way that this is a moral choice open to the player, merely requiring one’s restraint, 
departing from the game’s usual obvious signposting of choice. Furthermore, if the player 
decides to kill Cohen, and then takes a photograph of him, then just as Cohen ordered the player 
to do to others, the game rewards the player by giving him or her the achievement badge 
‘Irony’. Neither Cohen’s murder nor taking a photograph of Cohen’s dead body represent 




emerging both from the logic of the preceding three boss characters and the artworks Cohen 
forced the player to produce, building up to Cohen’s death in what might seem like revenge. 
This culmination represents Cohen’s own madness infecting the player’s character and the 
player’s own sense of strategy. 
 
Again, just as Johnson’s misogynistic stereotyping in The Unfortunates is temporarily adopted 
by any reader who wishes to understand that text, and just as Zembla is made real by the readers 
of Pale Fire and the father’s mistrust of others in The Road is adopted as a ‘correct’ strategy of 
reading that text’s first half, video games are not unique in necessitating the temporary adoption 
of thought patterns in order for communication to take place. The difference here is in the 
system’s direct feedback upon this possibility with the ‘irony’ achievement and the kinesthetic 
motions of performing violent murder, as although such incorporation can occur in novels as 
section two of this chapter showed, this is of a different location on a spectrum of immersive 
experiences. The game comments upon the irony of the player’s action, revealing it to have 
been an expected course of action -- the player is provoked into following an inferred but 
unnecessary authority. The game’s requirement for the player to take photographs locates the 
player as both observer and creator, ‘passively’ enacting what they believe the game’s narrative 
to be whilst simultaneously bringing that narrative into being, eventually leading to this point 
where the player continues the game’s logic even when it is not required for further narrative 
progression and foreshadowing for the game’s revelation of its control via ‘would you kindly’. 
 
Bioshock makes its manipulation of the player overt in the Andrew Ryan encounter that follows 
the player’s meeting with Sander Cohen. The player may have temporarily adopted the idea that 
his or her character wishes to kill Andrew Ryan in an acceptance of the avatar’s apparent lack of 
resistance to Atlas’s suggestions, a man who talks to the player’s avatar as if the avatar shares 
his every wish. This emerges from a common trope of many first person shooters of the ‘silent 
protagonist’, a device used to help a sense of immersion and synonymy between player and 
avatar develop in many narrative-based first person shooters by having the player-character not 
actually speak throughout a game even in the middle of conversations with other characters. 
Here, however, this frequent trope is used to create a twist via the revelation of the player’s 
silence as being due to mind control. The player has to kill Ryan due to the game’s literal 
control of his or her character as part of a non-interactive cut-scene. On the diegetic level, the 
phrase ‘would you kindly’ has been controlling the protagonist’s agency throughout the entire 
game. This revelation of the diegetic mind-control of the player’s character by Atlas emerges as 
a bizarre kind of reframing, as on one level the player knows perfectly well that they had to 
obey Atlas’s commands as otherwise it would be impossible to progress, but the player is likely 




accepted gameplay convention works in tandem with the diegetic revelation to critique the 
player’s acceptance of narrative conventions in constructing characters. For example, the game 
begins with a photograph and recollection of the avatar’s family, yet at the moment of his 
suicide, Ryan states that: 
 
You think you have memories. A farm. A family. A crash. And then this place. Was 
there really a family? Did that airplane crash, or, was it hijacked? Forced down, forced 
down by something less than a man, something bred to sleepwalk through life unless 
activated by a simple phrase, spoken by their kindly master. 
 
Frequently in games there is a strange tension between the avatar’s personal history prior to the 
player’s control versus the player’s ability to make choices for reasons that might stem from 
extra-textual morality or aesthetic interest instead of that avatar’s personal history. In Chapter 
Four of this thesis, I propose the term ‘player causality’ in order to explore the often bizarre 
ramifications of this tension for the resulting diegesis and ontology of fictional characters 
formed. In Bioshock, however, the possibility of this tension – the ‘farm’, ‘family’, ‘crash’ 
vaguely referred to prior to this point – is a trick. The avatar is hollow and void of such prior 
history, composed only of those actions the player has undertaken in addition to a biological 
identity as Ryan’s tabula rasa amnesiac and mind-controlled son. 
 
Many players do not want to kill Ryan at this point, a stance further invited by the visual 
rhetoric of the player’s character visibly hesitating in the non-interactive cut-scene where Ryan 
commands the player to do so. In Ryan being killed by his own son, the motif of family persists 
throughout the entire Bioshock series and is crucial to any understanding of the game’s 
processes. Likewise, Atlas, the player’s guide through Rapture, asks the player to save his 
family and help them escape the city only for Andrew Ryan to apparently blow up their 
submarine right in front of the player, resulting in Atlas’s grief and vow for revenge. Such 
devices trick the player into sympathy for Atlas, only to reveal that it was all just an illusion, 
that Atlas had no family on that submarine, and that the player’s avatar had no family either. 
Upon realising the player’s character is his son, Ryan says: ‘now that I see you flesh-to-flesh 
and blood-to-blood I know I cannot raise my hand against you. But know this, you are my 
greatest disappointment.’ Frank Fontaine, the player’s controller and abuser, even reveals his 
own sense of attachment as your de facto adopted parent: ‘I remember when me and the Kraut 
put you on that sub. You were no more than two. You were my ace in the hole. But you were 
also the closest thing I’ve ever had to a son. That’s why this hurts, kid. Life isn’t strictly 
business.’ His death, as with Ryan’s, is likewise linked to his nature as the player’s apparent 
adopted father: ‘I had you built! I sent you top-side! I called you back, showed you what you 




tattooed inside your head. […] Now if you don’t call that family, I don’t know what is! And 
now…’  
 
Frank Fontaine is interrupted by the arrival of a series of little girls who stop and finish him off, 
segueing into the final cut-scene. Throughout the game, the player is given the choice to kill or 
save these so-called ‘Little Sisters’ whenever they are encountered, and this choice forms the 
basis of much analysis of video games in general in the wider field of narrative studies.150 These 
analyses focus on the player’s choice over whether to kill or save these characters and the 
advantages this might bring in a gameplay sense of absorbing physical strength and quasi-
magical ADAM powers from the fallen Sisters, with other narratively significant elements, such 
as ‘Would you kindly’ and Sander Cohen’s ironic death often ignored just as these critics also 
often neglect the place of the Little Sisters within the game’s motif of family. This chapter will 
argue that whilst these choices regarding the life and death of the Little Sisters are important, to 
be fully understood they must be explored within the context of the game’s other concerns and 
this family narrative running throughout the first game, interrupting, as they do, Fontaine’s 
claim that he does not know what family is other than the creation and manipulation of a human 
being. To kill or save the little sisters is a decision made significant by the game’s narrative, not 
necessarily as much by the small gains in gameplay power that killing them might offer. 
  
These ‘Little Sisters’, as the propagandists of Rapture named them, are little girls kidnapped 
from their families who have a unique tolerance for storing and generating ADAM within their 
stomachs, harvesting it from the corpses of fallen splicers, drinking it, and returning through 
vents to bring it back to a central supply. As they are frail little girls, brainwashed to see the 
dead bodies as ‘angels’, men are likewise brainwashed as their protectors and put into hulking 
diving suits to protect them from attackers. These are named ‘Big Daddies’. On this issue, Atlas 
does not order the player to do anything, warning him or her that the children are not little girls 
anymore and that the player needs to kill the children to harvest their ADAM in order to help 
the avatar survive, whilst another voice, the regretful scientist who turned the little girls into 
what they are, pleads with the player to save them and restore their lost innocence.  
 
Encounters with Big Daddies disrupt the normal processes of the game’s combat. They are 
rarely encountered creatures of order, metal and strength who protect children against the 
disfigured, organic splicers who attack their charges. They move slowly, often holding the little 
girls’ hands affectionately, and issue guttural noises resembling whale songs as their only means 
of communication. Unlike everyone else in the game, their only role is to protect against harm, 
and will not attack unless provoked by splicers or the player; otherwise, they lumber slowly 
                                                          




along and protect their ‘daughters’, who can be heard calling them ‘Mr B’ or ‘Mr Bubbles’. The 
little sisters themselves, if the Big Daddies are killed, begin to weep. The player is offered two 
options, each represented by a button hovering on screen above the action in an entirely 
different control scheme to the rest of the game – one button for harvesting, one for saving, and 
therefore emphasising the special nature of their choices.  
 
If harvested, they are killed, their ADAM taken, with a marginally greater immediate benefit to 
the player in terms of power with accompanying ‘evil’ verbal and visual rhetoric, leading to a 
final cut-scene in the game where the player’s character leaves Rapture in command of the 
splicers to attack a nuclear submarine and take control of the world, making the sinister nature 
of the action clear according to the game’s interpretation of the player’s personality. If saved, 
angelic noises emerge and although the player is initially unaware that they will be rewarded, 
the player occasionally encounters teddy bears offering gifts at later points from the rescued 
little girls. At the end of the game, the player is shown all of them growing up, holding the 
avatar’s hand as children and as they grow older, through their wedding days to the avatar’s 
death bed. As the avatar dies of old age, the player is asked the rhetorical question of what his or 
her ‘reward’ was, with the speaker – the scientist who created the Little Sisters only to regret her 
decision -- claiming she knows the reward of the player for saving her charges: ‘a family’, the 
affiliation you never had throughout the game, but which the ‘good’ option seeks for the player 
to reclaim. The interim between the murder of Ryan and the final confrontation with Fontaine 
involves the player quite literally dressing as a Big Daddy in order to find their way to confront 
him, protecting a little sister en-route, allowing the player to fulfil this position before the 
conclusion. It is important to note that although these endings stem from player choices, their 
interpretation of the reasons behind the player’s choices might not necessarily be correct, and as 
mentioned, I explore the greater ramifications of games re-writing player intention in this 
manner as part of Chapter Four via the concept of ‘player causality’. 
  
Bioshock 2 (2010) represents a logical progression and complication of Bioshock‘s themes, but 
further manipulates the player’s sense of choice and responsibility by putting the player into the 
role of a Big Daddy who must rescue his Little Sister from her biological mother, the 
collectivist Sofia Lamb, who has assumed power in the city following the deaths of Ryan and 
Fontaine.151 Lamb wishes to unify the surviving splicers of Rapture as a group she calls ‘the 
Rapture Family’. Eleanor (Lamb’s daughter and the player’s former Little Sister) is to become 
what her mother calls ‘the People’s Daughter’, heralding the rebirth of the city via the transfer 
of all individual consciousness into Eleanor’s mind via ADAM. The only obstacle to this utopia 
is Eleanor’s lingering affection for her Big Daddy, the pair-bond implanted within the player’s 
                                                          




avatar compelling the player to save her and acting in place of the mind control ‘would you 
kindly’ narrative contextualisation of player action from the first Bioshock game. Sofia Lamb 
repeatedly reminds the player that as a Big Daddy, his or her avatar’s adopted familial relation 
is fake and controlled, that the avatar is a monster, much like the Ryan-Fontaine dynamic as 
‘parent’ figures in the original Bioshock, but with the player as a nobler version of this 
counterfeit parent figure and Lamb as the genetic parent who had her child stolen from her.  
 
The most interesting distinction between the procedural rhetoric of the two games emerges 
when the player finally confronts the first boss of Bioshock 2, Grace Holloway, after hours of 
tapes and narrative build her character, just as they helped to construct the bosses of the original 
game. Holloway is revealed to have been Eleanor’s carer only for the little girl to have been 
kidnapped and turned into the player’s Little Sister many years ago; at the moment of 
confrontation in the present day, Holloway states her belief that trying to stop the player’s 
advancement was an ethically correct course of action, proceeds to call the player a monster, 
and does not try to defend herself against what she views as the player’s inevitable attack – 
however, as with the Sander Cohen choice in the original game, the player can just leave her 
alone by walking away and displaying restraint. If the player does so, Holloway begins to re-
evaluate her faith in what Sofia Lamb has been saying about him or her, and tries to aid the 
player’s mission by sending his or her avatar some supplies. The majority of boss encounters in 
Bioshock 2 follow this logic, of allowing the player to walk away and leave the individualised 
boss character alive. The narrative irreplaceability of such characters in comparison with the 
endless splicer enemies of the game does not necessarily necessitate allegiance, however, so 
much as infuses their presence with narrative significance and additional affective weight to 
gameplay choices relating to such characters. The Road and We Are What We Are invite 
sympathy for protagonists that is perhaps almost impossible without a sense of narrative 
irreplaceability; however, although understanding the humanity and motivations of a human 
being often invites empathy, we can just as easily imagine such understanding of another’s 
thoughts as leading to hatred and condemnation. 
 
A feeling of hatred in response to a particularised character can be demonstrated via the second 
boss encounter of Bioshock 2 and the character of Stanley Poole, using my own personal 
experience of playing this game as an example of narrative empathy leading to a negative, 
murderous reaction. I aided Poole throughout an area of the game only to gradually discover his 
role in my brainwashing as a Big Daddy, in Eleanor’s kidnap from Holloway, and the mass 
murder of those who trusted him in order to cover up these actions. As he cowered beneath me, 
I wanted to kill him for what he had done to Eleanor, to the people he trusted, and to me (or the 




conversion therapy to become a ‘Big Daddy’). This feeling of wanting to murder the 
defenceless Poole was quite strong and contradicted the normally ‘ethical’ way I often try to 
play games as an aesthetic posture, feeling ‘evil’ options often to be quite facile; in turn my 
playing of the game in a manner contrary to my initial aesthetic intentions suggests a degree of 
emotional acceptance of this world that outweighed my extra-textual reasons for playing. 
Eventually I withdrew, deciding he was not worth it, that his guilt was in the past, and that if I 
remained any longer I would just shoot him. This tendency of some players to carry out 
decisions to create enjoyable or interesting narrative outcomes rather than necessary engaging in 
ethical behaviour in the way they might in real life must be noted here for its centrality to my 
initial impulse to play the game for a ‘good’ as opposed to ‘bad’ play-through, in an ‘aesthetic’ 
motivation for decision-making in accordance with how an enjoyable or interesting story might 
be judged; here, however, my experience of narrative empathy and affective engagement with 
the character of Poole led me to oscillate between wanting to murder him and wanting to let him 
go in a battle of narrative and ethical priorities.  
 
By now accustomed to this level of choice in Bioshock 2, the third encounter with Gilbert 
Alexander shook my reasoning further regarding good and evil aesthetic outcomes. The player 
discovers that Alexander is the inventor of the pair bond between Little Sisters and Big Daddies, 
and was to become the first ‘utopian’, the prototype of what is intended for Eleanor but who 
instead became a failed, insane brain in a vat. Alexander’s tapes addressed me directly, his past 
‘rational’ self asking me to kill the insane creature he had now most likely become as an act of 
mercy. I eventually decided to do so, out of respect for the man Alexander once was but was no 
longer; in so doing, I realised my agreement with the reasoning behind many arguments 
regarding euthanasia. This situation demonstrates how a broad fictional analogue to real life 
political issues can provoke ethical introspection in a manner apparently removed from the 
normal framing of such decisions but which can provoke both reflection and change in the 
player who faces them.  
 
However, few of the player’s decisions in this regard appear to have lasting or overt ethical 
impact throughout much of the rest of the game. Without reactivity from the system as to player 
choices, players might in some senses feel more free to act in an aesthetic or ethical sense 
without regard for gameplay consequences such as losing abilities or cutting off storyline 
options for choices (a player might choose to side with a certain faction in a game, for example, 
not because the player agrees with that faction’s aims but because failure to do so might lock off 
and exclude an interesting portion of narrative to be experienced). The lack of such reactivity 
harkens back to Žižek’s earlier argument regarding the true selves of players potentially 




games; however, I would argue that fictionality itself does not ‘free’ the player as the player 
might be concerned over storyline ramifications of actions – a factor Žižek is not likely to have 
considered due to the hyper-masculine caricature of gaming he presents. By not showing 
consequences for actions, games can conversely encourage players to act with less restraint and 
to do what they would ‘really’ like to do in the fictional space, whether such actions involve 
experimentation with game mechanics or treating another character a certain way. Here in 
Bioshock 2, such a lack of ramifications is false and merely a delay, however. The twist occurs 
when the player finally meets Eleanor, the avatar’s adopted daughter and Little Sister. She 
idolizes the player as her father, quite literally; she has been watching every decision the player 
has made throughout the entire game, and bases her morality upon the player’s example. The 
player sees this quite literally in a vision of the Little Sisters’ conditioning to view Big Daddies 
as moral and loving protectors, playing as one of the little girls in a world of light and marble 
instead of the darkness the player knows to be the true nature of the game’s world, of elegant 
dancers instead of splicers, of angels instead of dead men. The player sees depictions of his or 
her decisions memorialized as art work, with Eleanor agreeing with the player’s choices no 
matter what those choices were.  
 
The original Bioshock made assumptions about the player’s moral agency in its endings, with 
the player presented as an evil nuclear conqueror or an adoptive father even if he or she had 
more nuanced motivations than to save or harvest, a blunt procedural rhetoric in itself. By 
hiding the immediate ethical outcome, Bioshock 2 creates a kind of negative space 
characterisation for the player to identify with in the form of Eleanor’s ethical view the player. 
Depending on the ratio of sacrifices or benevolent acts throughout the game, the player will 
have created a monster in the figure of Eleanor, who might sacrifice her sisters, prevent her 
mother’s survival, and pursue power and greed, distinguishing between whether the player 
saved the ‘innocent’ or ‘offered no mercy’ to the guilty individuals who led to her fate. Or the 
player might have raised a benevolent young woman who saves her little Sisters and her mother, 
proclaiming that the player’s avatar will live on in her, that the bond between her character and 
the player is synonymous with utopia and that ‘evil is just a word. Under the skin, it’s simple 
pain. For you, mercy was victory. You sacrificed, you endured, and when given the chance, you 
forgave.’ If the player’s actions were confused, a mixture of harvesting little sisters and 
forgiving the individuals he or she encountered throughout the game, the ending is ambiguous 
and sad: ‘You taught me that right and wrong were tidal forces, ever shifting. To survive in 
Rapture, Father, you took what you needed from the innocent. But… when the guilty posed no 
threat, you simply walked away.’ In such an ambiguous ending, players can even seek to correct 




her father and moral guardian, leading Eleanor to remark on her loneliness, of how the player 
‘chose to die rather than have me follow you’, wondering ‘if even I could be redeemed’.  
 
The player might have conceived of himself or herself, for example, as acting in Eleanor’s 
interests by harming those who sought to harm her, acting with unforeseen consequences upon 
Eleanor’s own moral agency and tragically perpetuating the cycle of violence, as I considered 
doing with the Stanley Poole example earlier in this analysis. If the player chooses to live, 
Eleanor extracts the player’s mind calmly in the midst of a thunderstorm (recalling the ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ visual rhetoric of the little sister choices throughout the game), saying ‘You may not have 
wanted me father, but you defined me. You chose to survive, no matter what the cost.’ In the 
very worst ending, this extraction of the player’s mind will be forced, with the avatar shown 
visibly resisting Eleanor’s attempt. To further link actions with consequences, the colour 
scheme and imagery related to the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ endings for this game echo almost exactly 
the colour schemes associated with how little sisters view the world via their brainwashing and 
how the player views the devastation of Rapture throughout the game. 
 
In Bioshock 2, the ethical player must act as a good man so that another might develop their 
ethical agency along similar lines. The player becomes a father, identified with this role from 
the beginning with all it implies, including not just physical but moral protection through 
intimacy, rather than the grand, impersonal systems of Randian philosophy as with Andrew 
Ryan, or Collectivist philosophy of the nation as an all-encompassing family with Sofia Lamb. 
However, there are those who cannot earn the player’s forgiveness due to the demands of first 
person shooter systems and the narrative replaceability of the horde of splicers. The retreat to 
fatherhood in a series about the failure of grand totalising political systems on both the political 
right and left is not without its own political dimension, with the exclusion of those outside the 
family as threats to the objects of our intimacy; as George Lakoff highlights, governments on 
both the political right and left have often been framed as ‘strict fathers’ and ‘nurturing 
parents’.152 Indeed, the characters of the Bioshock series can be seen as potentially embodying 
both fascistic qualities (the Big Daddy defending against grotesque splicers) and leftist qualities 
(such as withholding the death penalty with regard to punishing individuals).  
 
In embodying both fascistic and leftist qualities, Bioshock calls into question the way in which 
both positions can at best ignore and at worst actively rob the homogenous masses of their 
individuality; in Bioshock, individuality is not afforded to these decadent splicers and thus the 
player is exempted from the guilt of substantial empathy in contrast to that which players might 
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be invited to feel towards individualised characters. The enemies of the Bioshock series are 
monsters without identity, utterly replicable by the game’s programming in a system which, 
intentionally or unintentionally on the part of the developers, echoes the social status of these 
enemies in the diegesis. The inequalities in Rapture society that led Fontaine to pose as the 
worker hero Atlas and Lamb to manipulate the Pauper’s Drop slum in Bioshock 2 is given some 
airing, yet ultimately the poor become unthinking servants of these causes; regrettable, perhaps, 
that they became this way through what is presented as partially their own fault, but the splicers 
are virtually irredeemable otherwise, unlike those who abstained from ADAM or the Little 
Sisters, to whom the player acts as a Father, literally removing ADAM from their bodies). 
ADAM is in the end partially a metaphor for drug use, rendering the grotesque faces of the 
splicers emblematic of the ravages of drug addiction, and the Big Daddies protectors who 
punish those hordes involved in such social depravity. Encoded within the system of the game, 
therefore, is a political logic every bit as rigid and problematic as those the game attacks, and 
even the retreat of the individuals from depraved society into the apparently free and affective 
family unit is inherently political. 
 
Therefore, player construction of non-playable characters is very important to the Bioshock 
series’ overall effects. Moreover, beyond the medium specificity of how player choice can 
explicitly alter the diegesis of these games, the way such control interacts with secondary 
characters who are ontologically ‘lesser’ and replaceable compared to the protagonists 
highlights how player bias and emotional engagement with a text can affect player/reader 
construction of fictional characters even in novels. Brewer claims that there is a cognitive bias 
towards processing newly encountered individuals as quickly as possible according to pre-
existing categories and stereotypes; only later will most people begin to decategorize and 
individuate the newly encountered person, unless something about the initial interaction 
promotes personalisation from the very beginning. In this framework, those characters 
developed by a narrative to be significant and individuated – to be narratively irreplaceable and 
unique to some extent – invite emotional responses in a similar manner to the way in which 
humans act in real life. In these texts discussed so far in this chapter, the depiction of family 
units – whether the father and son of The Road or those surrounding the Big Daddy/Little Sister 
relationship in the Bioshock series – invites a sense of narrative irreplaceability and allegiance 
while the poor, faceless, dehumanised, and homeless masses of both texts invite immediate 
murderous inclinations on the part of readers and players. Conversely, the protagonists of The 
Road invite narrative allegiance due to their emotionally engaging and omnipresent struggle, 
just as the repeated presence of the avatar in the Bioshock games (coupled with medium specific 
kinaesthetic control) is likely to invite allegiance with that character. However, the family 




tendencies of these enemy figures into an object for narrative empathy, as shown in We Are 
What We Are. Readers, viewers, and players do not have to like all narratively irreplaceable 
individuals, however – my optional murders of the ironic Sander Cohen and Stanley Poole 
demonstrate this – but these deaths matter far more than that of, say, the two hundred and 
seventy-fifth random man with a gun to fire at the player only to be met with execution. Such 
characters are ontologically lesser than the protagonists, and this difference is key to 
reader/player allegiance and emotional engagement. 
 
This chapter began with an analysis of how video games control systems are more complex 
than many theorists describe in their frequent use of different types of control schemes for 
different situations. I first analysed in this framework the sequence of the non-choice based 
novel The Road and its ability to manipulate the narrative empathy of readers with comparative 
reference to the video game Assassin’s Creed: Unity and the film We Are What We Are; I 
followed this with an analysis of the choice-based video game series Bioshock and its use of the 
games medium to make arguments about free will, obeying authority, and the responsibility of 
family. We can conclude not only that ‘control’ is an inherently unstable category in video 
games, but also that it is present in a metaphorical form in the reading of novels. Sequences not 
only suggest a certain logic or authority to be followed but necessitate inference; coupled with 
emotional engagement, inference as to what might happen will often transform into a conviction 
regarding what should happen next, a wish for certain narrative events to occur. Although video 
games allow players to take these wishes and influence diegetic events to enact them, choice is 
never constant and always partial and prescribed, in many senses taunting the player far more 
than the comfortable novel-reader who never had any such expectation of being able to change 
events. It is this tension created by being able to have some control but not complete control in 
video games that will provide much of my theorisation of one of my key new concepts, 
‘player/reader causality’, in Chapter Four. In the next chapter, Chapter Three, I build towards 
this point through an analysis of an oft-overlooked aspect of characterisation – the presence of 
multiple characters in almost all novels and games -- that likewise has further implications for 
video games studies even as the analysis of games helps clarify my theories regarding novels 
once more. An examination of such multiplicity can help us further define these concepts of 
control and authority that contribute to the overall action of identification.  
Moreover, throughout my thesis I have explored dynamics where characters in each text are 
constructed in a different way to others. In the Bioshock series, for example, splicers are 
ontologically lesser than other characters not only for their unlimited spawning as enemies with 
a frequently identical set of faces and voices, but also because they are given a far more 
restricted emotional range of complex characterising detail than the comparatively irreplaceable 




fiction or dystopia to find ontologically lesser characters. As I will explore in the next chapter, 





CHAPTER THREE: Multiplicity in Cormac McCarthy’s The 





All characters are not created or constructed equally in the minds of readers; this is not just in a 
sense where some characters are given less space or text relating to them and therefore do not 
have as many characterising details as others as with Woloch’s theory of ‘character-space’, but 
in the choice of detail and the kind of fabric with which each one is woven. Therefore Gradus in 
Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire is formed as a ‘half-man’ that the reader might view as lacking 
human emotions quite precisely because he does lack human emotions; such details are 
excluded compared to how other characters such as Kinbote and Shade are presented. Likewise, 
even when some characters only briefly appear, the selection of detail associated with each 
character can have a great impact upon a given narrative, particularly in terms of how they are 
placed within a sequence; for example, as explored briefly in the previous chapter of this 
dissertation in relation to Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, the old man who appears half-way 
through the narrative is written in a simplified and comedic manner, eliciting similarly comedic 
and simplified responses from the novel’s protagonists in a parody of their prior behaviour 
throughout the novel.  
 
Before they encounter this old man in The Road, the father rightly fears other individuals within 
this world as enemies; afterwards, the father’s fearful behaviour repeatedly leads to crimes 
against other survivors in the novel’s world who represent lesser threats or even no threat at all 
to the pair. The brief appearance of the old man invites a different kind of character construction 
to the previous encounters, relying upon caricature and a comedy of misunderstanding. These 
selective details allow The Road to hide the seams of an incoherent argument – one half of 
which suggests all should be feared, the other half of which suggests others should be given the 
benefit of the doubt. The old man’s appearance represents the introduction of a third character to 
be constructed and understood as an example of a human being within the narrative, yet as a 
human utterly distinct from the inhuman cannibals encountered up until this point, capable of 
cooperation whilst representing no harm. Likewise, the characterisation of the father and the son 
at this point slightly alters to echo the emotional palate of the old man as a simplified and 
caricatured figure, presenting caricatures of their own prior behaviour and making their earlier 
fear seem melodramatic. In the process, the novel’s way of defining success in this world 






As this encounter in The Road demonstrates, the introduction or removal of additional 
characters at various points in a narrative sequence can affect reader construction and 
identification with other characters. This mediation between multiple characters occurs to some 
degree within any text, whether the sequencing and manipulation of these interactions is subtle 
or overt. If macro-level events and micro-level style in a sequence are instrumental to the 
processes involved in reader construction of characters from details throughout a given text, 
then such realities as alternating between characters, manipulation of discourse time, exclusion 
of detail, varying spaces devoted to each character, and so on are integral to understanding how 
narrative sequences work to produce characterisation -- this is not to mention the role of 
narrators and focalisers as mediators of other characters creating further dimensions to these 
processes.  
 
In novels where a personified narrator is present, a reader might get a sense of character at the 
same time as an underlying inferred authority (what we feel a text sanctions in terms of 
interpretation) that may support or undermine overt narration. This situation becomes more 
complex when a homodiegetic narrator encounters another character in the narrative. Any such 
encounter is likely to involve the narrator interpreting and parsing the being of another 
individual – selecting bodily detail, physical actions, direct or indirect speech, and even guesses 
as to what the individual might be thinking or feeling and presenting them to the reader. Even 
with such narrators we can still experience comparatively ‘unmediated’ characters via direct 
speech, yet here there is a doubling effect. Readers can use direct speech to directly gain access 
to a character without mediating narration, although even this is impure as the homodiegetic 
narrator will have ‘chosen’ to allow direct as opposed to indirect speech at a given narrative 
moment. Therefore direct speech might not only allow a reader to gain direct access to a given 
character’s own storytelling but, as emerging from a larger frame narrative dominated by the 
narrator’s thoughts, might lead to the reader also considering how the narrator might feel about 
this character even if no explicit statements to this effect are present. These processes might 
therefore inflect reader responses to both this secondary character and narrator – to represent 
this diagrammatically, the process reader  narrator  character occurs at the same time as 
reader  character  narrator.  
 
It is a fallacy to assume that readers just identify with one individual character in a text such as 
the protagonist, focalised character, or even a narrator. Focalisation is never stable or constant, 
as alternative perspectives always seep through if there is more than one character in a text; each 
character becomes a lightning rod for the role-playing activity of identification and narrative 




the most part. Readers have to construct characters to make sense of a text, and to make sense of 
characters, readers have to use the characterising details within a text to generate a working 
mental image of what the particular individual is like. To analogise the performance of a reader 
in this regard to theatrical texts, the reader represents a theatre and theatrical troupe all 
combined for the enacting of a text, having to generate and perform each individual character to 
varying degrees. Identification is sometimes used to suggest ‘being’ a single character within a 
text almost as if that character is a video game-style avatar as much as it is used to denote a 
feeling of being like a character in a text due to some kind of similarity between the history of a 
character and one’s own real-life history. Such similarity between a character and a reader 
would need to be negotiated on an ongoing basis subject to revision as a text develops and 
would not be instantaneously possible in any narrative as details promoting such similarity 
could only emerge in a sequence rather than all at once. Therefore, we could instead say that 
readers engage in attempts to construct and understand all characters in a given text although 
some may emerge as prime candidates for this prized allegiance or ‘avatar’ style position of 
being the one the reader ‘identifies with’.  
 
Laura Mulvey’s theory regarding what she terms ‘the male gaze’ in her famous essay ‘Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ (1975) can assist here not only in understanding why readers of 
prose novels and players of video games identify ‘with’ certain characters as opposed to others 
but also in highlighting the ongoing and often unconscious nature of the necessary mediation of 
a reader, viewer, or player in response to the presence of multiple characters in a narrative.153 
Mulvey explores how ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ (the stylisation and coding of female characters in 
such a way as to encourage heterosexual cis men to find them attractive) operates in conjunction 
with what she views as a crucial distinguishing feature of the film genre – the camera’s control 
of the viewer’s perspective.154 Mulvey explores how female characters in film are often used as 
motivating forces for both the hypothetically heterosexual male audience and also the male 
characters on screen, concluding that these heterosexual cis male protagonists invite 
identification as avatars for the viewer not just through focalisation methods such as an 
alignment of camera gaze and presence throughout the story but also due to their ability to 
control events in the narrative.155  
 
For Mulvey, the formula is powerful – the viewer does not just gaze at the screen and the events 
of a plot through the eyes and mind of the protagonist, but also forms a simultaneous direct 
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relationship with these events and characters separate to that of the protagonist.156 The viewer 
might therefore wish to assert control over events due to the passivity of the medium, but 
cannot; the protagonist, as someone with such control over events, therefore becomes a focal 
point for identification as an avatar that can act on the viewer’s behalf, with the camera and 
sense of fictional illusion facilitating these processes. In the framework of my own thesis, 
Mulvey’s ideas hold a huge amount of interest for theorisation about character construction and 
identification beyond the arenas of film or feminist theory, particularly with regards to 
procedural rhetoric and video games. For example, Ian Bogost’s concept of procedural rhetoric 
(the way in which video games can lead players through an argument by encouraging players 
themselves to feel like they have generated that argument through learning rules and completing 
procedures) can be applied to prose novels and other traditionally-sequenced texts where 
although readers are unlikely to feel they are in control they can still be seen to have generated 
arguments emerging from the sequence of texts through their sense-making inferences. 
Mulvey’s suggestion that a viewer’s wish to control narrative events is key to a viewer’s feeling 
of allegiance with a particular character not only neatly explains reader investment in these 
processes but is also quite suggestive in relation to my ongoing comparison between novels and 
video games.  
 
This chapter will explore the operation of the male gaze and reader/player negotiation of 
multiple characters in two texts explored in the previous chapter of this thesis, The Road and 
Bioshock. I will develop my observations of these texts to apply them to another novel in a very 
different genre setting to the post-apocalyptic -- Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love – which presents 
similar manipulations to The Road yet with gender even more clearly aligned to problems with 
identification and with temporary shifts in narration at key points. Through all of this analysis I 
further the conclusions of my previous chapters regarding the effect of sequence in 
identification alongside the coherency of arguments and effects generated by such narratives, 
extending all of these with greater concentration upon the complicating factors of reader/player 
mediation between multiple characters and the role of gender in these processes. This analysis 
will lead into the final chapter of my thesis, exploring all of these concepts and issues emerging 
from previous chapters in relation to the question of what I term reader and player causality.  
 
 
2. The Abjection of the Mother versus the Heroism of the Father in The Road 
 
In Cormac McCarthy’s post-apocalyptic The Road, the main female character of the novel – the 
mother of the boy and the wife of the father – abandons both figures before the narrative begins, 
                                                          




recounted in the father’s memories as an abject and lost figure. As I explored in Chapter Two, 
the novel’s arguments shift from the first half presenting a terrible world where all must be 
feared to a second half where even dangerous strangers might perhaps be worthy of some 
empathy; against this backdrop, the mother’s role in the novel is brief and prefaces the majority 
of this material. The mother destabilises the logic of the father’s heroic narrative before it even 
fully begins by proclaiming they would be better off killing themselves. However, this 
destabilisation of the pair’s values will not necessarily continue through the reader’s progression 
through the narrative as seen in the reams of reviews deeming The Road to be capable of 
‘saving the world’. In this section, I will argue that the mother’s arguments are likely to fail due 
to the ontological construction of her character as comprised of esoteric sexualised arguments 
compared to the complex and more traditionally heroic emotional associations that comprise the 
male protagonists.  
 
As discussed, Laura Mulvey’s theory of the male gaze suggests that, due to emotional 
investment leading viewers to want to exercise control over narratives, as the viewer is unable to 
have such control in films then he or she will be likely to select the perspective of a protagonist 
who seems to be able to exercise control in a meaningful way over the film’s events; usually 
these are heterosexual cis men, with women often restricted to the role of object. With regard to 
the novel The Road, the mother is not exactly subject to the male gaze in the same way as a love 
interest in a film. Rather, the novel’s characterisation of the mother subverts and exaggerates 
features traditionally associated with a love interest in the male gaze to nightmarish extremes 
through the association of sexualised features with a nihilistic world view. Moreover, as with 
Mulvey’s standard framework for the male gaze, the father is the kind of character able to exert 
control over narrative events in the way the reader might wish to and the father therefore invites 
allegiance because of this. The mother on the other hand problematizes the male gaze here as 
she represents an even greater level of control over events than the father possesses through her 
wish to actively commit suicide rather than endure for no good reason. At the same time, 
however, the mother is unlikely to invite allegiance even though she has control over narrative 
events because her aim is likely to be quite different to that of the reader’s wishes, as if they all 
committed suicide there would be no cathartic and heroic narrative to continue reading.  
 
The mother’s characterisation interacts with and works against the father’s characterisation on a 
stylistic as well as a conceptual level. There is little overt delineation between direct speech, 
thought, and description in The Road, all blended instead into a focalization we might 
predominantly associate with the father even up until and after his death, having been explicitly 
internalized within the boy’s mind albeit with increasing destabilisation in the second half of the 




are frequent register shifts between highly poeticized – ‘some sad and solitary changeling’ (p. 
81) – and more precise stichomythic language – ‘the boy didnt answer, ‘you have to talk to me’, 
‘okay’ (p. 80) – in what John Cant has observed as McCarthy’s ‘double style’, where ‘sparse 
descriptions tend to lead up to final passages that are linguistically and philosophically 
ambitious’, moving readers towards opportunities ‘to reflect’ and, perhaps, shifting from 
focalizing the father to an implied author figure.157 However, it might just as easily be posited 
that the father’s moments of poeticized focalization are representational rather than direct 
depictions of his thoughts, echoing his wish to carry the fire of civilisation against the entropy 
and sadness of this world from which his concentration on physical action emerges in his sparse 
prose elsewhere. Indeed, as Cant writes, the virtuous elaboration of well-performed physical 
action serves to ‘divert the reader’s mind from the anxiety generated through identification with 
the protagonists in the extremity of their plight, just as it diverts the minds of the characters 
themselves in practical activity’.158  
 
The reader becomes acclimatized to this manoeuvring between different kinds of relating to the 
character of the father, but where thought is stylized and where action and direct speech are for 
the most part restrained. It is highly significant therefore that in her only dialogue in the novel 
immediately prior to her suicide, the mother speaks in the same poetic register as the stylized 
focalization of the father’s thoughts, with an extended metaphor of an affair with death in a 
nihilistic and sexualised manner – a sexualisation only really associated with women throughout 
the narrative: ‘I dont care. It’s meaningless. You can think of me as a faithless slut if you like. 
I’ve taken on a new lover. He can give me what you cannot’ (p. 58). She claims that she does 
not ‘dream at all’, ‘because I am done with my own whorish heart’ (p. 59). Her only expressed 
belief is found in her choice to commit suicide, replacing the life offered to her with the father 
and son (and therefore her continued existence in this heroic narrative) with the meaning she 
finds in death personified as an adulterous lover. Two implications emerge from this: the 
apparent problem of the mother’s gender as a character for this novel, and why this problematic 
gendering utilizes the same register shifts as have been associated with the father’s focalization 
up to this point in the text. Who willingly refers to herself as a ‘whore’ when about to commit 
suicide when no-one has even mentioned sex in that frame of reference? Why is the mother 
abjected in this sexualised way, and what does her abjection, couched in the register of the 
father’s inner thoughts, do to the reader’s identification with the father?  
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In comments echoing those reviewers made regarding B.S. Johnson’s treatment of women as I 
explored in Chapter 1, one reviewer of The Road comments on the mother’s ‘whorish heart’, 
‘Her long and windy speech, which seems torn from another reality, is perhaps the only 
discordant note in an otherwise flawless novel. McCarthy has never done women well’.159 This 
judgement is notably evaluative, perhaps even morally so: the wife does not register as someone 
capable of inviting narrative empathy in the same way that the father might, her emotions and 
her manner of expressing her emotions sexualized to the point of abjection. The claim of a 
‘discordant note’ here is useful as a metaphor for the mother’s place in the reader’s negotiation 
between these multiple characters. The mother’s sexualisation and refusal to play by the rules of 
the heroic father’s survival works as a foil to his characterisation, potentially destabilising the 
workings of the novel in a way that the reader is likely to reject due to the mother’s abject 
opposition to the narrative exercise the reader becomes invested in by reading the novel. To 
compare to the television series Breaking Bad (2008-13), the viewer is conditioned to value and 
forgive the methamphetamine cook Walter White despite the fact that he murders people and 
does not care about the lives he has ruined, because the programme rarely shows the victims of 
his drug in great detail outside of Jesse Pinkman (who escapes many of the symptoms such as 
rotting teeth).160 Walter White only truly invites the viewer’s ire after five seasons, the betrayal 
of Jesse, the attempted murder of a child, and the death of his brother-in-law Hank. Walter 
White’s wife Skyler however was an unpopular character amongst viewers since the very first 
season, purely because she stands up to Walter, acts as a narrative foil for his activities, reacts 
with suspicion and is upset at his emotional distance and lies, and eventually wants him to stop 
producing drugs when she finds out. None of these opinions or responses are unwarranted or 
unrealistic, but they work against the dominant exciting factor of the narrative – Walter White’s 
involvement in the drug industry – and due perhaps also to Skyler’s status as a woman, these 
opinions were rejected by reading her character as a ‘shrieking, hypocritical harpy’.161 
 
The mother in The Road opposes the father’s self-justifying logic in a similar way to Skyler’s 
actions in Breaking Bad, and this might be enough to earn the mother the ire of any reader who 
feels allegiance to the father regardless of the validity of the mother’s points. Similarly, it must 
also be noted that the novel presents all characterising details regarding the mother strictly 
through the father’s focalisation and therefore the reader has no access to her character other 
than that which the father provides. How can the mother be a hero when all the father seems to 
dwell upon is her sexualised nature and nihilistic end? These elements are combined in a dream: 
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‘in his dreams his pale bride came to him’, her ‘rib bones painted white’, ‘a smile, her 
downturned eyes’ (p. 17), culminating in physical interaction in his daydreams after he awakes: 
‘she held his hand in her lap and he could feel the tops of her stockings through the thin stuff of 
her summer dress. Freeze this frame. Now call down your dark and your cold and be damned’ 
(p. 18). Although it would be valid to critique McCarthy himself for his depiction of women – 
with the writer himself holding the belief that he is not ‘competent enough’ to write about 
women well –162 it is perhaps, as with film, more interesting here to explore how the reader’s 
own action generates some level of responsibility for the male gaze. Why, for example, might 
readers not judge the father himself for his potential lack of emotional support for the mother 
leading up to her suicide and his later sexualisation of her death-wish?  
 
The reader is unlikely to interpret the mother’s sequences as highly biased in memory, or to 
judge the father himself for his lack of emotional support, not only because there is no way of 
knowing how accurate the father’s rendition of the mother is at this point but also because much 
of the power of The Road arguably lies in the emotional tension between the protagonists’ 
‘carrying the fire’ of life and goodness versus the possibility that their efforts will be futile. If 
the reader is to emotionally invest in the father’s attempt to control this journey, such a radical 
critique as that suggested by the mother’s suicide stands little chance against the father’s 
simultaneous ruthlessness against cannibals and kindness towards the boy. As long as the father 
engages in these acts, he proves the mother emotionally incorrect to the reader, however 
logically valid her arguments are. For example, the mother critiques the hidden assumptions 
behind the father’s self-construction and his attempt to impose his model of thinking upon her. 
Their conversation begins in this manner: 
 
We’re survivors he told her across the flame of the lamp. 
Survivors? she said. 
Yes. 
What in God’s name are you talking about? We’re not survivors. We’re the walking 
dead in a horror film. (p. 57) 
 
The father expresses what we might take as a fact – that they are ‘survivors’ as they are still 
alive – only for the mother to reject and replace it with an explicitly aesthetic and pop-cultural 
alternative, ‘We’re the walking dead in a horror film.’ By extracting this pop-cultural sense as 
an opposite to ‘survivors’, the wife glosses the father’s phrase as itself a similarly cultural 
notion in the same vein as ‘good guys’ – the hidden assumption in his use of the term becomes 
that these characters will continue to survive, that along the usual narratives found in this genre 
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they themselves might metafictionally expect to remain alive, even that they therefore fill the 
same generic reader expectation of ‘goodness’ as opposed to their enemies and the cannibals.  
 
The wife expresses her ‘survivor’ status as stemming from her passive construction as a 
character by the father, ‘I didnt bring myself to this. I was brought. And now I’m done’ (p. 57) – 
as, indeed, stemming from the sort of invasive identification of the kind various post-colonial 
and feminist critics have warned against, who deemed such a process to be ‘a ruthless 
displacement and absorption of the other’,163 where identifiers are often ‘roused to action and 
full subjectivity by the spectacle of female suffering’.164 She similarly interrogates and reverses 
the father’s ethical claims so that his apparent pragmatism is read as a hidden passivity whilst 
her own suicidal choice is recovered as an active ethical decision, switching to a more direct and 
less poetic mode of speech: ‘Sooner or later they will catch us and they will kill us. They will 
rape me. They’ll rape him. They are going to rape us and kill us and eat us and you wont face it. 
You’d rather wait for it to happen. But I cant. I cant’ (p. 58). This statement expresses belief in a 
different kind of ‘finding’ to that the father proclaims at the end of the novel, ‘Goodness will 
find the little boy. It always has. It will again’ (p.300), stressing instead a nameless alterity, 
‘they’, and a sexualized death. The wife is potentially wrong after the fact; the father dies of 
illness, whilst the son is last seen entering the company of a new ‘good’ family who allow the 
boy to keep his gun and who have women and children with them, or so many readers might 
think. 
 
However, as I explored in Chapter Two, any reader who forms the idea that the son will survive 
in the protection of this ‘good’ family at the novel’s end is inferring the suggestion emerging 
from the argumentative shifts of the second half of the novel where the reader is trained to 
afford trust to strangers; if such a ‘good’ family had appeared in the novel’s first half, the reader 
may instead have interpreted the strangers as threatening. When reading the narrative for the 
first time, especially in light of McCarthy’s bleak corpus and the heightened apocalyptic threat 
of this novel, the wife’s version of the future seems plausible, even likely. The mother claims 
they do not talk about death anymore ‘because it’s here. There’s nothing left to talk about’ only 
for the father to respond ‘I wouldnt leave you’ (p. 58). Just as the mother did earlier with her 
claim that they were in a horror film, the father responds to a perceived implication of her 
suicide – ‘I wouldn’t leave you’ – appealing to yet another invasive identification of how he 
would ethically act if he were her and thereby suggesting that the situation is more about him 
than it is about her. The father’s appeal suggests, rather, that the mother is not engaging in an 
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autonomous action in committing suicide, but is betraying him. The mother in turn glosses this 
‘betrayal’ as sexual, using the sexual as a metonym for the nature of the father’s affective tie: ‘I 
dont care. It’s meaningless. You can think of me as faithless if you like. I’ve taken a new lover. 
He can give me what you cannot’ (p. 58). This gloss is as much a description of the father’s 
latent meaning as it is a suggestion – ‘you can think’ – that the father aestheticize her as a way 
of dealing with her abjection and as a logical continuation of his own thought processes to this 
point.  
 
Again, however, even if all of the mother’s critiques of the father’s logic can be understood as 
intellectually plausible, the reader’s emotional allegiance with the father and son’s struggle to 
survive up until this point may nevertheless trump her explanations. There is a likely danger 
here of misogynist response due to her apparent abandonment of her position as a mother, and 
she raises this gendered possibility herself in her explanation of her act: 
 
I cant do it alone. 
Then dont. I cant help you. They say that women dream of danger to those in their care 
and men of danger to themselves. But I dont dream at all. You say you cant? Then dont 
do it. That’s all. Because I am done with my own whorish heart and I have been for a 
long time. You talk about taking a stand but there is no stand to take. My heart was 
ripped out of me the night he was born so dont ask for sorrow now. There is none. (p. 
59) 
 
Gender and familial roles are considered to be acts of imagination in this formula, socially 
constructed by ‘the[m]’. The mother rejects her gender role by rejecting the symbolic system: ‘I 
don’t dream at all’, by rejecting the validity of the creative act, as she has done throughout this 
dialogue by drawing out the faulty logic behind the imaginative acts of the father. When the 
wife repeats ‘You say you cant? Then dont do it’, directly after her claim that she does not 
dream, this suggests not only that he should not attempt to survive alone, but through this 
ambiguous ‘it’ the mother might also be referring to the act of dreaming – more specifically, she 
is potentially suggesting that the father should not attempt to dream ‘alone’. The mother is 
therefore not only presenting the possibility of the father joining her in committing suicide, but 
a rather different possibility – that he defy the social construction of men dreaming ‘of danger to 
themselves’ and that he dream of danger to both himself and the boy in his care. More than this, 
she suggests that this protection might have a fictional story-telling quality to it: 
 
The only thing I can tell you is that you wont survive for yourself. I know because I 
would never have come this far. A person who had no one would be well advised to 
cobble together some passable ghost. Breathe it into being and coax it along with words 





‘A person who had no one’ should, as the son does with his own phantasmic ‘little boy’, project 
an identification with ‘words of love’ and continually feed it with ‘each phantom crumb’. The 
mother’s suggestion even suggests a degree of aesthetic quality in these phantasms – they can 
be ‘passable’, recognisable as ‘someone’, or they might fail or succeed to the point of being 
indistinguishable with ‘someone’ to survive for.  
 
This is arguably what the son in The Road really is – an imaginary ‘passable ghost’, more so 
than any other character for it is the position of the father that readers are encouraged to ally 
with in their likely wish to control narrative events. The father cares about the boy; so too is the 
reader likely to care about the boy. Readers, in identifying with the father, in allowing his 
emotions and cares to be partially experienced as their own in narrative empathy, partially live 
his life for the duration of the narrative; a rejection of the will to live, as in the case of the wife, 
would mean a rejection of the narrative’s continuation, and it is significant in this way that the 
mother places so much emphasis upon the father as surviving through creative acts. It is the 
invitation of the text to identify, an existentialist choice against the mother’s abject lack of 
ordering system: ‘Breathe it into being and coax it along with words of love. Offer it each 
phantom crumb and shield it from harm with your body.’ The characterising details of The Road 
drive us into allegiance with both father and son in this manner, investing readers into their 
development, survival, and success. Yet the mother is no passable ghost, she exists as poison in 
these crumbs of heroic survival, and so she is likely expelled as all abject things are. That such a 
position is filled by a female character is unsurprising given the history of literature; the mother 
is the furthest nightmare of the male gaze, combining sexualised death and abandonment of 
men, living on only as a photograph in the father’s pocket, a series of sexual dreams, and as the 
unanswered question of whether this story of men trying to view themselves as survivors 
matters at all or if it would not be better to refuse such terms entirely.  
 
 
3. The Male Gaze in Video Games and the Incest Taboo in Bioshock Infinite 
 
This thesis uses feminist theory and female characters in order to stage its analysis of how 
processes of characterisation and identification work, precisely due to the difference in how 
some authors, developers, readers, and players have created and respond to characters of 
different genders. Whilst the thesis therefore uses and attempts to contribute towards feminist 
theory, its arguments are not carried out for this express purpose but rather use misogyny and 
feminism as a case study of characterisation. It is therefore important to note that when 
Mulvey’s male gaze theory is used throughout this thesis, it is considered not in its totality or in 




regarding the nature of identification, control, and motivation in audience response to narrative. 
Many aspects of Mulvey’s original work have since emerged as limited by her original 
psychoanalytic context, her heteronormative assumptions regarding male viewers and directors, 
and her limited roles for female viewers of films as undergoing ‘masculinisation, masochism or 
marginality’ as Jackie Stacey puts it;165 this thesis is not concerned with the original 
psychoanalytic context of Mulvey’s work regarding the castration complex, for example, not 
because such arguments are irrelevant to discussions of identification and gender but because 
they are not necessary for the specific argument this thesis is trying to make that may include 
but attempts to extrapolate beyond specific considerations of gender and sexuality. 
 
For the purposes of considering how these concerns regarding identification and control might 
work in relation to video games, it is useful therefore to consider prior feminist games criticism 
regarding the male gaze in order to explore how such criticism negotiates this issue of ‘control’ 
in a medium that seems at first glance to provide a greater sense of agency than others. Indeed, 
the uses and limitations of the ‘male gaze’ concept for a feminist analysis of video games have 
been explored a great deal, with Lara Croft of the Tomb Raider series (2006-2015) often 
analysed in this frame. In older games in this series, the extent to which the character’s physical 
model was shaped with large breasts, unnatural poses, and revealing shorts could be seen as 
something akin to Mulvey’s ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’.166  
 
The term ‘male gaze’ is often used in shorthand in video game criticism as just referring to such 
scopoholic sexualisation of passive female characters as opposed to the complex original 
arguments found in Mulvey’s piece regarding the nature of control and identification. For 
example, Maddy Myers has criticised the use of male gaze theory in games criticism as 
perpetuating misogynist ‘assumptions, over the years, about the “intended” audience of games 
[…] many game developers do still presume that the player is straight, male, and interested in 
leering at ladies [and…] pander to these players’ eyes only’.167 However, Myers hints at the 
finer details of Mulvey’s male gaze schema when she argues that criticism using male gaze 
theory often ignores ‘unintentional subversions’ emerging from player activity and ignores the 
large base of female players who often find positive ways of responding to these games rather 
than somehow being locked out of the experience or masculinised as male gaze theory might 
suggest.  
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Although analysis of the subversive potential of these texts may not be as widespread as Myers 
might wish, Tomb Raider criticism has often considered readings outside of the narraow 
‘straight male’ player Myers conceives; for example, in Helen Kennedy’s analysis of prior 
Tomb Raider games, performed before the release of the 2013 reboot, she considers the ‘range 
of potential subversive readings’ that might exist regarding Lara’s sexuality, bodily 
representation, and potential feminist credentials, only to conclude that there is little ‘extra-
textual’ evidence to support these claims.168 For example, ‘the fact that little evidence can be 
found of lesbian readings of Lara does not in itself prove that this does not or cannot happen. 
The ubiquity of the heterosexual readings and re-encodings of Lara leaves little space of 
legitimacy for this form of identification and desire’. Kennedy suggests that ‘within the 
masculine culture that pervades gaming practice/discussion and dissemination it is unlikely that 
female gamers will feel adequately empowered to make such a position explicity’.  
 
Kennedy considers the view of Lara Croft as potential sex-object due to her in-game physical 
representation and the extra-textual sexualisation of her character outside of the game itself, and 
how these elements relate to the male gaze when we have a female protagonist who is not just 
there to-be-looked-at but controlled, acknowledging both elements as part of Mulvey’s original 
schema; Kennedy suggests the possibility that for a male audience, ‘in this complex relationship 
between subject and object it could be argued that through having to play Tomb Raider as Lara, 
a male player is transgendered: the distinctions between the player and the game character are 
blurred’. However, in Kennedy’s formulation, the potential for this transgendering to occur and 
be recognised as such is disavowed through a simultaneous lack of romantic links to other 
characters in-game and the hyper-sexualisation of the character outside of the game, with 
Kennedy concluding that it seems likely ‘that the pleasures of playing as Lara are more 
concerned with mastery and control of a body coded as female within a safe and unthreatening 
context’.  
 
Esther MacCallum-Stewart suggests that for Tomb Raider criticism prior to the 2013 reboot, 
critics ‘directly refute[d] Lara’s potential as a feminist icon because of her body’ and that 
elsewhere: 
 
She is stolen from the realms of female play, and her increasingly overt sexualisation is 
presented antithetically to that of the female gamer who seems to be invisibly idealised 
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– a feminist who rejects Lara’s disproportionate frame out of principle and therefore 
refuses to play her.169  
 
MacCallum-Stewart argues that, taken to their extremes, these sorts of arguments pose 
questions such as ‘does playing Lara make you a bad feminist for liking her[?...] it is not only 
not cool to like Lara, it is potentially offensive to do so’. Ultimately, this positioning ‘seems 
disturbingly like placing her as a moral and sexual compass that refutes sexuality, conflates it 
with gender, and loses the potential nuances of a truly gendered investigative response’, 
‘denying the part that Lara has played in the experience of female gamers’.  
 
In the recent 2013 reboot of the series, Lara’s physical model was altered to more realistic 
proportions, a female writer Rhianna Pratchett was hired to craft the game’s story, and a lot of 
focus was given to Lara’s emotional development and motivations as a character. MacCallum-
Stewart posits that regardless of the virtues or problems of prior instalments in this series, the 
2013 reboot represents an attempt at pushing Lara Croft in a less problematic and more feminist 
direction when compared with prior instalments. She is still ‘to-be-looked-at’ in this framework, 
but with less of an exaggerated emphasis upon this characteristic. The only real problem for 
MacCallum-Stewart was the apparent ‘molesting’ of Croft in one of the game’s early trailers, a 
complaint which she reads as audience misunderstanding that implied ‘Lara could only become 
proactive after the threat of rape’. MacCallum-Stewart’s analysis focuses on Rhianna Pratchett’s 
response to the situation: ‘Pratchett, who was unable to disclose her role in the game’s writing at 
that point due to contractual requirements, was understandably frustrated by the misreading’ – 
alongside the nature of wider fan response as showing that ‘players cared about Lara, and 
wanted her to retain the role of “strong female character” without the caveats that would be 
unnecessary for a male counterpart’.  
 
Although MacCallum-Stewart identifies the role of the trailer in this fan response, she does not 
identify one key factor in the furore that surrounded this apparent ‘molesting of Lara’, and one 
which provides a key for our understanding of how Mulvey’s theories might apply to games. 
The manner in which one of the producers described Lara prior to the game’s release and 
alongside this initial marketing material revealed how the game’s team viewed the character 
they were creating. Such a view cannot be dismissed as subordinate to Rhianna Pratchett’s 
intention in writing the game’s script, as writing is often subordinate or equal to other concerns 
in games design and production, rather than the driving force it might be for the reception and 
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analysis of such narratives as novels. The producer described his view of the player’s 
relationship with Lara like so: ‘When people play Lara, they don’t really project themselves into 
the character […] They’re more like, “I want to protect her.” There’s this sort of dynamic of 
“I’m going to this adventure with her and trying to protect her”’.170 The producer went on to 
link this statement in particular to the aforementioned ‘molestation’ episode in the game where 
an enemy male tries to drag Lara away in a sexually suggestive manner, with the producer 
claiming they ‘will try to rape her’ and that she is ‘literally turned into a cornered animal’. 
 
On the level of feminist critique, these remarks were criticised by many as indicative of the 
endemic male gaze in the games industry where female characters are usually either romantic 
interests or figures to be protected, sometimes even when they are protagonists;171 this 
contextualisation of Lara as being ‘protected’ by the player is particularly troubling when 
compared with the absence of such an explanation for Lara’s abilities in prior supposedly more 
problematic Tomb Raider games. Indeed, early Tomb Raider games did not have a great deal of 
narrative contextualisation for these abilities of any kind. Much of the early analysis of Lara’s 
character revolves around her body not only for purposes of titillation by the press or feminist 
analysis by scholars, but for her gameplay affordances in those early titles, which did not 
contain extensive narrative components. The feminist critic Diane Carr can therefore speak of 
Lara as being ‘driven’ with ‘mechanised’ identification in the same way that James Newman 
can argue that in games, characters like Lara are just ‘vehicles’ and ‘equipment’ insomuch as 
their gameplay affordances such as jumping and shooting have prime importance with 
representational traits irrelevant.172 
 
Newman argues that games are fundamentally different from other media in terms of their 
requirements for player involvement: ‘In the Tomb Raider movie, I can go to sleep or walk out 
and Lara will still save the day. But the game needs me […] The game is nothing without a 
player.’ However, the Tomb Raider film does not in fact depict Lara ‘saving the day’, not in and 
of itself as an artefact; it requires audience co-construction of its events and characters, with the 
view of a character ‘saving the day’ as a moralistic, evaluative judgement upon the facticity of 
the film's text. Of course few audience members may disagree about this view of the film and 
Newman is not attempting to make an argument specifically about the Tomb Raider film, but I 
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make this point here to gesture at the inseparability of any narrative experience from the 
involvement of the experiencer. Just because video games demand explicit operational input 
from the player does not suddenly render meaningful audience involvement in the co-
construction of films and novels non-existent. 
 
Likewise, we do not need to face a binary alternative of viewing ourselves as either controlling 
a vehicle or emotionally relating to a fully realised fictional character. Beyond feminist critique, 
the troubling remarks from Tomb Raider’s producer about players ‘protecting’ rather than 
acting as Lara herself indicate an intersection between the theory of the male gaze and 
something at the core of how narrative functions. They are suggestive of a potential 
simultaneous distance and presence in our involvement with fictional characters, albeit 
manifesting in gendered, sexist terms in that particular case.  As I argued in Chapter Two, we do 
not have radical free will in games; players must either choose between a set of pre-defined 
options or re-enact the steps of a pre-determined, linear narrative. Tomb Raider (2013) provides 
one such linear narrative where players observe Lara’s story as much as they explicitly 
participate in the re-creation of that narrative. However, I argue that this simultaneous 
observation and participation is endemic to all acts of identification, with readers and players 
simultaneously participating in the creation of characters from texts and responding to their own 
creations. It is true of all likeable protagonists in jeopardy, just as it is true of tragedy; we feel 
pity for the other, and fear for ourselves in that same moment. I both am, and am not, the 
character I encounter. We can protect them and distance ourselves from them at the same time 
as we become synonymous with the characters we control. We can view Lara as both a vehicle 
for player interaction with the world and as a character we can form multiple kinds of emotional 
relationship with, with identification and distancing possible simultaneously. 
 
The ‘unintentional subversions’ that Myers refers to arise from this complexity of reader and 
player construction of character I am proposing; the male gaze cannot hold complete dominance 
because a) any voice in any text, particularly inference-necessitating prose novels, is impure and 
compromised by the reader at the moment of reading and b) any text with multiple characters 
opens up multiple perspectives that interact with and modify one another as the reader 
constructs a given sequence. This negotiation between multiple characters occurs in ways that 
are often too complex to be fully accounted for, particularly given the role of reader 
idiosyncrasy in the process. Video games that seem to provide their players with direct control 






Moreover, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter, Laura Mulvey’s argument 
regarding the male gaze does not just posit a theory of gender presentation and viewer 
perspective but also how a viewer’s emotional investment in a narrative might lead to a wish to 
control and alter outcomes. In The Road, the figure of the mother is abjected in part because of 
her position as a foil to the narrative’s events and protagonists’ intentions; if the reader wishes 
for the father and son to stay alive, she is a dangerous perspective to follow. Narrative-heavy 
video games are interesting to explore in this framework as they appear to offer control of 
characters in a literal manner that Mulvey did not anticipate in her 1975 essay, yet as this 
section will explore, the instabilities in such control over characters in video games not only 
assist in clarifying the unique affordances of video games as compared to novels but also 
demonstrate the continuity between the two mediums. 
 
Video games seem, at first glance, to represent a direct alternative to films in Laura Mulvey’s 
original male gaze article. Mulvey characterises viewers as wanting to control events due to 
their emotional engagement in the narrative; as mentioned before, because viewers cannot 
control events due to the ‘passive’ nature of the medium, then due to a combination of this and 
other devices viewers are led to project themselves into a character whose desires are aligned 
with their own and who can control events – usually, a heterosexual cis male protagonist. In 
video games, on face value, players do not seem to need to find a figure who has control over 
narrative events because players possess such control already in playing the game. However, 
although some control is undoubtedly exercised in order for a game to be a game, as I discussed 
in Chapter Two these control schemes often involve very different types of control from game 
to game – in some, movement of a character will be the only thing a player can control and in 
others players might be able to select dialogue or ethical choices without being able to move a 
character – and, indeed, sometimes multiple styles of control are presented in alternation within 
a single game. It is difficult to allow too many types of control at once due to the multi-tasking 
limitations of human and also the financial limitations of programming budgets; therefore 
control will always necessarily be limited, at least until the advent of some hypothetical VR 
simulacra of the real world where anything is possible but even then philosophical arguments 
regarding free will versus determinism can be summoned to render such control incoherent as a 
concept.  
 
Due to control schemes alternating and games always removing some element of choice even as 
another is offered, any distinction surrounding control in apparently active video games versus 
other supposedly passive media is unstable in a way that is instructive in furthering our 
understanding of narrative empathy and identification in general. Games offer control at some 




and non-playable sequences, there is a transmedial, filmic quality to those aspects of games 
which involve a withdrawal of control options on offer to a player. Although one might assume 
players would project themselves only into their main avatar, if viewers do this with characters 
in ‘passive’ media such as films, what happens in the player’s relationship with non-playable 
characters (NPCs) presented in film-like cut-scenes? Does the player’s control of the avatar 
override all other relations? As I suggested earlier in this chapter with regard to multiple 
characters and identification in novels, readers logically construct the interiority of each 
character in a text to some extent even if they report feeling allegiance or similarity with one 
particular character only. Despite exercising control of an avatar in video games, there is no 
clear reason why these character construction processes would not likewise occur in relation to 
NPCs if these processes occur in novels or films. Moreover, this situation becomes even more 
interesting when the avatar is considered both as controlled and non-controlled in different 
respects and at different points in a sequence – does the allegiance/identification relationship 
suddenly alter for example in the game The Last Of Us when our main avatar Joel appears in a 
cut-scene as opposed to controlling his movements, and what is occurring in our relationship 
with Joel when whilst controlling his movements he suddenly speaks to another character 
without our control? Moreover, as Chapter Four and the conclusion of this thesis will explore, 
what happens when avatar status suddenly switches to a character other than Joel at various key 
points of the narrative and we interact as someone other than Joel watching his actions as an 
NPC? This is not to mention the pre-existing diegesis of the majority of video games narratives 
that fits the avatar into the milieu of a given fictional game world that necessarily limits control 
and limits the extent to which we are the avatar; for example, despite the game Skyrim (2011) 
being lauded for offering unparalleled freedom of choice for its players,173 the player character 
is still operating within a fictional continent called Tamriel with a pre-existing set of options 
available at that fictional historical moment that diverge greatly from the player’s own 
background, even if the game does encourage its players to feel some synonymy with their 
supposedly blank-slate avatars.  
 
These complications and multiple facets of player construction of individual and multiple 
characters in video games revolve around a similar factor to that of my analysis of novels thus 
far – sequence and alternation. As part of Mulvey’s analysis of the male gaze, the audience wish 
to control narrative, and the resulting audience projection in films, Mulvey also explores 
alternation in gaze and emphasis, arguing that the extent to which gaze is diegetically unified 
between characters and audience is often manipulated as a formal feature of films with a 
                                                          
173 The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim, dir. by Todd Howard (Bethesda Game Studios, 2011); Tom Francis, ‘The Elder Scrolls 
V: Skyrim’, PC Gamer, 10 November 2011 <http://www.pcgamer.com/the-elder-scrolls-v-skyrim-review/> [accessed 




‘tension and shift from one pole to the other’ as to whether the camera’s look at the actors is 
aligned to the look of one character at other characters in a film, and how the audience’s look at 
the camera screen varies through these shifting tensions. For example, Mulvey suggests that 
when show-girls are depicted in classic cinema, this ‘allows the two looks to be unified 
technically without any apparent break in the diegesis. A woman performs within the narrative, 
the gaze of the spectator and that of the male characters in the film are neatly combined without 
breaking narrative verisimilitude’ but this does not remain constant as men themselves can be 
threatened with the gaze of the camera and audience.174  
 
However, male characters are not subject to the male gaze in an objectifying sense for Mulvey 
because heterosexual male viewers cannot accept their own objectification in the form of their 
‘exhibitionist like’ (the protagonist readers ally with in the text). Therefore in Mulvey’s 
framework women are instead objectified with the ‘male movie star’s glamorous characteristics 
[…] thus not those of the erotic object of the gaze, but those of the more perfect, more complete, 
more powerful ideal ego’ considered as the viewer’s ‘screen surrogate’ who is ‘free to command 
the stage’.175 Mulvey does not merely analyse the male gaze in a dispassionate manner however 
but puts forward a political proposal to battle its effects in future film making. Mulvey argues in 
a manner reminiscent of Brechtian alienation effects that viewers should gain ‘distance from the 
image’ on screen and that filmmakers should assist with this by freeing: 
 
the look of the audience into […] passionate detachment. There is no doubt that this 
destroys the satisfaction, pleasure and privilege of the ‘invisible guest’, and highlights 
how film has depended on voyeuristic active/passive mechanisms. Women, whose 
image has continually been stolen and used for this end, cannot view the decline of the 
traditional film form with anything much more than sentimental regret.176 
 
As I argued in the introduction of this thesis regarding Brecht’s own views, Mulvey’s argument 
here fits within a broad tradition of viewing identification with suspicion as a kind of ‘psychic 
infection’ and, just as with Brecht’s theories, Mulvey’s proposals against identification act as a 
negative-space theory about how identification in general works and is achieved. By arguing for 
distancing and apprehending all characters rather than just identifying with one, the suggestive 
quality of Mulvey’s own analyses of the ‘shifting tensions’ of the gaze are undermined; 
Mulvey’s model of identification ostensibly seems to be one of allegiance and claiming one 
character as an avatar, when her arguments really suggest identification to be unstable, shifting, 
and always holding potential to break its hold. Identification can instead for all these reasons be 
seen as an ongoing process involving all characters; the process might produce a feeling of 
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synonymy with a particular character in a film, novel, or video game, but logically and 
necessarily identification must be carried out with every character to whatever miniscule extent 
in order to stage and understand a literary text and to make these evaluative decisions.  
 
Likewise, Mulvey’s suggestions regarding distancing as creating a more equal sense of 
allegiance between the audience and multiple characters is flawed and based on something like 
an Aristotelian ideal of friendship as being weaker the more friends one has. However, for a text 
to achieve such universal and consistent distancing between the reader and each character, the 
sequence of that text would have to somehow overcome the idiosyncrasies of individual 
response and the gaze which someone brings to a text but also overcome the biases present in 
sequence such as the primacy effect of early encountered details affecting later characterising 
details. The answer to this situation is not perhaps to promote detachment from texts, but either 
to present alternative gazes or, as Myers suggests, engage in ‘subversions’ of these processes 
without negating their emotional and pleasurable powers. Mulvey’s attention to control, the 
shifting tensions of identification, and perspective in relation to multiple characters provides a 
way of further exploring these issues in novels and video games not because I have purposefully 
set out to create primarily feminist criticism but because, perhaps unsurprisingly to Mulvey and 
many other theorists, the majority of available examples for the analysis of identification in 
novels and video games represent distortions and manipulations of characterisation and 
perspective relating to gender. 
 
In Chapter Two, I explored how the sequence of The Road leads readers through various 
arguments about morality and empathy through its post-apocalyptic world, yet as I analysed in 
the previous section of this chapter, the abject figure of the mother is likely received by readers 
in an entirely different way to the male characters, however much reader idiosyncrasy affects 
these processes. Likewise, the Bioshock series of video games highlights certain female 
characters in a different way to the method through which the series depicts its men, rendering 
various women into surrogate daughter figures of the play in order to affect the way in which 
the player responds to or feels about other choices. In the previous chapter I also explored how 
the first two Bioshock games manipulate the player through sequence and varying levels of 
instruction to make certain choices -- such as killing Sander Cohen in Bioshock and then taking 
an ironic photograph of him or killing Grace Holloway, Stanley Poole, and Gilbert Alexander in 
Bioshock 2 – that may be optional according to the hidden rules of the game but which the 
player has been persuaded to make through the text’s procedural rhetoric. In Bioshock 2, it is 
revealed that the player’s adopted daughter Eleanor has been watching the player’s every 
decision throughout the game and ultimately bases her morality upon the player’s example no 




represents an intimate alternative to the Randian and Collectivist philosophies proposed in the 
Bioshock series, yet the retreat to fatherhood in a series about the failure of grand totalising 
political systems is not without its own political dimension with the exclusion of those outside 
the family as faceless threats to this unit (the splicers) or as figures we stand in judgement of as 
a fascistic symbol (the militant Big Daddy determining whether to execute a black woman, a 
weakling, or a collectivist individual without trial).  
 
So too can ideas regarding the male gaze be explored through this game. For example, Eleanor, 
the player’s daughter, is portrayed in early cut-scenes as an idyllic but troubled image of a child, 
a ‘Little Sister’ with a lack of sexualisation as appropriate for her young age and with cartoonish 
facial proportions, yet requiring the player’s protection whilst others desire to ‘harvest’ her for 
the chemicals within her system. The player’s self-construction as a father is directly opposed to 
the vague sexual overtones found in the manner in which the Splicers pursue the Little Sisters; 
affectionate touching by the player’s character such as handholding with the little girl acts to 
abject its violent and sexual counterpart in the Splicers’ attempts to penetrate the Little Sisters to 
extract their ADAM chemical to be powered by EVE, further gendering the exchange via these 
Edenic naming conventions. When the adult version of Eleanor is revealed, her face is largely 
androgynous and her clothing is suggestive of a thin female archetype; however, the ‘Big Sister’ 
diving suit she wears hides the shape of her breasts and other traditional objectified elements in 
the male gaze through being covered up by the joints where her helmet would attach to her suit 
and so on, furthering her androgyny. The game suggests that Eleanor needs rescuing as if she 
were a traditional princess in need of a hero (a common trope in video games as demonstrated 
by Anita Sarkeesian’s Tropes vs. Women in Video Games (2013-15) internet series) only to 
subvert this trope by showing her to be quite capable of fighting Splicers as an ally that can be 
summoned in combat. Instead, she is arguably gendered as a total reflection of the overtly 
masculinised Big Daddy player, rejecting her mother and slavishly following patriarchal 
example. As I explored in the previous chapter, by hiding the immediate ethical outcome of 
choices, Bioshock 2 creates a kind of negative space characterisation for the player to identify 
with in the form of Eleanor’s self-embodied view of what kind of person the player is; this is 
something the game even allows the player to agree or disagree with in a series of choices if 
Eleanor misunderstands the player’s motivations. Almost all endings involve the player’s soul 
literally living on in Eleanor (whether given freely or forcibly extracted) to further show this 
transmission of values in the game’s metaphorical representation of what happens when 
encountering all fictional characters – constructing another individual using your own prior 





However, in the third game in this series -- Bioshock Infinite (2013) – a similar albeit more 
convoluted situation is employed for dramatically different purposes.177 The protagonist speaks 
with a pre-determined backstory, voice, and ending as Booker DeWitt, an ex-Pinkerton agent 
sent to the Rapture-like rogue city of Columbia, founded by a man named Comstock as an 
exemplar of American exceptionalism and xenophobia. The player must rescue Comstock’s 
daughter Elizabeth from the city, but discovers along the way that Elizabeth can travel between 
alternate realities. The game eventually reveals that Elizabeth gained these abilities by being 
sold as a baby by Booker years before for a gambling debt to a disguised version of his alternate 
reality counterpart who in turn is revealed to be Comstock, the founder of Columbia. The game 
therefore reveals Elizabeth as the genetic child of both versions of Booker, the biological child 
of the player’s Booker, and the adopted child of Comstock (the NPC Booker).  
 
Despite the eventual revelation that she is the avatar’s biological daughter, the ‘male gaze’ in 
this video game is clearly aimed at Elizabeth, the primary secondary character with whom the 
player as the male avatar Booker DeWitt interacts. As the game is a first-person shooter with 
few cut-scenes, the player controls the game’s camera (equivalent to the avatar’s gaze) for the 
majority of the game. Most likely the player will look at objects and characters of gameplay 
interest such as enemies or items, and when the focus shifts to exploration the player will most 
likely look at Elizabeth, the chief actor on screen, due to a variety of techniques designed to 
invite players to reorient their look in her direction. For example, when the avatar Booker’s 
disembodied voice occasionally emerges from the screen with speech undirected by the player, 
he primarily talks to Elizabeth; if the player’s character begins talking to someone in the middle 
of gameplay, it is likely the player will either begin to anticipate the other character’s response 
and perhaps look at that character as she responds. Elizabeth is almost constantly with Booker 
throughout the entire game, contributing her own speech to refocus the player’s narrative 
attention, pointing out objects of interest to provide a gameplay motivation to look at her, and 
even sometimes engaging in a brute-force method of redirecting the player’s camera control by 
throwing coins she finds at Booker and forcing the camera to orient towards these coins to catch 
them. The game’s designers claimed that they had Elizabeth engage in such behaviour in order 
to be helpful as opposed to a burden the player must constantly protect;178 in many ways this 
supports her ‘to be looked at’ nature and the player’s potential desire for her character, as she 
provides gameplay support in addition to narrative and possible romantic interest (whether 
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directly from players interested in women or indirectly in viewers who recognise genre cues as 
to a potential romance occurring).  
 
Although Elizabeth possesses the greatest amount of characterising details of any individual in 
Bioshock Infinite, she is not an avatar for the player’s control (aside from a short downloadable 
add-on scenario for the game). Instead, Elizabeth is a woman to be watched and observed to the 
point of the game forcing the player to look at Elizabeth at times, ensuring the player notices as 
many of these otherwise avoidable characterising details as possible. This is underscored in 
Mulvey’s tradition by being designed with a ‘to-be-looked-at’ sexual quality; unlike Eleanor 
from Bioshock 2, for much of the game Elizabeth wears a tight-fitting corset with a greater 
amount of cleavage on view than any prior female character in the series, and early trailers for 
Bioshock Infinite demonstrate that at an earlier point in development Elizabeth’s physical 
proportions were even more exaggerated. Likewise, advertisements for the game used this same 
clothing on a model to further sell this as a key aspect of the game’s purchase, accentuating the 
importance of the costume for those who made the game. 
 
As the blog How Many Princesses argues, this clothing is not only ‘absolutely sexualised’ but 
inappropriate for the time period depicted, all geared towards aiming the viewer’s gaze at her 
breasts: 
 
The main feature of her outfit is a corset, which is literally worn to shape and accentuate 
breasts, waist, and hips so that they appear to be more hourglass-shaped. […] The 
biggest difference here [from their original use] being that Elizabeth’s corset is 
completely exposed. This is absolutely not period correct, as I’ve seen some people 
bizarrely argue. The game is set in an alternate 1912, and women were definitely not 
running around town in their underwear. […] Elizabeth’s dress also makes what I like 
to call a “boob window.” Her breasts are boxed in by the top line of her corset, a bolero 
coat, and a choker necklace. All of this serves to attract the eye toward what’s in the 
middle — her breasts. She also has long dark sleeves, which makes her pale skin pop 
out even more. And what’s the most exposed part of her? Oh yeah, her breasts. […] A 
real woman can choose to wear a low cut top for whatever reason she wants. It doesn’t 
matter. It’s her decision. But Elizabeth is an image carefully curated for your 
entertainment and each and every decision about her clothing, demeanor, and speech 
has been artificially created by someone other than herself.179 
 
This sexualisation of Elizabeth’s ‘to-be-looked-at’ formation within the game has interesting 
ramifications for the player’s mutual construction of both Booker as the player’s avatar and 
Elizabeth as NPC (non-playable character). Now, although the player is playing the role of the 
fictional Booker DeWitt within the game’s diegesis, the player’s control of Booker is loose; 
apart from a few early futile choices designed to show the meaningless of choice in a multiverse 
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where each decision spawns infinite variations and which therefore have little effect upon the 
narrative of the game, the only control the player has over Booker’s actions is to direct his legs 
and arms in running and shooting.  
 
The exclusive use of this control system combined with a voiced avatar speaking outside of the 
player’s decision-making necessarily creates a qualitatively different kind of character-player 
relationship to the silent avatar of Bioshock 2, for example. The player avatar in Bioshock 2 is 
supposed to be a blank slate whose memories were forcibly removed, whose vocal chords were 
ruined, and who is compelled to protect the little girl within the story; all of these features 
represent a diegetic explanation for the player’s relationship with the game’s control system 
without providing motivations for the character that might run contrary to the player’s own 
purposes. For example, the player has no control whatsoever over Booker’s continued lie to 
Elizabeth that he is taking her to Paris in a ruse designed to win her trust; there is no science-
fiction or plot-based explanation for why Booker does this apart from his own inner motivations 
to which the player is not initially privy. Although the player is aligned in part to Booker’s 
viewpoint through controlling his movements, outside of this Booker is subject to inference-
making processes of characterisation just as if he were an NPC. Given that a first-time player of 
this game may not know that Elizabeth is in fact Booker’s biological daughter since this fact 
revealed much later in the narrative, the player is invited by the game to construct a sense of the 
relationship between these characters and the way they feel about one another just like the 
player would for other similar pairings of NPCs. However, the player’s control of the camera 
and potential construction of Elizabeth through the male gaze throughout the game can be seen 
to create a curious doubling here. The player might believe that he or she is being invited by the 
game to find Elizabeth attractive at the same time as the player is controlling Booker as his or 
her avatar. Due to the simultaneous nature of this invited attraction and the player’s control of 
Booker, the player may de facto infer that their avatar Booker is likewise supposed to be read as 
being romantically attracted to Elizabeth even though Booker himself makes no direct romantic 
comment or action. 
 
The process of transferring player gaze onto the avatar Booker’s gaze can be seen as emerging 
from all of these elements discussed so far, including Elizabeth’s visual appearance, the game’s 
various encouragements to look at her, but also the player’s likely genre assumptions. Booker’s 
protective quality, drawing from an archetype of male action heroes throughout cinema, 
combines with Elizabeth’s naïve and dependent nature to hint, particularly in the first half, that 
there might be some romantic interest between the two despite Booker never making any 
suggestions of this kind directly through his speech. We could instead argue that as the player is 




player may infer this attraction as occurring in Booker because the game’s procedural rhetoric 
has led the player to create it on Booker’s behalf. To add to this, various yet occasional narrative 
elements such as Elizabeth’s wish to go to Paris with Booker, her questions as to whether 
Booker is married, and indeed the usual nature of this prince-rescuing-princess stock situation 
authenticate any player feeling that there might be some romantic chemistry between the two 
characters. Players may understandably have the expectation based on the majority of modern 
video games, novels, and films that a beautiful single woman such as Elizabeth is likely to be 
sexually available to the heterosexual male avatar, and combined with the absence of anything 
seeming to prevent such narrative assumptions such as the father-child dynamic in Bioshock 2, 
there is no initial incest taboo to discourage players from attributing this motivation to either 
character within their mental staging of the characters’ inner worlds.  
 
However, as the game will reveal that the player’s avatar is Elizabeth’s biological father, the 
player will have unwittingly engaged in such a fictional act of incestual desire. An analogue to 
this situation can be found in the film Oldboy (2003), which depicts a man named Dae-Su’s 
sudden and unexplained fifteen-year solitary confinement only to be abruptly released with a 
taunt to discover who did this to him and why.180 Early on, Dae-Su learns that in his fifteen year 
absence he was thought to have murdered his wife and that after his wife’s death his daughter 
was adopted and moved abroad; as part of this discovery, Dae-Su meets a young woman, Mi-
Do, who helps him in his journey to find out who imprisoned him. A traditional romance plot 
ensues between the pair as inevitably occurs in many films featuring an unrelated male and 
female lead, just as the player of Bioshock Infinite might assume there is some romantic 
chemistry between the avatar and Elizabeth. In Oldboy, Mulvey’s ‘shifting tensions’ of the male 
gaze alternate between the viewer’s own gaze directly at the woman on screen versus the 
problematic ways in which the pair actually act out this romance. The hypothetical viewer gaze 
at the woman Mi-Do occurs not necessarily in terms of actual desire but through an 
understanding as to her romantic potential for the male protagonist.  
 
For example, distancing and abjection effects are invited in response to Dae-Su when he tries to 
act on his apparent attraction in a wild and violent charge against Mi-Do when she sits on the 
toilet. The scene is even made partially comedic when Dae-Su repeats the line ‘Can fifteen 
years’ worth of imaginary training be put to use?’, referencing a line from earlier in the film 
when he wondered if his watching fighting films over the past years could help him in actual 
combat. Here, Dae-Su is presumably alluding to his fantasising over woman with the conclusion 
‘apparently not’. Mi-Do responds even more strangely in a surprisingly methodical manner 
musing on the way in which he should properly approach her in the future:  
                                                          





I brought you back here and then turned you down. I can see why you’re angry, I really 
can. You know, I brought you back here because I like you […] You see, later on, when 
I’m really ready, I swear on my life that I’ll go through with it. […] I may try and resist 
you again in the heat of the moment, but no matter what, don’t stop. Just give it to me! 
 
In the film’s conclusion, in retrospect these odd moments in the development of their 
relationship are explained implicitly. Dae-Su realizes why he has been imprisoned; whilst at 
school as a teenager he witnesses a brother and sister engaging in an incestual affair and told 
others what he had seen, leading the pregnant sister to commit suicide by falling from her 
brother’s arms off a bridge. The brother grew rich and powerful over time and imprisoned Dae-
Su for this number of years not just as a punishment but specifically to allow Dae-Su’s daughter 
to grow into an unrecognisable woman and then arrange through a mixture of hypnotic 
suggestion and direct interference for an unwitting Dae-Su and an unwitting daughter to begin a 
sexual relationship. Dae-Su discovers this and apparently successfully atones for it by cutting 
off his own tongue for having had a ‘big mouth’, thereby leading his enemy to agree to keep the 
truth from Mi-Do.  
 
The power of this revelation in Oldboy involves the ‘shifting’ diegetic tensions of gaze suddenly 
uniting once more; the viewer’s enacting of the protagonists’ relationship collides with the 
retroactively established knowledge of its incestual and taboo nature, rendering any prior viewer 
support of (and, for Mulvey, a concomitant wish to control) this romance plot similarly 
transgressive. In Bioshock Infinite, the player’s literal control over Booker’s gaze, accentuated 
by the game’s ongoing encouragements to look at Elizabeth, implicates the player even further 
in an incestual transgression. As the player does not control Booker’s speech and as he is not so 
much of a blank slate to allow the player to impose his or her own motivations upon Booker, 
they are not really Booker’s actions at least in terms of verifiable or specific evidence within the 
game. They are only Booker’s actions insomuch as the avatar is an amalgam of textual detail 
and the player’s interpretative activity, just as with any NPC or indeed Dae-Su in Oldboy. The 
act of controlling Booker’s gaze and movements is a narrative affordance unique to video games 
and is powerful enough to provoke these judgements and emotional responses in the absence of 
explicit evidence on Booker’s part for romance (a burden of proof required for a film such as 
Oldboy for example) due to the player’s collaborative activity in physically staging Booker 
within the game world.  
 
The player becomes Booker in an analogous manner to how a reader of The Road might 
imagine the position of a man trying to keep himself and his son alive in a post-apocalyptic 
world full of cannibals and apply his or her own personal standards and beliefs to how the pair 




is like to survive within Columbia and travel with Elizabeth. Combined with the shifting 
tensions of the male gaze and the game’s encouragements to sexualise the pair’s relationship, 
such inferences become true and powerful in a narrative sense even in the absence of any hint 
that Booker was indeed interested in Elizabeth in such a manner. If something is constructed by 
a reader and no plot detail explicitly contradicts it, then there is no reason to necessarily 
abandon any idea, particularly if the procedural rhetoric of a text has worked to convince a 
reader or player of its truth. Whatever the different devices and unique affordances of each 
medium, a character exists in this way as an amalgam of player and text, with identification 
modified by negotiation in relation to other characters and emotional engagement, not subject to 
the same rules of coherency as other kinds of arguments and bound only to sequence of the 
narrative and the idiosyncrasy of the perceiver’s inference.  
 
 
4. Negotiating Multiple Perspectives in Enduring Love 
 
The interaction of multiple characters within a sequence can have a great impact upon the way 
each individual character is formed within the reader or player’s mind, whether these processes 
involve gendering in the male gaze, altering levels of characterising detail available for various 
characters, or shifting the control or perspective on offer depending upon a given text’s 
purposes. With The Road I explored how a prose text dominated by the perspective of just two 
characters briefly opens up a third protagonist in its early stages in the form of the father’s 
memory of the mother only for this perspective to most likely be rejected by most readers as 
antithetical to their emotional engagement with the father and son’s struggle. With Bioshock: 
Infinite I examined how player control of perspective in video games can be selectively offered, 
withdrawn, and manipulated by the game in various ways to encourage certain responses in 
players. With Ian McEwan’s novel Enduring Love, I will demonstrate how such manipulations 
of perspective can be tested in relation to prose fiction that itself engages in perspective shifts at 
key moments.  
 
Enduring Love manipulates identification by presenting rigorously structured checkpoints along 
the way that interrupt the predominant narrative of heroism and fear by simultaneously drawing 
attention to two alternate yet opposite point of views in the form of alternative focalisers in a 
text otherwise directly narrated by its protagonist. These moments, occurring three times 
throughout the novel, work to present two radically opposed ideas – that its protagonist is 
utterly correct to fear his apparent antagonist throughout the novel and alternatively that the 
protagonist was deluded, had nothing to fear, and that personal issues are to blame. These 




the reader is likely to find the most entertaining, interesting, and aesthetically fulfilling, as I will 
demonstrate.  
 
Enduring Love is narrated predominantly in the first-person by Joe as a homodiegetic narrator, a 
science writer whose relationship with his partner Clarissa is falling apart amidst the backdrop 
of another man, Parry, becoming inexplicably convinced that he and Joe are in love and meant 
to be together. The novel thematises questions of people’s ability to interpret others accurately 
from the very beginning, when Joe and Parry first meet whilst trying to rescue a child from a 
balloon accident only for another man to tragically die as the men let go of that balloon out of 
fear for their safety. During this initial event, Joe’s narration moves back and forth to suggest 
that what he narrates is affected by his discussion with Clarissa in the aftermath of the event, 
‘delaying’ information from the ‘buzzard’ perspective of imagining himself high above events 
rather than enmeshed within them.181 In Joe’s narration of Parry’s dangerous and ‘enduring’ 
love for himself in spite of all reason and every obstacle, and in Clarissa’s doubt as to the reality 
of Parry’s very existence and love for Parry, Joe’s narration is called into doubt in two totally 
different directions (that he does love Parry and that Parry either does not exist or is harmless). 
Joe himself posits what the other characters think in a manner which, via all these manipulations 
of sequence, is simultaneously slightly incoherent (the other characters are not entirely wrong in 
their accusations as to Joe giving some encouragement in these situations, as I will demonstrate) 
whilst strongly persuasive (the reader is invited to judge Clarissa as overly harsh whilst judging 
Joe’s narration as accurate and the man himself as heroic). That both The Road and Enduring 
Love brazenly state their logical incoherencies in the mouths of wives is a testament not only to 
the power of procedural rhetoric in overriding logical incoherency as I have argued in prior 
chapters but also the misogynistic cultural construction of women as foils or objects to be 
ignored. 
 
McEwan manipulates sequence and these effects in Enduring Love in a similar manner to the 
way in which Cormac McCarthy’s The Road sequences its various cannibal encounters to lead 
its readers through a procedural rhetoric regarding trust and ethics in a post-apocalyptic world 
(see Chapter Two). The Road accomplishes this regardless of the internal coherency of the 
actual stages of this argument, relying instead upon processes of characterisation and reader 
allegiance. Enduring Love shows Parry’s obsession with Joe at the same time as the text shows 
Clarissa’s scepticism at Joe’s version of events and the growing distance between herself and 
Joe. This pattern crystallises three times throughout the narrative with varying combinations of 
a structure involving a chapter told entirely as a letter from Parry or Clarissa, an encounter with 
                                                          





Parry, and an encounter with Clarissa who refuses to believe some aspect of Parry’s obsession; 
this occurs in Chapters 11-12, 15-16, and 22-23. 
 
The novel juxtaposes this doubt with actual diegetic proof of Parry’s obsession in the form of 
found document chapters featuring letters that represent Parry temporarily becoming narrator of 
the novel. In each case, such letters increase the likely extent to which Clarissa’s doubt might 
seem untenable to the reader, and even if such letters did not present direct proof of Parry’s 
obsession it nevertheless may seem odd that she is so quick to doubt her partner. Joe’s 
encounters with Parry create a sense of reasonable trustworthiness as to his depiction of events, 
there is no prior history of problems or arguments between Joe and Clarissa, and Joe generally 
does not engage in much behaviour in these early stages of the novel to suggest he is not to be 
believed. Even so, Clarissa has very little patience for Joe’s claims and instead seems more 
concerned by Joe’s turmoil regarding his science career options. For example, following 
Chapter Eleven – composed entirely of a letter from Parry to cement the diegetic truth status of 
his obsession with Joe outside of Joe’s own narration with a lower burden of proof than say the 
father’s narrated and stylised memory of his wife’s suicide speech in The Road -- Joe brings this 
doubting aspect of Clarissa’s behaviour into direct focus in Chapter Twelve when he decides to 
search through his partner’s possessions and letters to find some explanation for her lack of 
support: 
 
I told myself that I was acting to untie knots, bring light and understanding to this mess 
of the unspoken. It was a painful necessity. I would save Clarissa from herself, and 
myself from Parry. I would renew the bonds, the love through which Clarissa and I had 
thrived for years. If my suspicions had no basis in fact, then it was vital to be able to set 
them aside. I pulled open the drawer in which she kept her recent correspondence. Each 
successive act, each moment of deeper penetration was coarsening. I cared less by the 
second that I was behaving badly. Something tight and hard, a screen, a shell, was 
forming to protect myself from my conscience. My rationalisations crystallised around a 
partial concept of justice: I had a right to know what was distorting Clarissa’s responses 
to Parry. What was stopping her from being on my side? (p. 105). 
 
Joe goes on to posit that this might be ‘some hot little bearded fuck-goat of a post-graduate’, 
echoing his own ‘penetration’ of Clarissa’s private space, but can find no evidence of an affair 
in her letters, yet this whole process foreshadows a turning point later in the narrative where 
Parry will attempt Joe’s assassination at a birthday lunch, picking up a letter with ‘her 
godfather, the eminent Professor Kale, inviting us to lunch in a restaurant on her birthday. I 
already knew about that’ (p. 105).  
 
Later in the novel, this pattern repeats in a manner that not only links directly into this first 
moment – hinging upon Joe searching through Clarissa’s letters – but which develops Parry’s 




narrative. Towards the end of Chapter Fifteen, Joe encounters Parry on the way back to his 
home, finding the man with a letter in his hand. The encounter, as usual, shows a gulf of 
understanding between what Parry appears to be thinking Joe is saying and Joe’s fear and 
disgust at Parry’s apparent mental condition. For example, Joe says ‘Let me through or I’ll call 
the police’ only for the following mixture of description and direct speech to follow regarding 
Parry: ‘He nodded eagerly, as though he had heard me inviting him up for a drink. “But I’d like 
you to read this first,” he said. “It’s very important?” (p. 129). Parry’s action can be read by the 
reader as odd – he does not appear to understand the fear this man has of him – this ultimatum 
that he will call the police – or in turn be himself afraid of possible legal reprisals for his 
actions. On the contrary, it is as if Parry has heard something entirely differently – ‘nodded 
eagerly’ does not fit as a response to what has just been said – and Joe as narrator cements this 
possible reader understanding of events with his own reading, ‘as though he had heard me 
inviting him up for a drink’. The reader is forced to generate different versions of the narrative 
here not because the reader is likely to disbelief Joe but out of necessity to understand why 
Parry’s actions and words seem to be taking place in a different conversation and context. 
Readers need to attempt to generate Parry’s version of the world as much as they need to 
generate Joe’s version of events for such passages to be effective. However, as the novel is 
narrated by Joe, ‘Parry’s version of the world’ is only accessible through Joe’s biased 
perspective.  
 
Throughout his narration, for all his apparent fear of Parry, Joe’s narration provides and posits 
what Parry’s inner world must be like in feeling this love, hypothesising the elements of his 
romance: ‘There was something he wanted to tell me. First he glanced at the presence over his 
shoulder. When he spoke his voice was breathy and I guessed his heart was racing. This was a 
moment he had prepared for’ (p. 129). Joe guesses correctly that ‘there was something he 
wanted to tell’ him but it remains a guess nonetheless; when Parry ‘glanced at the presence over 
his shoulder’, ‘the presence’ possibly refers to Joe and Clarissa’s shared apartment in the 
building behind them. The apartment is presented as something indistinct and perhaps troubling 
for Parry through Joe’s word-choice of ‘presence’ to refer to the apartment block as opposed to 
using the term ‘building’ or ‘their apartment’. Joe’s imaginative act on Parry’s behalf continues 
with a shift from ‘his voice was breathy’ – a statement that seems reasonably factual – to ‘I 
guessed his heart was racing’, admitting an element of subjectivity outright with ‘I guessed’, to 
finally a judgement delivered with the force of fact – ‘This was a moment he had prepared for’ 
(p. 129). None of these things can entirely be known by Joe; perhaps Parry having an alteration 
in his breathing or tone of voice might be spotted, but so too is Joe fearful and emotionally 
charged in this situation. It is difficult to disentangle diegetic facts here from Joe’s perspective 




any focalisation via the perspective of any character in any text is likely to represent a distortion 
of ‘truth’ to a subjective perspective. Of course, even with an omniscient narrator, the reader 
still infers what these phrases mean and brings his or her own nuanced idiosyncratic 
interpretation of a text, but the reader’s trusting relationship with their inferred meaning of what 
an authoritative narrator might be trying to communicate is qualitatively different to a more 
sceptical relationship with a particular character in a text. Stylistic patterns can even have 
similar effects, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter in my analysis of the mother in The Road 
being recalled only via the father’s memory but being unverifiable by any other viewpoint due 
to the father’s focalisation of the scene and the mother’s use of his thinking style in her direct 
speech. Likewise, as Bioshock Infinite shows, due to the sequential arrangement of other 
elements the text can still strongly encourage reader inference as to what a character might be 
thinking or feeling about other characters even if no direct statement is made. 
 
Traditional questions of unreliability enter this equation whenever we encounter homodiegetic 
narrators and focalisers, regardless of the extent to which narrators actually seem to 
miscommunicate events. These questions of reliability emerge because in texts such as 
Enduring Love every encounter with a character who is not the narrator necessarily induces a 
moment of characterisation for the narrator as well as the character who is being narrated. The 
reader might also make a separate inference as to what that other character might be like outside 
of the character’s narration, however nuanced and subtle this secondary reading might be. To 
repeat the earlier formulae, this process of Joe reading Parry does not just represent Reader  
Parry but also Reader  Joe  Parry (contributing to Joe’s characterisation as much as Parry) 
and also Reader  Parry (inferring what Parry is like outside of Joe’s narration, a kind of 
reading that is particularly privileged whenever direct speech is used). Moreover, a fourth and 
more subtle reading occurs in Parry’s apparent reactions to Joe’s actions (characterising Joe 
through how Parry reacts to him) as Reader  Parry  Joe, even if Parry does not narrate the 
actions going on in this encounter outside of direct speech. Readers read readers reading 
readers.  
 
The narrator appears to be correct in his fear of Parry’s obsession, not because Parry goes on to 
give the expected declaration of love or realisation of unhappiness in their nascent ‘relationship’ 
associated with his heart racing and preparing for this moment, but instead due to the bizarre 
situation Parry describes in perfect keeping with Joe’s narration of his character’s 
unpredictability and mental health: 
 
‘I paid a researcher and he got me all your articles. I read them last night, thirty-five of 




succeed. Not even if you wrote a million and I read them all, you’ll never destroy what I 
have. It can’t be taken away.’ (p. 129) 
 
Parry suggests that Joe’s prior history in science writing is somehow a deliberate ploy to 
‘destroy’ and ‘take away’ his love through science’s conflict with Parry’s religious beliefs. 
Parry is suggesting more than just the kind of incompatibility that might be posited on 
discovering a new lover holds contradictory ethical beliefs to one’s own; Parry is suggesting 
that somehow Joe has written all these articles to intentionally diminish Parry’s love for Joe 
even prior to the pair having ever met. As we have access to Joe’s representation of his own 
thoughts (proving he did not in fact write science articles to attack Parry) and as the timeline of 
what Parry is suggesting makes little sense, the reader is very likely to think Parry’s accusation 
to be pure delusion. However, Parry’s dominant behaviour has shifted from inexplicable 
unadulterated joy at their ‘love’ to become negative for the first time. When this behaviour 
shifts even further to become threatening, the reader’s attempt to understand Parry’s alternative 
world view grows even more urgent insomuch as tragic implications involving matters of life 
and death might ensue:  
 
‘I’m pretty well off you know. I can get people to do things for me. Anything I want. 
There’s always someone who needs the money. What’s surprising is how cheap it is, 
you know, for something you’d never do yourself?’ He let this pseudo-question hang, 
and watched me. (pp. 129-30) 
 
This threat not only represents a turning point in the narrative towards the climactic events 
where Parry will attempt Joe’s assassination, but a general trend in Parry’s behaviour that will 
culminate in Chapter 22 with his holding Clarissa hostage.  
 
With such a threat of violence, it is imperative for Joe and any readers who feel allegiance for 
Joe to identify the nature of Parry’s obsession and what he might be capable of. Joe’s hypothesis 
of de Clérambault's Syndrome (where a person will become inexplicably infatuated with 
another without any prior interaction) seems to provide an answer. The novel’s conclusion with 
a found document ‘reprinted from the British Review of Psychiatry’ describing Parry’s specific 
case history encourages a sense that this diagnosis is ‘the answer’ to this thriller story. This 
conclusion explains the antagonist’s actions in a similar manner to how horror narratives will 
often explain the life story of the ghost haunting the characters and where such a story provides 
the tools the protagonists need to banish it from their home. However, the character of Clarissa 
not only doubts the existence of Parry and this medical condition, but moreover produces a 
triangle of this constant need to interpret another’s actions where Joe is trying to decode Parry’s 
motives, Parry is trying to decode Joe’s motives, and now Clarissa and Joe try to interpret one 




worry that he might be ‘over-interpreting’ Parry’s remarks, only to encounter Clarissa who has 
realised Joe looked through her letters and was trying to build up the will to look through his 
letters in retaliation, thinking that this is what he wanted: 
 
‘You even left the drawer open so I’d know when I came in. It’s a statement, a message, 
from you to me, it’s a signal. The trouble is, I don’t know what it means. Perhaps I’m 
being very stupid. So spell it out for me now, Joe. What is it you’re trying to tell me?’ 
(p. 132) 
 
Enduring Love’s structural repetition of chapter combinations (one which contains a letter from 
Parry to Joe, the other of which usually shows Clarissa doubting Joe’s claims) repeatedly recalls 
Joe’s own initial invasive curiosity in searching through Clarissa’s letters in this manner. For 
example, Chapter 12 features Joe searching through Clarissa’s letters, Chapter 15 features 
Clarissa realising this search took place at the same time that Parry starts making threats, and 
Chapter 22 features Parry directly carrying out this threat by holding Clarissa hostage. Likewise, 
this moment where Clarissa accuses Joe of purposefully leaving the drawer open as a ‘signal’ 
that she does not understand – ‘spell it out for me now, Joe. What is it you’re trying to tell me?’ 
(p. 132) – echoes the way in which Parry has repeatedly talked of hidden codes in Joe’s 
behaviour as recently as a few pages beforehand: 
 
‘It’s OK, Joe. It really is. It’s difficult for me too. I understand you just as well as you 
understand me. You can be open with me. You don’t have to wrap it up in code, really 
you don’t.’ 
    As I stepped back and turned towards my car I said, ‘There is no code. It would be 
better if you accepted that you need help.’ (p. 130) 
 
It is not only Parry that searches for codes; Parry is just an exaggerated, mentally ill incarnation 
of the same kind of behaviours that both Parry and Clarissa engage in. The title of the novel 
‘Enduring Love’ not only refers to Parry’s strangely enduring and unshakeable love, or Joe’s 
enduring love for Clarissa, but has a second sense – that one has to endure and suffer through 
love. The way in which Clarissa interacts with, suspects, and rebuffs Joe’s struggles with his 
admirer Parry is in many ways similar to Joe’s own rebuttal of Parry’s love. 
 
The novel thematises the inscrutable nature of not only love but of interpreting other people – 
one of Joe’s biggest fears over Parry being that ‘Perhaps I was over-interpreting. The ambiguity 
fed my fear’ (p. 131). Likewise, just prior to Chapter 15’s encounter with Parry, Joe finds a 
similar example of a failure to interpret the actions of another in his visit to a grieving widow 
who believed her husband to have been having an affair before his death based on a set of 
strongly convincing yet circumstantial clues. This widow’s misinterpretation will be proved 
false in the denouement of the novel following the combination of the final letter and Clarissa 




suggesting such failures to interpret another are part of the novel’s larger theme. Even the cause 
of Parry’s sudden threatening behaviour towards Joe and the content of his letter in Chapter 16 
revolves around doubt, love, and inscrutability, and here Parry places such doubt specifically in 
relation to God, Joe’s apparent failure to love God, and Parry’s belief without proof in both 
Joe’s love and God’s love. This nexus of concerns is echoed in the climactic Chapter 22 right 
before the final letter of the novel when Parry admits he tried to kill Joe – an action that even the 
reader might have begun to doubt due to the police questioning Joe’s account of Parry’s alleged 
attack as unreliable and incorrect in several remembered details. At the point of Parry’s 
confession, as much for the reader’s benefit as for doubting Clarissa’s ears, Joe insists that Parry 
repeat himself for proof: 
 
He took a deep breath. We were coming to it. ‘Forgiveness?’ he said on a rising 
interrogative note. ‘Please forgive me, Joe, for what I did yesterday, for what I tried to 
do.’ 
  I was so surprised I could not speak immediately. I took my hand out of my pocket 
and said, ‘You tried to kill me.’ I wanted to hear him say it. I wanted Clarissa to hear. 
  ‘I planned it, I paid for it. If you wouldn’t return my love, I thought I’d rather have you 
dead. It was insanity, Joe. I want you to forgive me.’ (p. 212) 
 
Later in the page, Parry once again defies Joe’s expectations – here being that he will harm Joe 
or Clarissa – and instead threatens to commit suicide. Parry links his love for Joe to his love for 
God and deems both of these loves to be entirely one-sided: 
 
He pleaded in a kind of rising wail, an unbearable sound. ‘You’ve never given me a 
thing. Please let me have this. I’m going to do it anyway. Let me have this one thing 
from you. Forgiveness, Joe. If you forgive me, God will too.’ (p. 212) 
 
Joe answers Parry’s request to kill him by incapacitating him instead. In refusing to kill Parry, 
Joe rejects Parry’s binary choice of forgiveness/non-forgiveness with a rhetorical question 
predicated both on Parry’s mental illness and an apparent newly discovered sympathy in Joe – 
‘How can I forgive you when you’re mad?’ (p. 213) 
 
However much this encounter is charged with suspense, excitement, twists, and turns, the 
aftermath once again takes a narratively unexpected route through the surprising and perhaps 
logic-defying continuation of Clarissa’s lack of sympathy for Joe and her denial of his 
sufferings. Joe sets up a hypothetical alternative world where ‘logic was the engine of feeling’ 
and where he and Clarissa would embrace with ‘conciliatory murmurs and words of forgiveness 
and love […] But such logic would have been inhuman’ (p. 213). Joe critiques this logic as a 





The narrative compression of storytelling, especially in the movies, beguiles us with 
happy endings into forgetting that sustained stress is corrosive of feeling. It’s the great 
deadener. Those moments of joyful release from terror are not so easily had. (p. 213) 
 
The reader is therefore informed that the usual expected end result of narratives in this genre 
will not occur and that no ‘joyful release’ (by which Joe appears to allude to a process akin to 
Aristotelian catharsis) should be expected. Such a direction is complicated by the way in which 
the next chapter uses an epistolary format. The reader has been primed to respond to letters as 
providing evidence and insight into Parry’s delusion, but likewise the reader has been primed to 
expect such chapters to be followed by Clarissa’s increasingly unbelievable doubt that such 
delusion exists. This final epistolary chapter, following this notice that ‘joyful release’ in a 
‘happy ending’ will not occur, unites these two prior chapter formats in a single chapter and 
features a letter from Clarissa herself. The fact that Parry has just directly held Clarissa hostage 
and threatened their lives might invite the reader to hypothesise that ‘release’ will come in the 
form of Clarissa finally realising she is wrong. Clarissa’s letter has the entirely opposite 
emotional content as she repeats her earlier doubts whilst still shifting emotional emphasis on to 
matters other than the gunman who just confronted both of them.  
 
The reader is finally permitted unmediated access to Clarissa’s character in a manner not shaped 
and selected by Joe as narrator in one of the final chapters of the novel after a dramatic climax. 
The epistolary chapters from Parry’s perspective act to humanise him and provide a more 
internally coherent logic than his disjointed conversations with Joe in real life due to the 
absence of a narrator mediating his words. This Clarissa chapter on the other hand acts to 
accentuate those features that readers may have found nonsensical rather than explaining them; 
indeed, this chapter leaves Clarissa as the only remaining villain figure of the narrative. Earlier 
when I explored the character of the suicidal mother in Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, I argued 
that she is likely to be abjected by many readers. Even though the mother’s arguments about the 
terrible life they will lead are valid, I argued that abjection in the eyes of the reader is likely to 
occur as the mother’s emotional and stylistic presentation of her arguments is unlikely to 
promote sympathy in a reader who is already likely to feel invested in the continuation of her 
husband’s and son’s survival across the wasteland. Frequently female characters are shaped by 
authors in this manner as homunculi born from an uncanny valley where the narrative tells us 
that they are human and experience emotion in a similar manner to other characters, but where 
the style and events relating to such characters invoke detachment or even active dislike in 
readers.  
 
It is perhaps of literary interest that Clarissa’s character represents an extreme doubting 




hardship, but likewise it is of feminist interest that the only female character in this novel is the 
only character to occupy such a monolithic and bizarre argumentative position. As I analysed in 
relation to the mother in The Road and as I will explore in the next chapter in my analysis of the 
video game Heavy Rain, some female characters are characterised in narratives in such a way as 
to lead to fundamentally different identifications forming in the minds of readers for female 
characters than might be formed in relation to male characters. Mulvey spoke of women 
existing as objects to be looked at and men as characters to support as active figures within 
narratives. Many texts have completed this misogynist project by rendering female characters as 
more than just objects to be looked at but as the diametric opposite of the desired role of active 
hero. These texts render female characters as enemies of the reader’s emotional engagement 
with various genres, whether consciously or unconsciously on the part of their authors. This 
class of characters attempts to stymy stories of survival and heroism by denying the existence of 
such traits, and in so doing engage in a range of behaviours from radical scepticism as in 
Clarissa’s case or to kill oneself rather than live a lie as in The Road. They cannot properly be 
called ‘anti-heroes’ for that term already contains the potential for the character to occupy a 
subversively heroic role. Instead, such characters can be identified by the misogynistic concept 
from which they spring in the form of the ‘nag’ and engage in such ‘nagging’ behaviour by 
opposing the further development of events that the reader might wish to occur or that the reader 
might believe to be emotionally engaging.  
 
It is the fault of authors that such roles are predominantly associated with women as although 
these ‘nag’ roles are likely to be the subject of reader ire, such characterisations are not 
necessarily representative of poor writing but can serve a function similar to a pantomime 
villain promoting a different kind of dramatic conflict. Therefore, the role of ‘nag’ has the 
potential to be one of great substance and effect, yet its repeated gendering renders it offensive. 
For an example of how this device can be narratively successful, we can explore the paragraphs 
after Joe dramatically saves both Clarissa and Parry. Despite Joe’s dramatic rescue of both 
Clarissa and Parry from Parry’s suicidal obsession, the main image focussed upon at the 
conclusion of that climactic chapter is once again Clarissa’s disapproval and lack of support for 
Joe. The location of such disapproval in a short paragraph at the end of a climactic sequence is 
intriguing for its confounding of the reader’s likely expectation. Moreover, Clarissa’s utter 
disbelief that a narrative struggle has occurred between Parry and Joe throughout the past weeks 
creates dramatic tension insomuch as Joe and the reader are given a final villain to rail against.  
 
Here, Clarissa is not pleased that Joe has saved her, but instead responds with disgust: 
 
I saw the expression on Clarissa’s face. She was on her feet and she was staring at the 




would never get past this moment. Lately my worst suspicions had tended to be 
confirmed. I was getting things right in the worst possible way. My score was 
depressingly high. Perhaps we really were finished. (pp. 214-15) 
 
That Clarissa is described as having ‘such repulsion’ upon her face could be seen as outrageous 
to a reader who has been following Joe’s trials. Joe has just saved everyone – himself and 
Clarissa from being murdered by Parry, and indeed Parry from suicide. For Clarissa to be 
disgusted at this is worthy of inviting a kind of repulsion and abjection from many readers 
herself for reasons that perhaps relate more to the workings of identification than to actual 
ethics. Clarissa works against the narrative wish of any reader emotionally invested in the 
novel’s narrative to exert control over events; she occupies the stereotype of the nagging female 
lead. I am not proposing that such ‘nag’ characters who act as a foil for narrative progression 
should no longer be present in texts, but there is no need for such characters to be almost 
universally women. Skyler White from Breaking Bad for example is an excellent, well-drawn, 
and deep character whose opposition to her husband’s lies and unethical behaviour is complex 
and nuanced. However, as I discussed earlier, the depth of this betrayal has not particularly 
endeared the character with many viewers who have harassed the actress with claims that she is 
a ‘shrieking, hypocritical harpy’. The repeated association of such antagonistic ‘nag’ characters 
with the female gender cannot help but promote misogynistic attitudes where the male character 
tries to do something exciting and where the female character attempts to stop the man’s 
journey. 
 
Not all ‘nags’ are necessarily women, although in cases of male characters occupying this role 
there are often more redeeming features to be found. In Chapter One of this thesis, for example, 
I explored how disgust operates in relation to the male character of Gradus in Vladimir 
Nabokov’s Pale Fire. On the surface, Gradus would seem to fit Enduring Love’s depiction of 
Parry more than he does Clarissa. Both Parry and Gradus are apparently mad for example and 
obsessed with their respective narrators Joe and Kinbote, with the character of Clarissa seeming 
to have a similar role to someone like Shade as a comparatively normal bystander. However, if 
we consider that Kinbote is himself also potentially insane depending on the reader’s 
interpretation of the novel -- believing that the whole world is hunting him as a lost and fallen 
king and self-deluded in thinking he had a great friendship with Shade – in many senses 
Kinbote is more like Parry from Enduring Love. Even if he is a stalker and obsessive, Kinbote’s 
‘dream’ logic as discussed throughout Chapter One of this thesis has a poetry and emotive 
power to it regardless of the reader’s acceptance of its diegetic reality – perhaps even enhanced 





In contrast with this, Parry is nowhere near as complicated a character as Kinbote. Parry lacks 
Kinbote’s complicated nature in part because Parry has very few opportunities to narrate or 
focalize apart from the aforementioned letter-writing chapters, as opposed to Kinbote’s 
narration masterfully mixing editing conventions, third, and first-person to convey his 
viewpoints. However, Parry does possess narrative virtues in line with the genre codes of a 
stalker narrative like Enduring Love; without such a figure for Joe to engage with, where is the 
conflict and emotional engagement for the reader? Gradus however is oddly stymied in his 
ability to present an antagonistic threat in Pale Fire and is instead elaborated as a ‘half man’ of 
stupidity and zealotry in his cause. Gradus’s incompetence and lack of depth throughout the 
narrative is not due to gender however but due to the twist reveal that Gradus may be an 
invention of Kinbote and that instead a mental patient killed John Shade. The notion that 
Zembla never existed and that this whole novel is a creative act to defy the meaninglessness of 
Kinbote’s existence and Shade’s senseless death emerges in part from this penultimate 
revelation that the novel’s antagonist never existed. In this sense, Gradus is more similar to 
Clarissa than Parry; Clarissa denies reality, fiction, and story in her conversations with Joe; she 
argues that nothing the reader is constructing is actually happening and that any sense of drama 
should end. The distinction between Gradus and Clarissa is that Gradus is a male character 
designed to fit this role as a consciously badly-drawn character for reasons other than his 
gender, whereas Clarissa potentially occupies her role because she is female according to the 
stereotype such characters usually adhere towards. Moreover, Gradus’s presence only explicitly 
contradicts Kinbote’s narrative towards the very end of the text, whereas Clarissa not only 
expresses her doubt of Joe’s claims at the earliest opportunity but intensifies them as the novel 
progresses. 
 
To reiterate the likely emotional and narrative engagement of the reader with Enduring Love, a 
story about obsession and love does not exist without one individual loving another or one 
individual being obsessed with another; all conflict, tension, and interest in this novel arise from 
the actions of Parry. When Clarissa accuses Joe of having created or been complicit with Parry’s 
actions, she is correct in a narrative sense if not in an interpersonal sense. Joe himself provides 
an ongoing guess as to what is going on in Parry’s mind in a way that is stepped in the imagery 
of love, as in Chapter Fifteen where Joe tells the reader that when Parry ‘spoke his voice was 
breathy and I guessed his heart was racing. This was a moment he had prepared for’. That Parry 
repeatedly defies expectation in what he says towards Joe – loving him yet with a strange logic 
that appears to respond to actions Joe never actually performed – only invites further reader 
curiosity and inference into what Parry must be thinking. He is emotional, crying for 
forgiveness at the end yet also capable of devotion, affection, intense thought, a strange kind of 




the imaginative work he demands not only due to his varied emotional life and this greater 
amount of reader inference required to construct his character but, simply put, because he is 
interesting and enables the entire plot of the narrative to take place. Clarissa cannot command 
the same level of emotional character construction due to her comparatively limited repertoire 
of actions and emotions and her limited significance in the story other than as a foil to Joe’s 
struggle. To describe the role of these characters in metaphorical terms, Joe and Parry can be 
said to figuratively dance for the reader’s pleasure and interest in their conflict; Clarissa not 
only attempts to stop this dance and the forward movement of the plot but attempts to deny the 
very existence of their dance or of dancing at all.  
 
When Joe refers to the ‘expression of such repulsion’ on Clarissa’s face at the conclusion, the 
reader constructs Joe’s feelings regarding the event (Joe sees repulsion on her face and feels 
upset about it), Clarissa’s feelings (why does she have such an expression on her face?), and 
whether Joe is accurate about Clarissa’s feelings as a narrator (is Clarissa the kind of character 
who might respond in this way? Should we trust Joe?). As posited before, simultaneous 
constructions of different characters occur at the same time here in the reader’s mind rather than 
readers just identifying Joe’s character. Due to the repetition of sequences involving Parry, 
danger, and letters, in addition to Joe’s warning that a ‘joyful release’ will not occur, the reader 
perhaps expects Clarissa’s negativity towards Joe to continue as soon as the following chapter’s 
letter begins. Such negativity not only continues, but reaches an untenable level, beginning by 
half-heartedly apologising for doubting Joe: 
 
I think I gave you that apology several times last night and I’m giving it again now […] 
I was completely wrong and I’m sorry, really sorry. But what I was also trying to say 
last night was this; your being right is not a simple matter (p. 216) 
 
Clarissa goes on to argue that Joe could have involved her more in his actions (despite Clarissa 
expressing repeated disinterest in his claims) and that Joe’s searching of Clarissa’s letters was 
worse than her abandonment of him – ‘your ransacking my desk was a terrible betrayal’ (p. 
217). Moreover, Clarissa uses the language often associated with men blaming female victims 
of abuse of rape to suggest Joe’s own complicity with Parry’s obsession. If Joe’s gender was 
reversed, the following suggestions would be heavily charged with such a context:  
 
I can’t quite get rid of the idea that there might have been a less frightening outcome if 
you had behaved differently […] I can understand how he might have formed the 
impression that you were leading him on […] You denied him everything, and that 
allowed his fantasies, and ultimately his hatred, to flourish […] you put my life in 
jeopardy – by drawing Parry in, by overreacting all along the way, by guessing his 





Towards the end of her letter, Clarissa even returns to her previous doubt – ‘You worked out he 
had de Clérambault's syndrome (if that really is a disease)’ (p. 218). The parentheses around ‘if 
that really is a disease’ add proverbial insult to injury through the offhand way in which 
Clarissa’s doubt extends to a denial of scientific knowledge. Moreover, although Clarissa claims 
that ‘together we might have deflected him from the course he took’, she offers this 
retrospective help despite having admitted she had previously denied Parry’s existence early in 
the letter – ‘At worst, I thought of [Parry] as a creature of your imagining’ (p. 216).  
 
Some of Clarissa’s comments in her letter have a degree of accuracy; if Clarissa were a book 
reviewer or a literary critic, she would be correct in saying ‘He brought out something in you. 
From day one you saw him as an opponent and you set about defeating him and you – we – paid 
a high price’ (p. 218). Joe’s narration does suggest fear and this kind of antagonism as I have 
suggested, where Joe frequently captures Parry’s facial expressions as hidden wellsprings of 
love and danger even if he has no idea from moment to moment about the accuracy of his 
judgements. However, diegetically speaking, Clarissa is for the most part unaware of how Joe 
has been narrating these events and is not a book reviewer existing outside of this diegetic world 
but is Joe’s partner. Moreover, Joe was not wrong about his judgement of Parry. Even if the 
events did lead Joe to become a hero, he is cousin to any number of heroes throughout the 
history of literature. Clarissa’s incoherent argument renders her single opportunity to narrate the 
novel outside of Joe’s focalising power to be a disaster for the reader’s likely feelings towards 
her character. She reiterates various statements the reader knows she has not mentioned before 
or which make little sense in relation to recent events, and in so doing insults both Joe’s 
intelligence and the reader’s own. She reports how she could have helped Joe if he had shared 
more with her; how she did not believe Parry existed, how they could have helped cure Parry, 
and how Parry tried to kill them but that Joe is somehow responsible for Parry’s behaviour 
despite believing in Parry’s non-existence.  
 
Clarissa’s argument is incoherent but is incoherent in a manner distinct from, say, the 
incoherency I explored in Chapter Two regarding The Road’s argumentative shift from a world 
where all others should not be trusted to a world where others are human just like the 
protagonists. The Road’s incoherency was papered over by the world slowly and gradually 
altering (so the initial world-view of the boy that the pair should try to trust strangers becomes 
correct in the second half of the narrative). In Enduring Love, in no sense does Clarissa’s world-
view match what the reader is likely to have constructed throughout the entire novel. Instead, 
the exact opposite structure is in place in this novel, where the repeated combinations of 
documentary proof of Parry’s obsession with Clarissa’s doubt at key moments in the novel 




prior to now has constantly proved that Parry is a threat. Although both Clarissa and Breaking 
Bad’s Skyler White inhabit a similar narrative role, Skyler is crafted in such a way in Breaking 
Bad as to invoke sympathy and even ethical allegiance from viewers who are not already 
predisposed to view her in a misogynist fashion. Even the mother in The Road who commits 
suicide instead of travelling with her husband and child might invoke some slight level of 
sympathy for the awful situation the family finds itself trying to survive within. However as I 
explored at the beginning of this chapter, McCarthy’s prose style and the father’s focalisation of 
the mother’s speech renders the mother ontologically distinct from other characters lacking their 
emotional range and existing as mixture of nihilism and sexuality. Clarissa shares some of the 
focalising and stylistic issues surrounding the mother in The Road in that it is McEwan’s choice 
to shape her in a manner distinct from all other characters. It is not misogynist to draw attention 
to the problems with her behaviour because she is a fictional being whose behaviour is entirely 
in her male author’s control. Moreover, Clarissa lacks any kind of excuse or mitigation of the 
kind the suicidal mother has with the awful wasteland of The Road; worse than this, Clarissa is 
not even the prime victim in her text. 
 
The novel’s shifts in perspective in epistolary chapters towards both Parry and Clarissa as 
temporary alternative narrators allow the reader opportunities to better understand the extreme 
perspectives these characters offer in their ongoing direct speech where Joe (and likely the 
reader) struggles to construct the interiority of either character. The presence of these chapters 
creates a far more drawn-out critique of the protagonist by his partner than is found in The 
Road’s early abjection and removal of the mother, and can be seen to work as the antithesis of 
the kind of player negotiation of multiple characters in Bioshock Infinite or Oldboy. There, the 
player or viewer might attribute romantic motivations to the characters due to genre 
assumptions regarding male and female pairings. In Enduring Love, the reader must somehow 
maintain an imagined version of Parry’s world (that he and Joe are in love) in order to properly 
construct Parry’s character at the same time as, on a more subtle level, the reader is supposed to 
trust Joe and Clarissa’s repeated claims that they too are in love despite a lack of trust, intimacy, 
or kindness. The reader is invited to perform mental acrobatics in their construction of multiple 
possible frames of emotional reference, to make these senses of love endure whatever obstacles 
in terms of logic or emotional feeling get in their way, and in order to fulfil Joe, Parry, and 
Clarissa’s various narrations and statements throughout the novel.  
 
As I have also argued throughout this chapter, some characters are shaped in ontologically 
distinct manners to other characters resulting in people who seem in emotional terms to be of a 
different species to the texts’ protagonists. Moreover, such characters are usually women, 




heroic journey. Mulvey argues that in many films women are to be looked at and men are to be 
allied with in their ability to achieve the viewer’s wishes on screen. The ‘nag’ stereotype I have 
identified does not necessarily sexualise or objectify women but in many senses does something 
far worse in narrative terms in its implications for the reader’s likely emotional response to the 
character. As I have argued, such characters as the ‘nag’ are the diametric opposite of Mulvey’s 
male protagonist who is able to achieve a viewer’s wishes on-screen; the nag, on the other hand, 
actively works against the reader’s wish and if the nag’s desired state of affairs comes into 
being then the plot of the given text would no longer be able to continue. Such a character type 
as the ‘nag’ can be effective in narrative terms, but its repeated association with female 
characters is likely to increase misogynistic responses to future texts and indeed possibly in 
everyday life. 
 
The device of the ‘nag’ works mainly in relation to the reader’s identification and emotional 
engagement with the protagonist. As I have argued throughout this chapter this interplay 
between the ‘nag’ and the protagonist is one of many ways in which reader attempts to 
understand and identify the interiority of all characters in a given text rather than the model of 
prior criticism where readers frequently identify with only one character. Such an attempt to 
understand and identify all characters creates a need for the reader to critically mediate the 
interactions between multiple characters particularly when a diegetic focaliser limits access to a 
given character’s inner thoughts. In video games, such perspective is even further complicated. 
In relation to Bioshock Infinite for example I suggested that the control of perspective enhances 
responsibility for the player’s characterisation of the avatar through a more explicit co-creation 
of the character, although this ‘control’ is managed by the game through its various 
encouragements to look at Elizabeth and indeed its forcing the player to look at Elizabeth at 
various moments. In Enduring Love, the narrative can introduce alternative perspectives via 
direct speech (and therefore brief switches in narration) that are so divergent from the narrator’s 
view of the world that the reader must engage in unusually strong effort to understand why for 
example Parry thinks he and Joe are in love or why Clarissa does not believe or help Joe. Found 
document epistolary chapters featuring the unmediated words of their writers act as 
opportunities for the reader to fully flesh out such alternate perspectives. When the writers of 
such chapters are then encountered once more in the narrative, the reader will have a stronger 
sense of the role he or she must enact on the character’s behalf.  
 
Furthermore, just as the player’s ability to control the camera in video games is a specific 
medium affordance, so too is the novel’s reduction of multiple strata of diegetic reality 
(dialogue, interiority, senses, and chronological events) into sequential prose a unique medium 




likewise force a viewer’s gaze (the reader would need to skip a section to avoid obeying the 
implicit command to read and imagine a line of text) but in a qualitatively different manner to 
films and games due to the reduction of all sensory stimuli to a sequence of words. The pre-
determined sequence of this novel (as opposed to the chance or choice-based novels of Chapter 
One of this thesis such as The Unfortunates or Pale Fire) helps in maintaining a strong grip on 
the reader’s pathway through the text. Following such a set sequence as Enduring Love’s letter 
chapters or The Road’s cannibal encounters allows literary critics and theorists to talk with a 
greater degree of certainty as to the likelihood of certain reader responses occurring that might 
not be as clear without the contrast of texts that have no such set sequence as with video games. 
However, more so than video games or films, the novel has the potential to create fascinating 
and bizarre characters due to the presence of multiple characters across sequential prose. 
Everything in a prose novel occurs in a mono-linear fashion that leads elements of character to 
be divided pages apart and often absent in that narrators and authors will frequently exclude key 
details. There is far greater potential in novels than in visual mediums for ontologically distinct 
‘nag’ characters such as the mother in The Road or Clarissa in Enduring Love to be produced as 
both sequence and style can severely limit the reader’s ability to generate equally deep and 
emotionally complex interiorities for each character if this sequential progression is not 
managed properly. In visual mediums there is instead a greater albeit not unlimited opportunity 
for viewers to interpret visual and aural detail without quite the same level of pre-determined 
selective detail as is necessitated by the prose medium. This opportunity to interpret characters 
outside of selective prose detail is, as I said, not unlimited by any means however, as I shall 
explore in the next chapter in relation to the character of Madison in the video game Heavy 
Rain.  
 
The next and final chapter of this thesis will unite my various arguments as to the nature of 
reader identification with fictional characters invoking sequence, control, and multiplicity. At 
various points throughout Chapters Two and Three I have referred to situations where narratives 
reveal diegetic details that contradict reader or player assumptions or that try to provide 
explanations for player choice that might not fully account for player reasoning, such as 
Eleanor’s inference as to the player’s ethics in Bioshock 2, or the player’s potential inference of 
romantic attraction in Bioshock Infinite being revealed as incestual. In this latter case, a reading 
of incest only emerges due to the likely bias of the player’s prior inference of romantic 
attraction acting upon the later revelation that Booker is Elizabeth’s father. If players just 
immediately forget biases and accept new diegetic details in a pure fashion unadulterated by 
prior inferences, neither this revelation nor any narrative twist could have any emotional impact. 
I term the influence of prior bias ‘reader/player causality’ and in the final chapter and 




CHAPTER FOUR: Causality in The Last of Us, Heavy Rain,  





Whether on the macro-level of content and structure or the micro-level of style, there is always 
a problem in discussing the manipulation of readers and players via sequence due to the fact that 
readers can and will often act in unexpected or idiosyncratic ways. Once again, the comparison 
of novels and video games can assist here in further complicating existing categories and 
providing more tangible ways of discussing what readers and players do in constructing 
characters. All three prior chapters of this thesis – on sequence, control, and multiplicity – have 
put forward arguments that have in different ways already and necessarily dealt with this 
conundrum of the extent to which texts logically necessitate or make likely certain kinds of 
responses. Sequences not only suggest a certain logic or authority to be followed but necessitate 
inference; coupled with emotional engagement, inference as to what might happen will often 
transform into what should happen next, a wish for certain narrative events to occur. The 
reader’s necessary mediation between multiple characters means the temporary adoption of 
multiple perspectives in order to understand each character, with identification occurring 
constantly as an ongoing and evaluative attempt to construct characters, destabilising total 
allegiance with any individual character.  
 
All of these processes in my theory of identification and sequence might logically emerge as 
likely for most readers. However, there is a foundational element of inconsistency in the stages 
of my argument – one which can only be rectified once its latter steps have been established. If 
my argument is that sequence invites certain processes, such ‘sequence’ does not causally begin 
with the text but with the reader, and therefore what readers bring to a text and conceive of 
themselves as doing is a crucial modifier to all of these processes as well as something which is 
shaped by the invitations of text and genre. In this chapter I will propose various logical ways in 
which players and readers can be seen to use what I term their own ‘causal’ power in relation to 
how a character or decision is viewed at a given moment, potentially explaining and resolving 
issues over mimetic and thematic considerations of character discussed through the previous 
chapters of this thesis. Characters are formed as a combination of diegetic statements in the text 
and reader/player causality; as explained in the introduction to this thesis, by this term I refer to 
the way in which reader/player involvement in constructing characters leads to the ‘alteration’ 
of such characters in such a way that lends aspects of the reader’s own life or values to the 




‘involvement’, and so on. The reason I propose the term ‘causality’ is to better highlight the 
broad philosophical orientation I argue to be a common element to all of the prior terms 
mentioned and thereby allow for a range of reader behaviours to fall within the scope of this 
concept. By demonstrating the commonalities as well as the distinctions between video games 
and novels throughout this thesis, I build to a conclusion that will determine that fictional 
consequences are still an ethical matter when considered in and of themselves due to this 
concept of reader causality, even aside from ‘real world’ mimetic and thematic ramifications. 
 
What readers/players bring to characters from outside the text is more complicated than just an 
imposition of personal real-world morality upon fiction; the reader/player operates as extra 
textual judge, a role-player pretending to be each character, as the director of a drama and acting 
troupe combined, and more. I will explore questions relating to such motivations and stances, as 
well as ontological implications for what exactly fictional characters are, through two video 
games – Heavy Rain and The Last of Us. I will then conclude the chapter by exploring all of 
these concerns in relation to a precursor of the apocalyptic and dystopian novels and video 
games discussed throughout this thesis, a text which thematises empathy, identification, and 
abjection – George Orwell’s 1984 (1949). All of the concepts I have explained throughout my 
thesis, including reader inference of authority, the instability of control, and reader construction 
of multiple characters, build towards this exploration of reader causality in these three texts; this 
concept of reader causality is not a fourth stage, however, but rather a making-explicit of an 
underlying element to the process of identification I have been gradually building toward 
throughout the prior chapters of this thesis. For this reason, each text in this final chapter has 
been chosen to shift the argument from texts where players can explicitly make plot choices 
(Heavy Rain) to texts where reader ‘choice’ is limited to the reader’s inference as to what 
will/should occur in the narrative (1984). The Last of Us stands in between these two texts as a 
game where a small degree of explicit choice is allowed but where the player is generally 
speaking an observer of a pre-determined story and therefore is likely to have a similar wish for 
narrative events to occur to that of a film’s viewer or book’s reader. Through the full spectrum 
of controllability found within these sources, I will demonstrate potentially surprising 
similarities between the bizarre ontology of video game characters and the way in which readers 
construct prose characters.  
 
 
2. ‘Are you prepared to kill someone to save your son?’: Playing as Hero, Murderer, and Love 





The video game Heavy Rain (2010) presents four characters hunting for the Origami serial killer 
who has been drowning little boys and leaving paper models on their corpses.182 The alignment 
between these four characters and the player who controls them involves kinesthetic physical 
control not only of movement but also of mind and dialogue, as the player is routinely able to 
affect what characters say or do in a variety of situations compared to slightly more set-progress 
games such as the Bioshock series. As I argued in Chapter Two however, control in all games is 
always by logical necessity incomplete and partial. In Heavy Rain, control is not always offered 
over key plot events (some will occur regardless of whether the player wants them to); when 
control is offered it is often limited to a restricted number of options; and some choices do not 
have a great deal of narrative impact compared to others. Furthermore, the player’s control of 
four different characters, some of whom interact with one another, means that control is 
sometimes relinquished completely. Moment to moment, avatars will perform actions and 
engage in dialogue which is only controllable through set key words. Although players can set 
in motion events and dialogue according to general intentions, diegetically these events move 
beyond player intention. The player ‘does’ something but the character seems to do far more, 
and it is in such moments that player causality most becomes clear in relation to reader 
causality.  
 
As I will argue later in this chapter, the player/reader’s causal involvement in texts is not just 
found in obvious game-specific affordances such as explicit choice-making. Readers and 
players generate a diegesis from texts that accommodates and moves past the choices made by 
players and the wishes expressed by readers. By ‘accommodates and moves past’, I mean that in 
games players make choices that subsequent narration by characters will explain. For example, 
if a player chooses to shoot a potential suspect in Heavy Rain, the player’s avatar will explain 
why he shot that suspect; this explanation is unlikely to be exactly the same as the original 
reason the player chose to shot the suspect as the game has no way of knowing the player’s 
specific intention. Some recent games such as the horror game Until Dawn (2015) attempt to 
more accurately infer player intention through on-screen questions.183 Until Dawn presents its 
player with a psychological evaluation between its episodes and asks the players various 
questions such as to rank the characters encountered so far in terms of likability, what kinds of 
things they find terrifying, and various ethical questions. Significantly these questions do not 
actually alter the events that follow apart from affecting the visual presentation of various 
scenes; however, the presence of such questions as moral choices with on-screen prompts is 
likely to create the expectation that they matter and that they will affect the game. In this way, 
Until Dawn creates a feeling that the game is trying to actively infer the player’s motivation for 
                                                          
182 Heavy Rain, dir. by David Cage (Quantic Dream, 2010). 




choice-making even if no active alteration is occurring in the way the game then explains later 
choices. The example of Until Dawn shows how video game characters incorporate both player 
intent in choice-making and subsequent explanation of these choices on-screen.  
 
With regards to novels, when I say the reader is likely to generate a diegesis that 
‘accommodates and moves past the wishes expressed by readers’, I refer to the comparatively 
less explicit way in which reader interpretation of texts is affected by the reader’s emotional 
engagement with events. As I have established throughout this thesis, in prose novels characters 
depend a great deal upon their readers for their resulting ‘existence’ once decoded from the text. 
Readers may believe they are following interpretations sanctioned by a given narrative, but are 
responsible for inferring this sense of authority in a way that is highly influenced by the reader’s 
own predispositions. Therefore when a character is encountered throughout a given novel, the 
reader is likely to generate a model of what that character would or would not do in a sub-
conscious manner that will be heavily biased by the reader’s emotional engagement in the 
narrative. However, regardless of whether a character does or does not act according to the 
reader’s expectations, the reader is likely in most (but not all) cases to accept the narrative’s 
version of events. According to the principle that prior-encountered details and interpretations 
by readers will affect the way in which newly encountered details are incorporated into a 
character, however, the initial expectation will shape the way in which the new characterising 
details are accepted by the reader. Although this situation is distinct from the way in which 
video games ‘rewrite’ player decisions, video games offer a far more tangible metaphor for 
exploration of what is an implicit and easily unnoticed process in novel reading. 
 
In video games, diegetic characterisation emerges from player choice as the range of choices on 
offer is predefined by the game’s programming, even in emergent games. Because of this 
predefined range of choices, the range of diegetic results for each choice is likewise predefined. 
Moreover, as many controllable protagonists speak outside of the player’s control in games like 
Heavy Rain, likewise character reactions to choices made on their behalf by the player are 
predetermined but somewhat bizarrely so as they will often present reasons for their actions 
very different from those in the player’s mind. However, these results are not necessarily 
rejected – such diegetic ‘rewriting’ of player choice is a habitual and accepted part of the 
medium. Heavy Rain manipulates this disjunction between player and character for dramatic 
effect. One of the game’s four playable characters, Scott Shelby, is presented to the player as a 
private investigator hired by the families of the killer’s victims to uncover new leads and 
determine the identity of the Origami Killer, an objective shared with the other three characters 
in the game. For much of the game we are presented with the choices made by a tender man, 




pre-determined behaviour in response to on-screen cues. For example, we avert a mother’s 
suicide and look after her baby while she recovers. We give the child bottled milk and rock her 
to sleep. We chase leads with the help of a woman we saved from an attacker, the mother of one 
of the killer’s victims, Lauren. Lauren proves herself extremely competent, tracking down the 
name of the killer by cross-referencing the subscribers of an Origami magazine the killer might 
have read with a list of owners of a certain kind of typewriter the killer appears to have used to 
create notes for the victims’ parents. Finally, we experience two flashbacks where we play the 
killer himself when he was a child, running to find his father to save his drowning brother, only 
to be refused by the drunken, neglectful old man. The drowning child reveals the killer’s true 
name with his final word – the name of his brother and the boy who has tried and failed to save 
him from drowning, who will grow up to become the player character: ‘Scotty’. All of these 
events occur regardless of player choice, but the player’s response to button-prompts on screen 
still brings them into being to continue the narrative. 
 
In the following scene, we see Scott Shelby, the seemingly likeable, normal private detective 
crying over a photograph of his dead brother. The player is then prompted (without choice) to 
pick up each piece of evidence the player has gathered throughout the narrative and throw it into 
a fire. Flashbacks remind the player of what they have been doing in gathering this evidence, 
and remind the player of the narrative contextualization the game provided at each occasion – 
that Shelby claims he needed all these clues to help him discover the killer’s identity, a 
motivation that many players might have accepted blindly. The truth is revealed the final time 
we actually get to control Shelby’s actions and do not just witness him as an uncontrollable 
third-party ‘NPC’ (non-player character): we have been the Origami Killer we sought the whole 
time, and Shelby has lied or omitted truths repeatedly in the course of his so-called 
‘investigation’. In effect, ‘we’ have lied to ‘ourselves’. The player is retrospectively 
compromised and betrayed in a manner distinct to the way in which a reader might feel betrayed 
in light of a twist. We did not just read about the Origami Killer – in many respects we are the 
Origami Killer, and we have been forced to be him. 
 
When we hear of the Origami killer’s actions throughout the game, we infer an idea of the 
character behind him, even –as we believe – without seeing or hearing his physical presence for 
much of the game. What kind of a man would kill these children? Why does he torment the 
children’s fathers, as we discover through Ethan’s trials and Shelby’s meetings with various 
widowed women whose husbands went off into the night to answer the Origami killer’s 
requests? We build a picture in our head as to the killer’s possible identity, and compare it with 
the other characters we encounter to see if the two could be one. If building each character could 




Origami Killer and Shelby, both incomplete. The moment we realize Shelby is the Origami 
killer, it is as if these two puzzles are placed upon one another, superimposed without 
contradiction or overlapping in pieces, to fit perfectly. There is no narrative cheat, no unreliable 
narration, nothing in the story that prevents Shelby from being the killer, other than his lies to 
other characters within the game (but never to himself or to the player who controls him). Even 
these lies are rare and partial: Shelby thrives and protects himself more through clever evasion 
and omission of the truth, through his charisma and otherwise kind and noble actions. He 
engenders allegiance and sympathy from both players and other characters within his world, and 
evades detection as a result.  
 
It is technically possible to figure out the identity of the killer on the grounds of genre and 
aesthetic considerations. If a player is well-acquainted with detective stories, then it might be 
noted that Shelby never interacts with the other cast members or any real authorities at all for 
much of the game; his heroism might likewise also be suspicious, as often the reveal of a killer 
can be more effective if the revelation breaks some kind of bond of trust with a reader/player 
and the killer’s identity is not obvious. Moreover, if the reveal is to be effective, the killer might 
be seen as likely to be a main character or one introduced earlier in the game, rather than 
someone barely seen throughout the story which might lead to a less dramatically powerful 
conclusion. This is not diegetic or empathetic logic but rather involves guesses as to the genre 
codes of the text, and might therefore only occur to players who are less emotionally engaged in 
the story (and therefore more consciously aware of the fictitious crafted nature of the narrative) 
or who are more familiar with genre conventions and thus more able to recognise these 
elements.  
 
It might therefore be thought that it is the player’s emotional engagement in Shelby’s narrative 
that renders his revelation as the killer so dramatically effective; he has betrayed the trust built 
up by his heroic actions and measured persona. Yet if we are Shelby to some extent, if we 
control his actions, then who did we trust throughout the game, and who do we feel betrayed us? 
The player’s participation in Shelby’s character means we cannot talk about him as entirely 
separate from the player, nor can we describe what occurs in the reveal as ‘betrayal’ since that 
would require that another party be involved. Here, the emotional power of Shelby’s betrayal 
emerges due to the player’s participation in Shelby’s character as a positive force (acting as if 
we were Shelby trying to carry out good deeds) combined with the player’s accumulation of 
characterising detail from the diegesis (Shelby as a third party to be learned about, who we 
watch as if he is in a film). The chimeric nature of these characters means that they are born 
from both the causality of our choices as players and the text’s subsequent rewriting of that 




choice x occurring because the player had a particular motivation, it is revealed in game as 
proceeding from the character’s history and personality). At the same time, however, radical 
free-willed choice is not possible: the games’ designers have decided what is possible for each 
character do at each moment. We, as the player, select which of the options included in the 
design each character will take. We can choose whether, for example, Shelby allows an old and 
evil man to die by not helping him reach his medication. We can make a choice here because his 
characterizing details up to that point accommodate a range of reactions without rendering the 
overall character of Shelby as incoherent (as with the Arno stealing wine scene in Assassin’s 
Creed: Unity discussed in Chapter Three) or rendering him a mere vessel for player choice (as 
with the lack of diegetic characterisation for the protagonist in a game such as Skyrim).  
 
However, our choice is nevertheless limited; we cannot choose whether Shelby attempts to 
murder children, as such events have occurred prior to the game and are not on offer to us as 
players. So, how do we talk about our response to a character that is both –us- and not –us- at 
the same time? Frequently throughout this thesis I have posited that texts can ‘impose’ their 
ethics upon players/readers through the logical necessity of restaging/constructing what one 
infers to be a text’s or character’s perspective, even if opinions that differ from the reader’s own 
are likely to be dismissed afterwards (so, as in Chapter One of this thesis, reading about 
misogyny in The Unfortunates imposes temporary repetition of the act). Furthermore, I have 
established that the instability of choice and control in video games can be extended to novels 
and films with a ‘wish to control’ narrative events. The comparison between games and novels 
extends in both directions, however, as the player of a video game will still undergo 
identification in relation to non-controllable characters albeit in a different manner to the 
identification the player will experience in relation to his or her avatar. Moreover, as the player 
cannot completely control the avatar in any game, the player will therefore act as an observer of 
his or her own character at times even as this character is being physically controlled by that 
player. The troubling factor here in relation to Shelby is that the player engages in multiple 
ways of constructing a character at the same time that are not entirely coherent in their 
methodology. The player tries to apprehend the character’s personal history and interiority at the 
same time as the player causes the character’s agency to come into being through his or her 
choices. The player’s inference of the character’s interiority in addition to the choices the player 
has made on behalf of the character are both rewritten by subsequent diegetic revelations of 
Shelby’s status as murderer, upending the player’s causal function even further. For example, if 
a player believes Shelby to be a good man based on his words and non-controllable actions 
within the game, and if the player makes a decision to be nice to a potential witness because the 




identification can remain after it is revealed that Shelby is a murderer and that he is pretending 
to be good in order to achieve his goals.  
 
Whether restricted to Heavy Rain or evocative of wider concerns, however, Shelby’s 
characterisation has great implications for the ethics of player decision-making and character 
construction in terms of the ontology of the character produced. If, as I have claimed, readers 
and players must temporarily adopt perspectives they might later disagree with in order to 
evaluate them, sometimes perpetuating unethical mental behaviour such as misogynistic thought 
patterns, then what happens if players make decisions that are then retroactively rewritten by the 
text to emerge from different motivations to that which the player intended? These different 
diegetic explanations of events are provided to explain a character’s actions, but as those 
character actions were chosen by the player, the narrative can be said to ‘rewrite’ the motivation 
behind the choice in the diegesis as stemming from the character’s personality as opposed to 
whatever motivation the real-life player originally had for making that choice. Such rewriting is 
likely to be accepted by the player – it is habitual in games – but traces of the original 
motivation for an action is still likely to have left an impact upon the player. It would be as if a 
decision I made five minutes ago is suddenly rendered unethical through reality warping around 
me to replace my original intention with another, or at the very least emotionally convincing me 
of the alternative intention’s validity and truth in that past moment. How can fiction present a 
coherent ethics if character construction is often founded upon such bizarre premises in 
comparison to ‘real life’? 
 
The game contrasts Scott Shelby in this regard with another playable character, Ethan Mars, a 
man who must complete five trials to prove his love for his son, hence the game’s marketing 
tagline, ‘How far would you go to save the one you love?’ Viewed as an overall progression in 
this way, the trials begin as physical tests (requiring the player to engage in quick and accurate 
button presses or to intuit the best path across the screen towards Ethan’s obstacles, such as 
when the player must drive against the traffic down a busy road to demonstrate courage, or 
crawl through glass to show one’s willingness to suffer). These physical tests gradually give 
way to primarily ethical tests, asking whether the player is willing to value the life of a morally-
compromised stranger such as a drug dealer over that of a little boy (the killer’s pre-recorded 
tape asks ‘Are you prepared to kill someone to save your son?’), or value your own/Ethan’s life 
over his son’s (the tape asks ‘Are you prepared to give your life to save your son’s?’). In this 
final test, the player must drink a vial of poison in the knowledge that Ethan will die within an 
hour, but that the final clue to Ethan’s son’s identity will be given and Ethan will be able to find 
him in time (the poison is in turn revealed as a placebo if Ethan takes it). In all scenarios, there 




skilled or fast enough for many of these challenges – players of the game also know that he 
failed to navigate a shopping centre and move fast enough to save his son Jason (a death the 
player had no control over). There is nothing in the game’s characterisation to suggest how 
Ethan might respond when forced to kill another, or himself. All of this is down to the player’s 
control of Ethan, that aspect of his character we inhabit.  
 
It is our morality on trial, not Ethan’s, despite Ethan enacting our choices as his own in his 
responses in subsequent diegetic rationalisations of player causality. Ironically, however, 
alienation is invited through repeated suggestions that Ethan may himself be the Origami killer; 
Ethan experiences frequent blackouts after which he wakes up in the rain holding origami 
figures in his hand. Such clues represent a red-herring, as Ethan’s blackouts are ultimately 
unexplained and Shelby is revealed as the killer later in the game. However, for a large portion 
of the game players are encouraged to believe they may already know the killer’s identity. As it 
seems as if we are not seeing all of Ethan’s history or character, our ability to act as if we are 
him is compromised. Ironically, Shelby’s history and even some of his present-time actions are 
hidden and omitted by the narrative throughout the game. Such omissions may be taken as a 
cinematic convention, however, whereby the viewer is unlikely to see all the events relating to a 
particular investigation but where the director will cut to and from scenes of pertinent interest. 
In this video game, familiarity with this cinematic convention would mean that the player might 
not necessarily be suspicious about why the game does not show us such absent moments. 
Instead, the player is likely to hold the impression that they know pertinent details about his 
character early on – that he is a private detective with a heart of gold – and therefore the player 
is invited to more fully inhabit the character at hand with less caution. We do not feel like we 
are still trying to work out who Scott Shelby is throughout the majority of the game, whereas 
the narrative goes out of its way to raise overt question marks over Ethan’s sanity.  
 
Trust in Shelby can lead to complex ethical situations arising through an interplay of player 
causality and textual expansion of diegetic history and motivation. At one point in the narrative, 
Shelby and his partner, Lauren, are trapped in a car beneath water, put there by the father of a 
copycat killer in an attempt to silence both of them/us forever. The game does not reveal that 
Shelby is impervious here – for all the player knows, Shelby needs to get out of the car as soon 
as possible, but however long the player takes Shelby will still survive. This task is very 
difficult to accomplish, complicated by an implicit choice regarding whether to try and save the 
unconscious Lauren first. If she is not saved, she dies. If Shelby somehow escapes confrontation 
with the other three playable protagonists and does not die for his crimes at the end of the game, 
in a post-ending cut-scene we see that Lauren has tracked Shelby down, realizing he is the killer 




Lauren is the only character who persistently interacts with Shelby, admiring and trusting him. 
Therefore to some extent Lauren’s admiration and trust of Shelby mirrors and authenticates the 
text’s patterning of the player’s likely opinions throughout the game; this final vengeance feels 
satisfying as an answer to the character’s betrayal.  
 
This ending with Lauren killing Shelby can only occur, however, if the player chose for Shelby 
to save Lauren earlier in the storyline. Shelby-the-murderer (the character he morphs into after 
the revelation of his identity) has become his own undoing through the player’s potential choice 
to save Lauren, a choice made without the narrative having yet confirmed his status as killer and 
therefore without the player knowing that it would have been more coherent to allow Lauren to 
die due to her piecing together of clues. The metaphorical river of Shelby’s diegetic 
characterisation rights its course, however. The game once again diegetically rewrites player 
causality by suggesting that Scott cares about and perhaps even loves Lauren in this version of 
events; the game responds to the player’s choice to save her by showing the pair briefly share a 
kiss a little while later. If the player makes Shelby’s character into someone who cares more 
about another than about himself, then this is authenticated as already having been true of 
Shelby’s characterisation by subsequent narrative events; if the player decides that Shelby 
should save himself, then this likewise is authenticated by Shelby’s reveal as a serial killer. 
Shelby’s characterisation here contrasts greatly with the alienated identification mechanisms 
present for Ethan Mars. When Shelby is revealed to have been testing Ethan and by extension 
the player to find out if the player/Ethan is a good parent, so too has the player likely been 
wondering throughout the game whether the character we are controlling in the person of Ethan 
is a good father or not. If we evaluate Ethan, we are deciding whether the actions we caused a 
character to engage in qualify him to be a good father. To further capture the bizarre nature of 
this situation, it must be remembered that Shelby’s characterisation at this point has not just 
emerged unfiltered from the game’s presentation of events but will likely be heavily influenced 
by the player’s inferences as to the kind of man Shelby is.  
 
If we think Shelby is an innocent prior to the revelation of his murderous ways, then he is an 
innocent until the game contradicts our identification and reveals such innocence was just a glue 
we injected into Shelby’s character to help his characterizing details fit together, the same kind 
of gap-filling inference that occurs in response to all fictional characters out of necessity. If we 
can say that we feel morally guilty, repulsed by our retroactively making choices as the 
causality behind the Origami Killer, we are also repulsed by that part of us that previously 
admired Shelby’s diegetic characterisation. We literally made Shelby a good person. The player 
has assisted Shelby in his subterfuge not just in obeying button prompts for Shelby to collect 




man means he is a good man until the game’s revelation of his murderous ways. When the 
tormented Ethan Mars meets his tormenter Scott Shelby, in mere moments the player inhabits 
both positions, and the player-inferred motivations of both characters throughout the entire 
game clash. The game’s trailer asks the question “How far would you go to save the one you 
love?” The question is not so simple when there are multiple ‘you’s within the game, when 
there are multiple loved ones.  
 
Heavy Rain’s only female playable character, Madison Paige, further complicates this clashing 
of multiple characters through the misogyny latent in her depiction. Due to the qualitatively 
distinct affordances offered to her player both in available choices and in the predetermined 
diegesis relating to her character, she provides useful contrast with Shelby and Ethan for 
understanding these processes. Madison’s playable sections entirely revolve around her gender; 
she is either a nurse for Ethan Mars, a sexual partner for Ethan Mars, or preyed upon by men in 
various sexualized situations from which the player must extricate Madison. Madison’s first 
playable scene in the game features her waking up late at night and walking around her 
apartment scantily clad, with several uneasy camera angles following her movement. The 
game’s camera likewise keeps Madison’s body and animations at a distance to foreground her 
body in a way that rarely occurs with any of the male playable characters. There is little 
characterising detail to introduce her to the player when every other character is introduced 
through speech or a real situation pertinent to the game’s larger narrative. Moreover, as it 
gradually becomes clear that Madison is being watched and is not alone, the player is alienated 
from Madison in something similar to a ‘slasher’ scenario as highlighted by Carol Clover in 
relation to film –the player knows of the danger, she does not, and she cannot act upon our 
knowledge or suspicions.184  
 
This whole sequence is revealed retrospectively to have been a dream when Madison then 
wakes up, and this nightmare of men breaking into a single woman’s apartment to attack her in 
the middle of the night is the beginning of a theme of sexualized male violence that continues 
throughout her narrative. Each time Madison is unaware of a threat or plot detail which the 
player can quite clearly intuit, she loses her authority as a reliable strategist in relation to the 
narrative’s forward momentum of solving the mystery and even of staying alive. This role of 
strategist is comparable to the father and son varyingly occupying the position of reliable 
strategist in The Road (as analysed in Chapter Two). The player is alienated from Madison’s 
perspective and through this alienation a situation is created that is akin to the aforementioned 
infamous statement by a producer of Tomb Raider that the player might feel they are protecting 
the female avatar rather than becoming her. If one’s emotional engagement with a narrative can 
                                                          




lead to a wish for certain outcomes to occur and also allegiance with a character with a great 
deal of agency suited to achieving such outcomes, then Madison is excluded from this position. 
 
When we next see Ethan, Madison plays the nurse. An undercover journalist, Madison pretends 
to be staying in the same motel block as Ethan in order to get a story about the father of the 
kidnapped boy. She tends to Ethan’s wounds, and throughout this process Madison is 
controllable by the player in a manner reminiscent of a Shelby scene immediately prior, where 
Shelby bandages the wounds of a woman who attempted suicide. This contrast only serves to 
emphasize Madison’s almost entirely blank nature at this point and Ethan’s similarly weak 
status. Furthermore, when Madison then talks to Ethan and she answers various questions Ethan 
has (and which the player might also have, in the absence of any other characterisation), 
Madison only has a single dialogue option every question, presenting the player with far less 
agency than any other conversation. Some of these dialogue options are even lies, such as 
claiming she is a professional furniture photographer. Control is then unceremoniously 
transferred to Ethan when she leaves, her bandaging complete. The player’s causal power is far 
less intertwined with the character’s diegetic characterisation here not only because we have 
little choice but also because even as we control Madison’s kinesthetic movement, she exists as 
a series of functions without much knowledge of the killings compared to other controllable 
characters such as Shelby and Ethan. Madison is once again distanced from the player’s own 
position of knowledge. The player may wonder whether Ethan Mars is the killer, but at the very 
least he has greater knowledge of narrative events than Madison and has been established as 
protagonist through the series of trials the Origami Killer has set Ethan (and by extension the 
player). Although this comparative lack of knowledge on Madison’s part does not completely 
prevent her becoming a focal point of any allegiance and identification for the player, her lack 
of agency combined with the presence of the ‘real’ protagonist of the game might mean that 
even though the player is controlling Madison, the scene at hand is really all about Ethan. 
Madison’s number of dialogue options increases the next time we see her once again acting as 
Ethan’s nurse. The game even reverses the dynamic so that she is the one asking him questions 
about his identity instead of the reverse. However, these questions are ones that the player 
already knows the answer to just as Ethan does; the player is once again aligned with Ethan’s 
perspective despite our technically controlling Madison in this scene. Moments such as this 
further emphasise that although the processes often occur at the same time, literal control of a 
character in a video game is not precisely the same process as allegiance or feeling synonymy 
with a particular character. 
 
For a period late in the game, Madison’s storyline emerges from Ethan’s shadow. Although 




provide a window for some revealing differentiation between different groups of possible 
players. Madison spends the latter part of the game chasing various leads relating to the killer’s 
identity and in the process visits the house of a doctor who gives medicines without 
prescription. Madison is offered a drink by the doctor, and we could hypothesise that some cis 
male players might not be suspicious of this drink in the same way as many women are 
encouraged by society to be suspicious of drugged drinks they have not prepared themselves. In 
such a situation, if a cis male player for example fails to be suspicious of this offer, the 
terrifying results could be said to demonstrate how little cis men can truly conceive of a female 
world view that experiences danger and oppression as a matter of daily lived experience. If the 
player does drink this, or if the player spends too long in the man’s house without leaving, 
Madison is knocked out and nearly tortured in the basement unless the player fights back 
successfully. If she does fight back successfully, it seems to be to no avail as Madison stops 
moving and the doctor begins stroking Madison’s body before moving in to kill her, only for 
Madison to spring up, having pretended to be dead. The symbolism of the scene is not subtle, 
with the doctor attempting to use a power drill in the direction of Madison’s crotch. The episode 
is certainly problematic in its cheap reliance on sexual violence and horror film penetration 
tropes,185 and even more so in that the game removes control of Madison in order to have her 
surprise the player by her pretending to be dead. Madison not only knows little about the 
killings compared to other characters but the player is not allowed to control her in the same 
way as other characters can be controlled. Even though Shelby is a murderer, the effective 
nature of this twist emerges from negative space; when controlling Shelby, the player’s actions 
and motivations and motivations are likely to highly resemble Shelby’s own albeit for distinct 
overall agendas. With Madison in this scene where she pretends to be dead, Madison’s 
behaviour is far more distinct from the player’s own; her status as a woman affects her 
characterisation in this world more than Shelby’s status as serial killer seems to affect his own. 
 
When Madison follows up her next lead in a nightclub, the actions required of the player are 
again heavily gendered. Madison needs to make herself seem sexually attractive to attract the 
attention of the owner, Paco, so she can question him. As a cis male player, it might feel 
incredibly strange to make choices to expose Madison’s skin, to alter the height of her skirt and 
the buttons open on her blouse, as if in some way violating the character. Such a feeling of 
violation would suggest an orientation from the player towards the character not of acting as 
Madison but instead viewing her as separate to the player. Several industry figures have 
similarly reported feeling uncomfortable about this scene.186 For some female players, being 
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forced to sexualise themselves to progress and to attract approval might be seen as a regrettable 
but widespread fact of life. When the nightclub owner then takes an interest in Madison, she is 
almost raped at gunpoint before the player is able to knock the man out. These moments, and 
the drinking choice in the previous scene, could be read as interrogations of the male gaze. 
Regardless of how successful we view the game’s developers to be in achieving this aim, 
Madison’s gendered challenges could be seen to mount a Bogostian procedural rhetoric to make 
certain players aware of how women are expected to act in certain societies. They either invite a 
great feeling of synonymy with the player for those who are aware of and understand these 
situations, or promote partial alienation, albeit with sympathy, as players recoil in surprise with 
a lack of frames of reference for the experience.  
 
This brings me to the most problematic example of player characters interacting in the game, 
and my concluding point for this analysis of Heavy Rain. Shortly after Madison is almost raped, 
she returns to Ethan Mars’s hotel room only for Ethan to have the option to kiss and then have 
sex with Madison. At no point in the process does the player control or get to make choices on 
Madison’s behalf. It might be argued that such a mechanic of controlling multiple characters’ 
choices simultaneously might be unworkable.187 Why give priority to Ethan here, where in 
every single other interaction between them we have controlled Madison? Is it for the titillation 
of an assumed male perspective to sleep with the ‘to be looked at’ character of Madison?188 If 
considered in sequence, it does not make much sense in real-world psychological terms; a 
woman that has just almost been raped is not likely to jump into the arms of someone she hardly 
knows, and Ethan’s son is still in danger – why is this man breaking from his quest to save his 
son for his own sexual gratification? The pair have hardly interacted, mostly just for Madison to 
tend to Ethan’s wounds. Madison is reduced from a point of identification and synonymy to 
more of an object, a body for the player as Ethan Mars to have sex with. The choice is made as 
Ethan, not as Madison, and her final appearances are clichéd and almost comical when 
summarised. In the epilogue Madison can potentially capitalise on all of her experiences with a 
tell-all book only to encounter a second serial killer who threatens her once again; Madison can 
adopt Ethan Mars’s son; or Madison can bizarrely insist that Ethan should not in fact mourn his 
dead son but should impregnate her instead. In this final scenario, Ethan then engages in an 
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unintentional tragicomedy moments later by proceeding to shoot himself around twenty feet 
from where Madison has just made this suggestion.  
  
Player causality – by which I mean not just the ability of players to make choices in games but 
also their involvement, interpretation, emotional investment, and anything which brings the 
idiosyncratic presence of an individual player to bear upon the narrative at hand – operates 
differently in Heavy Rain in relation to men and women. Madison is not given the same 
narrative affordances as other characters and certainly on a gameplay level is controlled in a 
very different manner to the male protagonists. This is not to say that Madison could not be 
reclaimed or that the player could not have some positive experience in playing through her 
storyline, and responses to her characterisation could be shaped by the identity of the player as 
male or female and any prior bias on the player’s part. Nevertheless, as my analysis of Shelby, 
Ethan, and Madison has demonstrated, the game clearly sequences its gameplay and narrative 
offerings in such a way as to promote stronger albeit distinct ties with Shelby and Ethan. In this 
framework, Madison is subordinate to the other protagonists, and it is difficult for the player to 
easily become causally involved in Madison’s story not just for the lack of choices compared to 
other characters but her subordinate placement and constant victimisation. The ‘wish to control’ 
I explored in Chapter Three in relation to Mulvey still operates here – players are likely to ally 
with characters capable of doing what they want as players or what they are positioned to want 
by the game. Madison’s demotion demonstrates that it is not just choice that enables or limits 
player causal investment, whilst Shelby’s betrayal shows the presence of such causality in 
action through the disastrous emotional consequences of such identification with Shelby’s 
character being utterly broken. 
  
 
3. ‘I lost people too’: Stance and Shifting Avatars in The Last of Us 
 
The video game The Last of Us, considered by some to feature the greatest video game narrative 
of all time,189 thematises empathy and humanity in a post-apocalypse where the majority of 
humans have either murdered one another or have been rendered mindless predators through the 
Cordyceps fungal infection. Unlike Heavy Rain, there is virtually no choice offered in terms of 
bifurcating the diegesis in different directions; however, it is still quite possible to discuss the 
events of the game as inviting the player to wish for certain events to occur or to summon their 
own real-life values as a reference point just as the previous chapters of my thesis have 
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established. The game shifts the player’s dominant stance in relation to these characters in a 
myriad of ways, often involving shifting tensions between what you might do in real life 
(imagining yourself in the place of the character but in such a way as tabula rasa ignores the 
prior constraints of previous characterisation); what you think the character as depicted in the 
game might do based on prior characterisation; what you think that character should do or what 
might be best for him or her; larger concerns as to how actions might affect all characters in the 
ensemble (although an action might promote good for one character, how can that be weighed 
against the potential benefits or problems it might cause for other identified characters?); and 
abjection/othering of characters to try to avoid all of these prior stances (something which is not 
entirely possible in a pure sense but which can occur to large extents or after the fact). These 
stances are equally likely to emerge, combine, and shift in the majority of readings novels and 
playing of video games by logical necessity, not just with regards to future moments in the 
narrative but with the evaluation of each event as they occur. Each of these dimensions shows a 
way in which players might logically relate to the characters at hand and suggests the kind of 
causal investment a player might make in a particular character, often with one or more stance 
working in tandem. 
 
Although The Last of Us does not offer much in the way of explicit plot-altering choices, the 
concept of player causality can be seen as instructive in relation to set-sequenced texts such as 
this. To reiterate my explanation of ‘player causality’, by this term I refer to the way in which in 
video games a player’s choice can be rewritten by the game’s diegesis as stemming from the on-
screen character’s personality as opposed to the player’s own involvement in the text, regardless 
of whether such choices are explicit in altering plot events or implicit in terms of interpretation 
and a wish for events to occur. The Last of Us is an ideal bridging point between choice-based 
games and set-sequenced novels in this regard due to its hybrid nature as a game where more 
than 99% of narrative encounters lack any possibility of multiple diegetic outcomes due to 
player choice, but where the penultimate moment of gameplay leads the player to make a choice 
without any signposting that a choice was on offer, with some players only realising they had 
multiple options upon reading about it in articles.190 In this section I will analyse the player’s 
shifting involvement in the text throughout The Last of Us and will conclude with an analysis of 
this final choice, determining the extent to which prior narrative involvement can be said to 
involve player causality even if choices are not directly made in the narrative world. Moreover, 
the game’s depiction of Joel and Ellie as a kind of father and daughter pairing travelling across a 
post-apocalypse, the father getting sick, and the daughter being faced with a group who do not 
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try to take her weapon and who have children with them, is narratively highly similar in plot 
and theme to the story of The Road, although The Last of Us acts in many ways as a critique of 
The Road’s arguments in how it develops this narrative situation and therefore serves as an ideal 
final game for this final chapter. 
 
The narrative of The Last of Us is contextualised by an initial prologue level that shows the 
outbreak of the Cordyceps fungus crossing over to humans and turning them into zombie-like 
figures and the game’s protagonist, Joel, fleeing his home with his daughter Sarah and his 
brother Tommy. Through the majority of the playable prologue that follows the initial cut-scene 
of The Last of Us, the player controls Sarah, who wakes up to an empty house, televised news 
reports of a dangerous outbreak and collapse, and missed calls on the home phone. She shares 
the player’s likely confusion and feeling of danger as news of the outbreak spreads, with the 
player controlling Sarah’s vision as she is able to look out the back of the car in all directions as 
the family flees their home. Her diegetic curiosity is therefore likely to mirror the curiosity of a 
player who wishes to steer her vision in multiple directions to witness the game’s narrative. 
After a car crash, the player’s control is shifted to her father Joel, and after a cut-scene shows 
him picking up the injured Sarah, the game’s prompts make it clear that the player must flee to 
safety with the girl. Eventually, the player is led to approach a member of the military, 
appearing upon a hill as the characters’ potential salvation. However, a combination of the 
soldier’s confrontational stance, his belief they might be infected, and Joel’s own gradually 
defensive verbal and body language create a sense of oncoming potential danger, reaching a 
crescendo when the soldier says on his radio: ‘Sir, there’s a little girl’, with a pause before he 
begins shooting. Joel falls back down the hill with his daughter, whilst his brother Tommy 
arrives as a saviour to rescue them and shoot the soldier. Due to the speed of this encounter’s 
unfolding, the brother’s arrival, and the normal progression of advancement and achievement of 
goals throughout the video games medium, the player may not initially realize that Sarah was 
hit by the soldier’s fire, just as Joel does not realise it for a few moments until he runs over to 
his dying daughter and cradles her, saying repeatedly ‘Don’t do this to me, baby. Don’t do this 
to me, baby girl. Come on’, words which will be echoed later in the narrative.  
 
This initial encounter inverts player expectations of threat – the humans of this world are far 
more terrifying ethically in some respects than the infected zombies, figures which may in some 
senses represent metaphors for the violent potential of humankind – whilst also using 
perspectival devices to achieve narrative empathy for these characters and the barest 
understanding of Joel’s shock and loss. The player’s initial character is dead, and Joel’s shock at 
the loss of his daughter is echoed by the player’s own likely shock at the narrative progression; 




with the player’s own likely direct response to witnessing the event. The narrative affordance of 
the game allowing the player to control the daughter for a time and then to control the father in 
protecting his daughter is powerful; the player’s first avatar is dead minutes after control is 
shifted, with the player’s new avatar having been unable to protect the first, compounded on a 
film-like level by the observing viewer’s genre assumptions perhaps leading the player to think 
she might have survived based upon the brother arriving to rescue the pair. In the same way as 
The Road patterns its readers to expect certain things of interactions between the protagonists 
and strangers, so here does the entirety of the game echo and revolve around this initial scene, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, with the game’s shifting control cementing this not just here but 
in later interactions between Joel and his surrogate daughter figure Ellie. 
 
The game repeatedly builds towards tragic climaxes such as this only to employ cinematic cuts 
with text indicating a time change and eerily mournful music. Each cut shows the characters in a 
new situation and invites the player to infer events in the interim. The player’s mental model of 
the two characters is therefore rarely stable as the characters are intermittently re-introduced 
with new gaps in their history that must then be inferred on an ongoing basis. However, due to 
the association of these jumps with traumatic events and the inability of the characters to fully 
overcome them, such patterning encourages the player to mimic the trauma of the characters. 
Just as the characters cannot forget events that occurred months or years ago in their timeline, 
players are likewise unable to forget the traumatic events that occurred just moments ago in 
their play-through of the game. We think of what we would do in this situation partly because, 
in a sense, the events have occurred to us in that we witnessed them just as the characters did. 
However, due to the narrative time jump, this stance of ‘how would I respond in this situation?’ 
does not match the diegetic depiction of how the characters are responding precisely because the 
player is not able to see the character’s prior response over the intervening time period, so we 
are still grieving when characters have already sublimated this grief into their ongoing 
personalities. 
 
The first cut of the game, occurring after this soldier kills Sarah, is a prime example of this 
disjunction between player and character – twenty years pass instead of a few months as in later 
cuts, and a much older and humourless Joel awakes from sleep with a panicked expression. This 
awakening from a dream rewrites the opening events of the narrative prior to this point as the 
basis of a nightmare which has haunted his sleep the night before. Joel’s daughter is hardly 
mentioned going forward until he eventually meets his brother once more, but the memory of 
this initial encounter may inflect in the player’s mind almost everything that Joel does, says, or 
appears to show in his body language or facial expressions throughout the game. The version of 




player is presented with no deceptive and gradual switch in the text’s argument as with The 
Road or the jarring personality switch of Assassin’s Creed: Unity’s murders for wine. The gap 
of twenty years created in the narrative here combined with the traumatic event of the 
daughter’s death are likely to invite inference in the majority of players as to why this man 
might have become a ruthless killer mistrustful of authority and others. The game does not need 
a character to state this explicitly, although some come close later in the game such as when Joel 
re-encounters his brother; even outside of such moments, however, the sequence of the game 
itself effectively makes this argument regarding Joel’s motivations and ethics.  
 
Joel soon meets Ellie, a young girl entrusted into his care to smuggle out of a military-protected 
city on behalf of a supposedly altruistic rebel group known as the Fireflies, initially with the 
help of his girlfriend Tess. As becomes apparent during their journey, Ellie has been bitten by 
one of the infected. This infection has spread the Cordyceps fungus to her mind but no further 
and has led to no visible signs of infection beyond her covered bite mark. Ellie’s apparent 
immunity seems to be unique and provides an opportunity for humanity to recover from this 
blight. The entire narrative and gameplay experience of The Last of Us builds to a point where 
Joel decides to condemn the entirety of the human race and prevent Ellie from being killed to 
provide a medical cure for the worldwide infection, out of his growing feelings of paternal love 
for this girl who becomes a surrogate daughter to replace the one he lost in the prologue, and 
against the wishes of that girl who very much wishes to sacrifice herself in this manner. The 
world is damned out of love for a single individual, and the structure of The Last of Us invites 
players to form their construction of these characters in such a way that he or she may be likely 
to agree with Joel just as much as they might simultaneously condemn him. This simultaneous 
response is likely to occur precisely due to the game switching perspective and control of 
characters throughout between Joel and Ellie at key moments in a similar way to how The Road 
gradually switches authenticating power between the father and the son. This final choice by Joe 
to kill those trying to extract a cure from Ellie is the surprising gameplay culmination of the 
player as Joel killing hundreds of infected or human hunters. In this climax, Joe’s victims 
believe themselves to be good people, but Joel’s motivations may detach slightly from the 
player’s in not carrying about this self-justification on the part of those who intend to harm 
Ellie. In killing the Fireflies at the end of the game, Joel’s ethical motivation is solely for Ellie’s 
survival above all other considerations.  
 
Early in the game, however, Joel is initially distant towards Ellie and self-consciously 
uncomfortable around a child of her age. Due to the juxtaposition of his meeting with Ellie and 
the initial sequence where the player saw Joel’s very natural manner of interacting with a 




his daughter or possibly an inability to fully grieve and process her death. In my analysis of 
Heavy Rain, I discussed how the lack of knowledge and ability to act towards a narrative’s 
‘strategic goals’ according to genre and dominant values within a text can encourage distancing 
from the player, such as with Madison Paige. In The Last of Us, the player is simultaneously 
distanced from and emotionally close to Joel in these early moments; the player has undergone 
many similar experiences to Joel and can infer why he is upset and distanced from Ellie, yet 
many are likely to also realise that Joel’s distance is emotionally cold and that due to genre 
expectations he is likely to grow closer to Ellie later in the text. As the player has not actually 
made decisions on Joel’s behalf there may not be as much of a sense of responsibility for his 
actions here in a causal sense, but rather simultaneous frustration and aesthetic interest in his 
emotional struggle not yet reaching the same point as that of the player. The player’s inability to 
make explicit choices here is something like a phantom limb; the wish for events to occur is still 
there even if it cannot directly be enacted, with the force of a player’s causality still lurking in 
every moment of interpretation and enjoyment of a narrative yet without such extensive 
ontological implications as a game such as Heavy Rain. 
 
Soon after these early events Tess sacrifices herself so that the others might get away, with a 
similar conversation about their self-definition as survivors to the one I analysed in Chapter 
Three between the father and mother in The Road: 
 
Joel: What are we doing here? This is not us. 
Tess: What do you know about us? About me? 
Joel: I know that you were smarter than that. 
Tess: Really? Guess what, we're shitty people, Joel. It's been that way for a long time. 
Joel: No, we are survivors! 
 
After Tess dies, the player is not likely to see any real sign of grief in Joel at his girlfriend’s 
self-sacrifice, not only refusing to talk about it but getting actively annoyed and uncomfortable 
when other characters such as Ellie mention her name. This is one of the few tragic incidents 
where we see its aftermath rather than the game jumping forward as it did with the death of 
Sarah. This incident is marked by its lack of any depiction of closure, just as the time jumps 
elsewhere in the narrative provoke a feeling of lack of closure in players who have just 
witnessed tragedy only to be instantly transported to a point in the narrative where everything 
appears fine. Joel does not consider himself to be ‘shitty’ but a ‘survivor’, an imperative to live 
at all costs beyond good and evil. Tess’s sacrifice makes no sense to Joel in this framework as it 
suggests some actions are more important than living, whereas Joel has not only engaged in 
murderous activities to survive but even grappled with whether to continue living prior to this 
journey, as he steadily reveals throughout the game and even emphasises in his final speech. 




encourage exploration but survival via tutorials that teach stealth, shooting, and other survival 
mechanics. Joel is a survivor, so the player re-creates the text’s arguments regarding survival on 
the level of gameplay to echo this identity.  
 
It is only as Joel begins to get to know Ellie as they travel together that the gameplay devices of 
The Last of Us expand, allowing the player for example to notice Ellie lingering at various 
locations and press an optional button prompt to speak with her when outside of combat. 
Selecting these button-prompts is an entirely optional action and only available at 
predetermined moments in the game. Therefore if the player selects such non-compulsory 
prompts and chooses to have Joel speak to Ellie, the player is only likely to have done this if he 
or she is curious about the girl or wants Joel to interact with her. Such curiosity in turn is likely 
to have emerged from the way in which the game’s cut-scenes and other events invite the player 
to want to be so curious about Ellie. She interacts with newly encountered areas and expresses a 
curiosity the player might feel at likewise encountering a new area; moreover, Ellie’s emotional 
responses to panic or to traumatic situations (such as an encounter with a cannibal named 
David, to be discussed later in this analysis) likewise invite interaction for a player who might 
wish to see his or her own feelings of trauma or narrative empathy dealt with and voiced by the 
narrative.  
 
Moreover, such interactions are important with regard to Ellie as a result of the manner in which 
they develop the player’s characterisation of Joel. A wish to interact with Ellie may come from 
the text’s invitations regarding curiosity about her character or the environments visited. 
However, through Joel’s own resulting words with Ellie, his own diegetic motivation in talking 
to Ellie may be revealed as slightly different from the player’s personal motivations, rewriting 
player causality in a similar manner to Heavy Rain. Such interactions might involve a mirroring 
a sense of curiosity and wish to interact, but also represent a developing relationship troubled by 
the similarity of his relationship with Ellie to that he had with his dead daughter Sarah and all 
the grief this triggers for Joel. Cut-scenes such as that of Joel and Ellie riding in a car together 
listening to an old cassette tape not only show a developing bond between the pair away from 
the immediate dangers of the infected and of other humans, but implicitly mirror the opening 
Sarah scene where Joel rode to bring his daughter to safety. The player may not only feel like he 
or she learns about Ellie’s character directly through their interaction but will also construct 
further characterising detail for his or her mental model of Joel.  
 
All of this contrasts a great deal with Bioshock Infinite’s similar mechanics in tone and 
execution. Although The Last of Us encourages us to notice what Ellie is doing and to look at 




young teenager with no sexualised corset window as with Elizabeth in Bioshock Infinite and on 
the other end of the spectrum no androgynous diving suit as with Eleanor in Bioshock 2. The 
incest taboo is in place in The Last of Us not just due to the clear age difference and lack of 
sexualisation but also the player’s own likely comparison of Ellie with Joel’s biological 
daughter from the beginning. Likewise, the use of the third person as opposed to first person 
camera encourages the player to form a slightly different relationship with the avatar in The Last 
of Us. We do not see through Joel’s eyes or control the camera via his look (and the same goes 
for our brief control of Ellie), but rather we use Joel as a central pivot for much of the game to 
which the camera is tied and through which the player can assist in protecting both characters 
from harm through gameplay. We are still attached to the character’s perspective to some extent 
but for example when Joel speaks outside of our control or prompting, we see the character 
doing so visibly on screen, unlike Bioshock Infinite’s first-person unseen avatar speaking from 
behind the screen. This makes the gaze in The Last of Us far more detached than in Bioshock 
Infinite, and combined with the lack of an overt ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ in Mulvey’s formula in 
relation to any character, these effects are neutralised. When the player is encouraged to look at 
Ellie’s actions, it involves a dialogue option to speak with her, allowing interest to be expressed 
not as a gaze but as fatherly conversation. Joel’s relationship with Ellie is symbiotic rather than 
just protective; not only does she save his life on numerous occasions in cut-scenes but at one 
key moment control shifts to Ellie to let the player act as her in rescuing Joel. 
 
Halfway through the game, after finally reaching the Fireflies’ research laboratory, they 
discover the Fireflies have not only failed in their prior research but that the scientists at this 
laboratory have either died or fled. Hunters attack the building and Joel falls onto a metal spike 
that impales him. His resulting pain and bleeding causes him to gradually lose focus and need 
help standing. The gameplay controls suddenly become ineffective for shooting and running, 
which further cements an identification between Joel and the player’s own control in a 
kinesthetic manner not possible in novels. Finally Ellie has to guide him out of the building and 
after Joel seems to be at the point of dying, another of the time jumps associated with traumatic 
events occurs. It is now winter, not autumn, and the player controls Ellie standing alone, raising 
the very real possibility that Joel might be dead. In the resulting combat throughout this section, 
the game removes many of the gameplay options such as the multiple weapon types and skills 
the player will have earned for Joel whilst controlling him. Video games theorist Jonas 
Linderoth has hypothesised that a key part of game narratives involves what he terms 




skilled through the challenges of a game.191 Linderoth’s theory can be seen as operating in 
player skill, diegetically within the game’s fiction, and formally in the accumulation of weapons 
or what are often known as ‘experience points’ in games that allow new skills or control options 
to open up based on spending these accumulated points gained killing enemies. For Linderoth, 
ecological advancement in games does not need to feature actual improvement in skill by the 
player but can just widen affordances as the game progresses to create the illusion of such 
improvement.  
 
There is a removal of ecological advancement gained within The Last of Us up to this point with 
the shift in control to Ellie, who has none of the upgrade advantages earned by the player 
throughout the game in a formal sense of unlocked control options. However, Ellie nevertheless 
turns out to be surprisingly competent as a result of the player’s skill level (learned through 
reaching this point in the game) merging with the diegesis; if the player is skilled at shooting 
due to controlling Joel for so long, then so too is Ellie automatically skilled as the player 
controls this aspect of her character, passing on that knowledge to a new character. As much of 
the narrative shows Ellie learning about the world and combat, this advancement within the 
diegesis is completed by the player’s own transfer of these skills to Ellie, just as Joel himself 
taught Ellie some of these skills in the story.  
 
As mentioned, the player has no idea after a time jump if Joel survived or not. Playing as Ellie 
hunting a deer with a boy in snowy woods, the player comes across two men and, using her bow 
as a threat, tells them to drop their weapons; one of them, a man later identified as David, tells 
the other to comply with Ellie. The appeals David makes about them having women and 
children, allowing Ellie to keep her gun, and his kind calm voice echo the ending situation of 
The Road where the boy encounters a man who makes the same claims regarding women and 
children and who also allows the boy to keep his gun. Throughout my thesis, I have argued that 
the sequence of The Road leading up to this moment features a shift from the novel’s first half 
where strangers are to be rightly feared to the point of attacking them to a second half where 
strangers deserve cautious empathy. This pattern culminates in such a way that after the father’s 
death, when the boy meets this stranger who acts utterly unlike the others and allows him to 
keep his gun, the reader may think the boy is safe without having total certainty over such a 
belief. The Last of Us works to critique this scene in The Road by revealing David to be the 
leader of the group of hunters that led to Joel being injured, that they were looking for a man 
and a girl to avenge their dead, and even allows Ellie to flee with antibiotics for an injured Joel 
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(revealing him to have survived) only in order to lure the hunters towards his position. Ellie is 
recaptured and discovers the group are cannibals, though David wishes to keep her alive. The 
game suggests based on the way another hunter suggests Ellie is David’s new pet’, and the way 
David talks to her, looks at her, and touches her hand through the bars of her cell, calling her 
‘special’. As a result, the player may realise that his earlier kindness was a ploy to groom her as 
a potential victim of his paedophilia. If the player did not perceive this danger, they are in a 
sense aligned as a victim of David’s manipulation just as Ellie has been. 
 
The player shifts back and forth at this point in the game between Ellie escaping and a healed 
Joel waking up to go and find Ellie. The combination of paedophilia and cannibalism with 
which David threatens Ellie is a powerful motivator in the player’s potential support for Joel 
brutally torturing a hunter for the location of his camp and then killing him anyway. This 
motivation in turns creates a situation where the player is likely to support or forgive behaviour 
that will in the next section of the game lead Joel to murder an already injured and defenceless 
woman. Likewise, as Ellie escapes by biting David and therefore infecting him with Cordyceps 
due to her immune status, when David chases Ellie in the final room of the area he is made even 
more monstrous through the addition of an early onset of infection, leading to twisting and 
quivering. However hard the player tries, Ellie is inevitably pinned down in a position implying 
her possible imminent rape, with control lessening gradually as the player presses on screen 
prompts to escape but is overpowered. Finally, however, Ellie manages to stab David a few 
moments before Joel enters the area in an attempt to rescue her – an attempt that is unnecessary 
as both the player and Ellie have already rescued themselves through Ellie’s own actions. Joel 
comforts Ellie with the same words he used at the beginning of the game as his daughter died in 
his arms, ‘baby girl’, a shift that will become crucial in the game’s denouement.  
 
In the conclusion of the game, as I mentioned earlier, Joel and Ellie finally find the Fireflies yet 
with unexpected results. The scientists attempt to operate on Ellie to find a medical cure for the 
Cordyceps infection, believing they have no other choice as they need to examine her brain in 
order to see how she has become immune to the symptoms of infection. Joel wakes up after 
being knocked out by soldiers to find that Ellie is already being prepared for surgery and, 
without the player being able to choose, attempts to save her. The player must kill a great 
number of Fireflies in order to rescue her, finally arriving in the room where Ellie is being held 
and murdering several unarmed medical staff before exiting with Ellie in his arms. In the 
ensuing section where the player controls Joel’s physical movements as he flees, Joel repeats 
‘Come on, baby girl, I got you, I got you’ and various variations upon this phrase, thereby 
echoing the beginning of the game exactly when he/the player carried Sarah in their arms as 





After exiting an elevator to the car park, Marlene, Ellie’s former mother-figure, aims a gun at 
the player, with the following dialogue exchange raising many ethical questions for Joel and the 
player in the same manner as I discussed earlier with self-definitional statements about being 
‘survivors’ or ‘shitty people’; this dialogue exchange at the end of the game not only asks Joel 
whether he is doing the right thing, but asks the player to directly consider his or her own real-
life ethics: 
 
Marlene: You can’t save her. Even if you get her out of here, then what? How long 
before she’s torn to pieces by a pack of clickers? That is if she hasn’t been raped and 
murdered first. 
Joel: That ain’t for you to decide. 
Marlene: It’s what she’d want. And you know it. Look... [She lowers the gun] You can 
still do the right thing here. She won’t feel anything. 
 
The game then jumps forward in time in the same manner as each prior tragedy of the narrative, 
whether Sarah’s death at the game’s beginning, the murder-suicide of a pair named Henry and 
Sam that our protagonists meet along their journey, Joel’s almost-dying in the Fireflies 
laboratory, and Ellie being rescued from David’s attempted murder-rape. Although nothing has 
ostensibly happened here prior to the jump, the player is likely to have been trained by the 
sequential logic of the text to have expected some traumatic event to have occurred. Instead, 
Joel is in the car with Ellie waking up in the back seat still wearing her surgical gown, with the 
pair engaging in the following dialogue: 
 
Ellie: What the hell am I wearing? 
Joel: Just take it easy… drugs are still wearing off. 
Ellie: What happened? 
Joel: (pause) We found the Fireflies. Turns out there’s a whole lot more like you, Ellie. 
People that are immune. It’s dozens actually. Ain’t done a damn bit of good either. 
They’ve actually st—They’ve stopped looking for a cure. I’m taking us home. I’m 
sorry. 
 
In the only moment of analepsis in the entire game, we then see what actually happened with 
Joel and Marlene. As soon as she lowered her gun and said ‘you can still do the right thing 
here’, Joel fires his own weapon at Marlene and puts Ellie in the car.  
 
Marlene: Wait! Let me go. Please. 
Joel: You’d just come after her. [He shoots Marlene in the head, cutting to black] 
 
This climax manipulates various temporal devices such as jumping forward and backwards in 
time to not only evoke certain traumatic emotional responses attached to previous time jumps 
and thereby prime the player to expect tragedy but also to ruthlessly restructure the player’s 




hands of authority when Joel repeats ‘baby girl’ and ‘I’ve got you’, and also to sympathise with 
what this moment means to Joel – that he is not only saving his new daughter Ellie but is in a 
sense ‘correcting’ his old failure to save Sarah.  
 
After appealing to both the player’s personal response to viewing the situations of the game and 
our sense of what Joel must be feeling according to his diegetic characterisation, the game then 
raises several implicit questions: according to the game you have played so far and the 
narrative events witnessed, do you think Ellie is at risk of being killed by Cordyceps infected 
people or raped/murdered by hunters? Concomitant to these questions is the idea that if Ellie 
can yield a cure for humanity, then perhaps these situations will not have to be faced by anyone 
at all in the future, healing this world. Joel sidesteps the question by making it an issue of 
personal choice, but Marlene then says ‘It’s what she’d want. And you know it’. Indeed, Ellie’s 
characterisation so far has been entirely aimed at achieving this end and the player has 
witnessed her will to self-sacrifice to achieve this goal.  
 
When the game flashes forwards and we see Ellie in the back of the car and see Joel lying to 
her, Marlene’s questions drive a potential schism between the player and Joel. Joel does not 
appear to have listened to Marlene’s questions, but this does not mean that the player has to 
disagree with Marlene as well. With barely a minute or so to emotionally apprehend what Joel 
has done in potentially ridding the world of its cure, the player is shunted back to this moment 
of decision in flashback by seeing Joel respond with violence to Marlene lowering her weapon. 
When an injured Marlene then suggests that she be allowed to flee with her life, Joel executes 
her on the chance that she and the other Fireflies might one day try to take Ellie again. Joel 
shows more emotional agony in lying to Ellie in the car a few moments before in the ‘present 
day’ than in the flashback to this extremely quick and barely-considered execution, which is one 
of the only times we see Joel kill someone in a cut-scene outside of our control. This lack of 
player control further widens the gap between the player’s potential view of Joel as constructed 
throughout the narrative and the character as revealed to us in these final moments.  
 
In the introduction to this section I suggested that The Last of Us is an ideal bridging point 
between choice-based games and set-sequenced novels due to its hybrid nature as a game where 
more than 99% of narrative encounters lack any element of player choice but where the 
penultimate moment of gameplay leads the player to make a choice without any signposting that 
a choice was on offer. There is, however, one key choice. When Joel enters the room to rescue 
Ellie and kills the medical staff, an action I engaged in as a player, it is not actually necessary to 




seem to realise it even was open for player control. When Joel enters the room, the following 
dialogue occurs if Joel kills the doctors: 
 
Nurse: Doctor? 
Doctor: What’re you doing here? I won’t let you take her. This is our future. Think of 
all the lives we’ll save. Don’t come any closer. I mean it. 
[Joel kills the doctor] 
Nurse: No! You fucking animal! 
Doctor 2: Kari, shut the hell up! 
Nurse: Please. I don’t wanna die. Oh god… oh god… 
 
If the player does kill these characters despite their protestations – something which might be 
likely as the game does not foreground a choice as being available – the player has in effect 
prefigured Joel’s own actions a little later in the game in murdering a defenceless and (at least in 
her self-image) righteous woman, Marlene. It is important to note that the player is not made 
aware that he or she had a choice over whether to kill the medical staff; if they move past the 
doctors without killing them, the game does not highlight that players have engaged in a 
particularly noble action. When the medical staff beg for their lives in the version of events 
where the player begins killing them, such protestations emerge as dialogue in the same way 
other enemies throughout the game might shout intimidating statements at the player. It is not 
clear that the player did not have to kill these doctors at any point.  
 
Therefore this moment is potentially even more complex than the kind of decisions I analysed 
last section with regard to Heavy Rain, where the player would make a choice on behalf of a 
character only for the diegesis to then have the character explain their decision for reasons 
potentially distinct from that of the player’s original reasoning. The following scenes of the 
game do not alter in any way regardless of the choice made as to whether to kill the doctors. The 
game does not ‘know’, so to speak, whether the player as Joel killed the medical staff or not; no 
line of dialogue and no cut-scene will alter in the moments that follow and their death is utterly 
irrelevant to the forward continuation of the game. If players are not aware that they had a 
choice here, then killing the medical staff can be written off as yet another action of Joel in 
rescuing Ellie. If we compare this killing to Arno’s murders of various bar staff in Assassin’s 
Creed: Unity in order to steal their wine (an incident discussed in greater depth in Chapter Two 
of this thesis), it is significant that players might not be hugely disturbed by killing these 
medical staff in The Last of Us versus the incoherency and ethically bizarre nature of Assassin’s 
Creed: Unity’s transposition of normal game mechanics of killing guards to the protagonist’s 
drunken low-point in the narrative. Is it just that rescuing Ellie represents a greater reason to kill 
other humans than for a barrel of wine, or is something more required here? The reason why so 
many players are likely to kill these medical staff, yet why this section of the game is still so 




the diegetic characterisation of Joel so far. ‘Almost’, because although we have seen Joel kill 
those he views as threats before, we have not seen Joel kill anyone quite so innocent, yet at the 
same time their innocence is perhaps clouded by Ellie’s sudden appearance and the way in 
which one doctor tries to block the player’s way.  
 
It is extremely easy and inconsequential to kill the medical staff and this action may seem like 
an appropriate response after hours of killing almost every other person you encounter, so the 
player does so, and so does Joel minutes later when he shoots Marlene in cold blood. Whether 
for good or ill, the player is ethically responsible in perpetuating Joel’s violence in a way that is 
perhaps more powerful for its unwitting nature and its lack of direct bifurcation of the game’s 
plot in any way. It is easy to make game choices that result in interesting dramatic outcomes for 
aesthetic rather than ethical reasons, out of an interest to see ‘what would happen if I did this?’ 
and to complete all versions of a story. Yet in decisions such as this where there is no direct 
outcome whatsoever, the only outcome of the decision is the making of the decision itself from 
the player’s causality and the way players might feel when they find out that they did not have 
to make that choice, if they ever do discover this. It is in such implicit decision-making and its 
equivalents in novels, perhaps, that the ethics of fiction can partially be located. 
 
 
4. ‘You shall see yourself as you are’: Characterisation in George Orwell’s 1984 
 
All of the texts discussed thus far in this dissertation have either been video games, 
experimental prose fiction texts, or comparatively ‘normative’ set sequence novels such as The 
Road and Enduring Love, produced between the 1960s and the present day. I did not select 
these texts out of any purposeful attempt to make a historical argument, and I would argue that 
my methodology and theories are applicable to prior time periods, albeit requiring greater 
specificity over how hypothetical readers might respond to texts and differing values of prior 
historical moments. I selected these texts in part because they were the best type for their 
category – the experimental novels of Chapter One allowed me to comment on the contingency 
of identification upon sequence due to these texts’ experimentation with these elements; the 
stark and stripped-back The Road allowed me to analyse a relationship between just two 
characters with only a few interactions with others; and Enduring Love’s unprecedented level of 
obsession on Parry’s part and of an almost unbelievable disbelief on Clarissa’s part allowed me 
to foreground issues of identifying multiple characters and competing perspectives. Beyond the 
mechanics of each text, the contemporary or near-contemporary nature of many of the novels to 




and ethical issues, particularly those relating to women, parenting, the male gaze, and 
apocalyptic themes.  
 
The final text of this final chapter is slightly more than a decade older than any of the others, yet 
it shares many of these tropes in a way that not only foreshadows their arrival in later fiction but 
sets the stage for them through its influence on its genre, on texts that use similar tropes, and 
indeed every-day politics and society: George Orwell’s 1984. By pushing further back in 
literary history, I intend in part to demonstrate the further applicability of my theory of 
characterisation to older texts, but in a way which does not require too much concentration on 
historical analysis, something which falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, primarily I 
use 1984 for many of the same reasons as my other texts, as not only does it share tropes with 
my previous examples, but it also acts as an excellent source text for exploring issues of reader 
causality in prose fiction, particularly in its use of the medium specificity of prose fiction – an 
aspect important to account for in a chapter that has thus far been partially concerned with the 
medium specificity of video games in terms of player causality emerging from explicit decisions 
made by players.  
 
I will argue that 1984 manipulates reading conventions relating to narration in prose fiction and 
genre to lead the reader to construct the protagonist of 1984 in a way that is likely to be 
diegetically rewritten in the novel’s concluding moments in a process broadly comparable to the 
manner in which The Last of Us and Heavy Rain ‘rewrite’ player construction of characters and 
their choices. Winston’s use of certain words in his focalised narration may be constructed by 
readers according to their understanding of the words being used (something akin to a principle 
of minimal departure)192 that may be different from that which Winston intends in his own 
oppressive society or which may be taken for granted as true by the reader when Winston 
cannot live up to their standards in his later actions. This process is underscored on a thematic 
level through the manipulation and destruction of language itself in ‘newspeak’ and the attempt 
by the ruling classes of the novel’s fictional society to eradicate certain words in order to 
destroy beliefs and values associated with them, mirroring what happens to Winston’s 
characterisation and narration.  
 
In 1984, Winston Smith rebels against the oppressive Party through thought-crime first, then 
private writing, an illicit sexual relationship, and finally with promises of violence on behalf of 
a resistance movement. In each case, ‘old-world’ values are evoked by Winston in a way which 
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even readers from 2015 may broadly align with their own pre-dystopian world, albeit in a 
manner that is likely to have been particularly politically urgent for British readers with recent 
European fascist and contemporary communist activity at the novel’s publication in 1949. 
Elision of different historical and social positions is not necessarily a problem for my analysis 
here; such activity as that which I am engaged in is representative of the way in which readers 
are likely to apply their own understanding of the world and their own values to the use of 
language in a way that will almost certainly be distinct from any original author intention to 
some extent due to the limitations of language as necessarily ‘corrupted’ by the recipient.193 
However, as established throughout my previous chapters, the sequential logic of a text is likely 
to pattern readers in certain ways both on the micro level of style and the macro level of events 
and characterising statements. Therefore even if reader idiosyncrasy is likely to transform 
characterising details in a text, as I have argued in previous cases we can still discuss certain 
identifications as being likely in light of sequence. The same is true of 1984. At each moment of 
rebellion and evocation of pre-dystopian values, Winston mentions his mother in some way. 
This repetition establishes a sequential patterning that leads the reader to expect rebellion 
whenever Winston’s mother is mentioned, in a fashion that resembles the patterning I have 
described in The Road, Enduring Love, and The Last of Us. 
 
Chapter Three of 1984, for example, begins with the statement that ‘Winston was dreaming of 
his mother’. The description of the dream suggests that the protagonist believes himself to be 
responsible for the death of his mother and sister: 
 
[…] one of those dreams which, while retaining the characteristic dream scenery, are a 
continuation of one’s intellectual life […] His mother’s memory tore at his heart 
because she had died loving him, when he was too young and selfish to love her in 
return, and because somehow, he did not remember how, she had sacrificed herself to a 
conception of loyalty that was private and unalterable.194 
 
Elsewhere in 1984, dreams frequently act to foreshadow future plot events that Winston can 
have no knowledge of, such as Room 101 and ‘the place where there shall be no darkness’, but 
here in this first dream we see one of the first of many references to the past associated 
primarily with Winston’s mother and his feeling of having betrayed her. For Winston, the past is 
not a happy place with a superior world to that of the Party, but instead a mausoleum of abject 
hunger and anarchy where his wish to preserve and glut himself on his family’s food potentially 
killed the only people in the world who loved him and who he loved in return. This emotional 
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tie in turn links Winston’s family and only this family to pre-Party values: ‘a conception of 
loyalty that was private and unalterable’. Moreover, the reader is likely to align Winston himself 
with such pre-Party values due to the emotional intensity with which he discusses such incidents 
even if there are hints he does not entirely believe in them, in a similar manner to Huck’s 
potential alignment with possible reader belief in freeing slaves in The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn (1884) despite (or because of) Huck’s own belief he is going to go to hell as a 
result.195 Just as with the frequent use of time jumps in The Last of Us, the letter/Clarissa-doubt 
chapters of Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love, and the cannibal encounters in Cormac McCarthy’s 
The Road, Winston’s dreams and flashbacks regarding his mother and childhood throughout the 
novel act as a sequence that primes the reader for the novel’s final arguments and encourages 
the reader to respond in certain ways to the novel’s climax.  
 
On virtually every occasion that Winston acts in a rebellious manner, the act follows Winston 
thinking of his mother in some way, and vice versa. Paradoxically, in the majority of these cases 
the seeds are also sown for Winston’s final self-betrayal and the collapse of the reader’s 
identification with a character we thought we knew. In this early dream of his mother, Winston 
places her ‘private and unalterable’ loyalty in opposition to the workings of the Party: 
 
The thing that now suddenly struck Winston was that his mother’s death […] had been 
tragic and sorrowful in a way that was no longer possible. Tragedy, he perceived, 
belonged to the ancient time, to a time when there was still privacy, love and friendship, 
and when the members of a family stood by one another without needing to know the 
reason […] Such things, he saw, could not happen today. Today there was fear, hatred 
and pain, but no dignity of emotion, no deep or complex sorrows. (p. 35)  
 
For his very ability to have ‘perceived’ that tragedy is no longer possible, Winston might seem 
to rise above the intellectual constraints of his society with a ‘dignity of emotion’ and ‘deep or 
complex sorrows’; if Winston can conceive of these concepts, readers can carry out their usual 
operations by recalling their real-life knowledge of what tragedy, emotion, love, and friendship 
are. Although the reader has no idea whether Winston means the same things by these words, 
readers interpret such language as being self-evident in the majority of texts without needing a 
great burden of psychological evidence. Limitations of publishing length, cognitive processing 
limitations in humans, and the nature of verbal prose leading to the flattening of reality into 
sentences word-by-word all contribute to this situation of words not ‘properly’ capturing the 
interiority of characters. However, the characterisation is not ‘untrue’ until diegetic statements 
contradict it; as Winston is not transformed in this manner until later in the text, there is nothing 
exactly incorrect about interpreting Winston in this manner at this point in the narrative. Due to 
both genre considerations and the likely reader belief that Winston supports old-world (and 
                                                          




therefore ‘our’) values, readers are likely to consider Winston as the ‘hero’ rebelling against this 
regime and therefore ‘like us’.  
 
This construction ultimately fails, however. Winston’s mother, we are told, had ‘a conception of 
loyalty that was private and unalterable’; Winston has no such conception. In the novel’s 
conclusion, Winston chooses Julia to suffer instead of himself – ‘Do it to Julia! Do it to Julia! 
Not me! Julia! I don’t care what you do to her. Tear her face off, strip her to the bones. Not me! 
Julia! Not me!’ (p. 329). He fails to maintain his love for Julia in the face of the horror of the 
rats of Room 101, where: 
 
You think there’s no other way of saving yourself, and you’re quite ready to save 
yourself that way. You want it to happen to the other person. You don’t give a damn 
what they suffer. All you care about is yourself. (p. 336).  
 
Winston cries out for the torture and death he is about to receive to be given to his love Julia 
instead. Both Winston and the reader have believed throughout the novel that Room 101 
contains ‘the worst thing in the world’ (p. 325). Many readers might be mistaken for thinking 
this refers to the rat torture that Winston so fears, but something deeper occurs here. Throughout 
the novel, Winston is indeed scared of rats, but often expresses this fear in particular after 
thinking of his mother or his impoverished childhood. This childhood experience represented 
more than just saving himself; Winston gorged on excessive chocolate in the process and 
thereby believes that he killed his mother to save his own skin. The worst thing in the world is 
not a rat. The worst thing in the world is Winston betraying those who love him once again, and 
in this moment Winston repeats the primal crime of his childhood.  
 
Not only is Winston broken in a psychological sense by his betrayal of Julia, but also the 
reader’s sense of his character is utterly altered from the conception built up by the novel up to 
this point. My conclusion here resonates with but deviates from that of Phelan in his work 
Reading People, Reading Plots. Although Phelan notes the alignment of Winston’s mother with 
Julia, he concludes: ‘he violates something at the core of his values because it is at the core of 
his own existence: the feeling that he is alive because the woman who brought him into the 
world and loved him had sacrificed herself for him’.196 On the contrary, I am arguing here that 
Winston did not violate his own values at all but rather ‘saw himself’ as he really is and as he 
was as a child – someone who had his entire life been sacrificing others for self-preservation, 
and who is nowhere near as noble as he thought. Phelan’s conclusion is symptomatic of the 
potential success of the novel’s initial emotional appeals, just as I concluded with Boyd’s 
reading of Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire in Chapter Two. 1984 can be seen to encourage a 
                                                          




sense of Winston as a potentially good man and closest character to the position of an active 
hero, only to reveal that much of said construction was in part aided and abetted by the reader’s 
own likely inference and causal involvement in the character’s formation (using ‘real world’ 
values and understandings of words as opposed to attempting to grasp the alien nature of the 
setting). 
 
This tragic loss of self-image and realisation of his own base nature is threaded throughout the 
novel but may not be recognised by readers as such due to the potential success of the reader’s 
elevation of Winston to hero-status. Repeatedly, the novel appeals to values of love and family 
that might convince the reader of Winston’s potential to rise above this world alongside implicit 
suggestions of his complicity with his society’s thinking. One of Winston’s earliest transitions 
from thought-crime to actual rebellion against the state occurs, for example, in attempting to 
create a record of his feelings in contrast to the mutability of the party’s records; however, this 
record quickly loses its structure with an attempt to capture mimetic dialogue. While watching 
war films, ‘a woman down in the prole part of the house suddenly started kicking up a fuss and 
shouting they didnt oughter of showed it not in front of kids they didnt it aint right not in front 
of the kids’ (sic) (p. 11). By reporting this incident Winston evokes the image of a more 
traditional kind of mothering relationship than that offered by those in the Party, and this in turn 
transitions into reflections on women in general: ‘He did not know what had made him pour out 
this stream of rubbish. But the curious thing was that while he was doing so a totally different 
memory had clarified itself in his mind’ (p. 11). Here Winston then thinks of his sexual desire 
for Julia and remarks ‘he disliked nearly all women, and especially the young and pretty ones’ 
whereas he feels ‘deeply drawn to’ O’Brien, a figure of false comfort to Winston throughout the 
novel all the way up until Winston’s torture at the man’s hands (pp. 12-13).  
 
During the torture of Winston, O’Brien asks him why he believes the Party to have created such 
an apparently awful dystopia as that which the reader has learned about throughout the novel. 
Winston echoes the reader’s own potential answer to this question, trained throughout the 
history of tragedy and the novel to believe that evil men are the heroes of their own stories, by 
suggesting that the Party might believe it is doing all this for the benefit of humankind. O’Brien 
intensifies Winston’s torture after this suggestion, calling him ‘stupid’ (p. 301) and dismissing 
the ‘hedonistic utopias that the old reformers imagined’ (p. 306). O’Brien suggests instead that 
they have created this world to exercise power for its own sake without pretence:  
 
Alone – free – the human being is always defeated. It must be so, because every human 
being is doomed to die, which is the greatest of all failures […] in the future there will 
be no wives and no friends. Children will be taken from their mothers at birth, as one 
takes eggs from a hen […] If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping 





The individual is animalised, like an ‘egg’ from a ‘hen’; only through overcoming death by 
abandoning the self in an everlasting mass collective can power for power’s sake be maintained 
forever, O’Brien argues, specifically highlighting a relationship with ‘mothers’ in this regard. It 
is critical here that this final rebellion, leading as it has to Winston’s torture in Room 101, has 
once again been preceded by thoughts of his mother and the values she represents.  
 
Winston tells Julia, remembering his theft of food from his starving mother and sister as a child, 
that ‘until this moment, I believed I had murdered my mother’, believing it to have been a 
‘memory that he must have deliberately pushed out of his consciousness’ (pp. 185-86). This 
guilt manifests itself in the moment of his decision to rebel, raising his mother to become a call 
for action: 
 
Yet she had possessed a kind of nobility, a kind of purity, simply because the standards 
that she obeyed were private ones. Her feelings were her own, and could not be altered 
from outside. It would not have occurred to her that an action which is ineffectual 
thereby becomes meaningless. (p. 190).  
 
Winston decides to rebel in a way that might similarly be ‘ineffectual’; the result does not 
matter for him, with the act meaningful in and of itself in a way that ironically parallels the 
state’s tautological justification of power for power’s sake. Winston repeats throughout the 
novel that he is aware that Big Brother will inevitably discover his crime but continues 
regardless. O’Brien, masquerading as a resistance member, asks Winston a series of questions 
designed to test his allegiance to this fictional resistance movement. Among them, he asks: 
 
‘If, for example, it would somehow serve our interests to throw sulphuric acid in a 
child’s face – are you prepared to do that?’ 
‘Yes.’ (pp. 199-200) 
 
This statement is quickly moved past, present in a catalogue of other less problematic tests of 
allegiance. The text’s pace is reminiscent of The Last of Us moving quickly past potentially 
problematic moments in its climactic events so that the reader/player is unlikely to be able to 
fully and explicitly consider the morality of each events. O’Brien claims to believe all previous 
regimes to have been in a state of denial about their aim towards power, yet how exactly is 
Winston’s suggestion of ‘ineffectual’ action for its own sake and his willingness to ‘throw 
sulphuric acid in a child’s face’ without hesitation any different from a pursuit for power? That 
Winston knows he will inevitably fail might be read by the reader as a heroic act – of fighting 
even though the battle is lost – but instead as the novel moves towards its conclusion Winston’s 




so that one can temporarily feel agency in an oppressive world. O’Brien directly reminds both 
Winston and the reader of this earlier sulphuric acid promise during his torture: 
 
‘If you are a man, Winston, you are the last man […] And you consider yourself 
morally superior to us, with our lies and our cruelty?’ 
‘Yes, I consider myself superior.’ 
O’Brien did not speak. Two other voices were speaking. After a moment Winston 
recognised one of them as his own. It was a sound-track of the conversation he had had 
with O’Brien, on the night when he had enrolled himself in the Brotherhood […] 
‘You are the last man,’ said O’Brien. ‘You are the guardian of the human spirit. You 
shall see yourself as you are.’ (pp. 309-10).  
 
As with Tess and Joel’s argument about being ‘survivors’ or ‘shitty people’ in The Last of Us, 
these statements explicitly posit ways of categorising and viewing the protagonist that readers 
have to contend with in some form in their construction of the narrative. Is Winston morally 
superior? Winston’s private emotional discourse and criticism of the way in which his world is 
run has likely been, up until this point, relatable to any reader who likewise judges its world as 
hellish. Moreover, in his attempt to fulfil the narrative promise of rebellion suggested 
throughout the novel, Winston has likely achieved some level of allegiance with the reader, just 
as the father of The Road or Joe and Parry in Enduring Love do so regardless of their other 
flaws. Yet in this instance, O’Brien does not necessarily say that Winston is not morally 
superior, he just provides evidence instead in reminding both the reader and Winston of earlier 
events. When O’Brien then repeats his claims, ‘You are the last man [...] You are the guardian 
of the human spirit’, the meaning might be changed in the eyes of the reader; O’Brien is arguing 
that humanity is self-deluded as to its ethical superiority and that the reader might likewise have 
been deluded in their support of Winston. When O’Brien therefore says ‘You shall see yourself 
as you are’, he speaks both to the character and to the reader constructing him. The reader sees 
Winston choose himself over Julia, and in this moment the reader’s view of the character is 
likely to fundamentally change. 
 
Just as Winston cannot withstand the rats, neither can the reader’s likely sense of continuity 
between Winston pre- and post- torture be sustained, something which is emphasised and 
partially obscured by the novel’s time jump forwards. This jump occurs in a similar manner to 
the time jumps of The Last of Us, ending the prior section with the exact moment of Winston’s 
betrayal (not just of Julia but of himself and more importantly the reader’s likely view of him) 
but skipping to some future time point after Winston’s release. Not only might the reader be 
looking for some signs of the pre-torture version of Winston for characterising purposes, to 
recoup the lost character development not shown to us due to the time jump, but so too does the 
narrative play with this question as to whether Winston is ‘still the same’. As I have argued, 




betrayed her and his sister. The same occurs in this section, potentially and even unconsciously 
priming the reader that a similar rebellious act may occur due to this conditioning throughout 
the narrative, yet there is a crucial difference here: 
 
His tiny sister, too young to understand what the game was, had sat propped up against 
a bolster, laughing because the others were laughing. For a whole afternoon they had all 
been happy together, as in his earlier childhood. 
He pushed the picture out of his mind. It was a false memory. (pp. 340-41) 
 
Not only does Winston actively push away the memory as ‘false’ in a similar manner to the way 
in which he rewrites history for the government as part of his occupation in this world, but even 
beforehand the memory was highly positive and pleasant, free of the pain of all previous 
instances.  
 
Likewise, when Winston meets Julia with so little emotion they could almost be strangers, the 
reader is likely to persistently wonder if there is any sign of the prior love the two characters 
expressed before their capture, but instead there is a melancholy dissection of what they did to 
one another – ‘You don’t give a damn what they suffer. All you care about is yourself’ (p. 336) 
– followed by their parting as virtually strangers. All that Winston cares about now is Big 
Brother, with connotations of a replacement mother-figure or even lover in the ‘loving breast’: 
 
He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of 
smile was hidden beneath that dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O 
stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down 
the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was 
finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother (p. 342). 
 
There is a terrifying doubling of stance here; the reader is invited to take Winston at his word 
that he loves Big Brother not just due to the prior meetings of this chapter suggesting his broken 
nature but due to the impassioned love here, reminiscent in its expression to poetry of lovers and 
their complaints. At the same time, despite Winston’s own evocation of prior old-world values 
likely having been taken at face-value throughout the novel by the reader, the values expressed 
in these ending sentences run contrary to the reader’s own likely feelings here towards the 
abominable Party.  
 
The character we are reading about has the same history and name as the Winston we have 
generated throughout the text, but the values now expressed and even some of the writing style 
conflicts with the reader’s likely identification prior to this point. When the novel therefore says 
‘The struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself’, the novel makes explicit the 
reader’s conflict over the multiple versions of Winston likely constructed up until this point. In 




to varying extents as part of the process of generating and understanding characters from texts, 
conceptualising each character’s perspective even when multiple characters appear and interact. 
In analysing the games of this chapter, I have shown how this process of identification is 
complicated by the player’s own causal involvement in making explicit choices in games but 
also interpretative and emotional choices in response to set-sequence narratives, and I have 
suggested that these choices can be anticipated and manipulated by such texts. 1984 likewise 
implicates the reader’s causal activity in likely identifying Winston as holding certain values, 
matching to some extent Winston’s possible self-image suggested by O’Brien as ‘the guardian 
of the human spirit’, only to dismantle this in its latter moments in a way that triggers all prior 
emotional associations with Winston’s mother, rebellion, and the sacrifice of others throughout 
the text.  
 
This shift in the final moments of 1984 sets up the conclusion to my thesis and the introduction 
of my final concept – that of each character itself representing a multitude. The reader may 
believe that Winston is a complete victim of his regime, but he only rebelled after all because 
the Party wanted him to, watching him and manipulating him this entire time in a ritualistic 
tragedy and conversion into a model citizen. The text’s triggering of multiple prior details of 
diegetic characterisation prevents its ending from being rejected as ‘unlike’ Winston entirely, 
for the character we see may contradict some prior narrative details but coheres enough to prior 
moments that readers can see he is the same man. It is this multiplicity of the same character, 
and the negotiation the reader must engage in to make multiple versions fit, wherein I will argue 
in my conclusion that much of the ethical and unethical potential of fiction lies. Not only do we 
identify with every character in a text, but every character becomes many characters in the 
process of identification, elided and indistinct from one another just as any present moment is 
indistinct to its perceiver, the present moment passing as soon as one attempts to frame it. Like a 
flipbook of images flipping from page to page and forming a smooth animation, a character is a 




CONCLUSION: A Theory of Identification and Ethics 
 
 
In my final chapter, I explored how 1984 involves diegetic rewriting of Winston’s character – 
the reader might believe him to be representative of the ‘human spirit’ and a hero but in the final 
moments of the text he is revealed to have not necessarily been the man we thought he was, and 
even beyond this he is further transformed through his torture into abandoning much of his prior 
apparently noble behaviour. This revelation of a protagonist as holding different motivations 
and values to those a reader/player believes them to have can be found also in Scott Shelby in 
Heavy Rain and the revelation that he is a murderer, yet the incident is distinct for the fact that 
Winston only commits his crime of trying to sacrifice Julia at the end of the text and is indeed 
partially altered by the experience into someone who loved Big Brother, as opposed to 
committing crimes literally throughout the text. The Last of Us perhaps represents a closer 
comparative example for 1984 with Joel’s murder of Marlene at the end of the game potentially 
representing for the player a line being crossed, an action that transforms the player’s view of 
Joel’s character. As I recounted in the previous chapter, Joel then lies to Ellie in the car on the 
way back but finds such lying far more difficult than murder, suggesting a scale of values where 
his relationship with Ellie is prized above all and creating an emotionally complex situation for 
a player who might sympathise with Joel for this lying but condemn him for his other actions. 
 
In the concluding moments of The Last of Us, players find themselves controlling Ellie instead 
of Joel, a switch that has only occurred before when Joel himself was physically incapacitated. 
Here, however, the shift reinforces distance from Joel and encourages consideration from afar of 
his actions, with the game giving the player time to do so in a way it might not have done with 
the player’s potential unthinking execution of medical staff earlier in the game. Although the 
player does not control Ellie’s dialogue, the player is invited to share her perspective in having 
to physically keep up with Joel yet being unable to move as fast. In the final conversation, 
Ellie’s dialogue style alters from her usually energetic and verbose speech and Joel’s dialogue 
suddenly becomes quite talkative and willing to discuss a past he has been evasive about it 
earlier in the narrative. This following exchange concludes the game: 
 
Joel: Well, looks like we’re walking. Should be a straight shot from here. 
Ellie: Alright. 
Joel: Actually kinda pretty, ain’t it? 
Ellie: Yeah. 
Joel: Alright. Now watch your head going through. [The pair move past a barbed wire 
fence] 
Ellie: Here… got it. 
Joel: Oh… Feelin’ my age now. Hmpf. Don’t think I ever told you, but Sarah and I 




friends. Think you really would’ve liked her. I know she woulda liked you. 
Ellie: I bet I would’ve. 
[They emerge above the town Jackson where Joel’s brother has founded a safe haven] 
Joel: Wow. Look down here. Just a little bit further now. Shit. Here, I got you. Gimme 
your hand.  
 
At this moment the player must select a button press to be lifted up by Joel in the final action of 
the game. Throughout this sequence, the player is simultaneously reminded of all the 
experiences they underwent as Joel/player combined and therefore the psychological 
justification for Joel’s behaviour due to having lost his previous daughter Sarah and gaining 
Ellie, yet at the same time possibly gladdened by Joel’s apparent healing insomuch as he is now 
able to discuss Sarah in a positive way, ‘I think you two would’ve been good friends. Think you 
really would’ve liked her. I know she woulda liked you’. At the same time, these words are 
troubling in light of what actions we know Joel has performed to achieve the possibility of such 
words being spoken – that he murdered a woman just in case she might follow them, and has 
debatably ridden humanity of one of its only chances to be healed. Joel’s happiness and Ellie’s 
life has cost the world.  
 
In Ellie’s uncharacteristically muted assent, the player’s own potential response is mirrored and 
her disbelief in Joel’s story prefigured: 
 
Joel: Alright, come on. 
Ellie: Hey, wait. Back in Boston – back when I was bitten – I wasn’t alone. My best 
friend was there. And she got bit too. We didn’t know what to do. So… She says ‘Let’s 
just wait it out. Y’know, we can be all poetic and just lose our minds together.’ I’m still 
waiting for my turn. 
Joel: Ellie -- 
Ellie: Her name was Riley and she was the first to die. And then it was Tess. And then 
Sam. 
Joel: None of that is on you. 
Ellie: No, you don’t understand. 
Joel: I struggled for a long time with survivin’. And you – no matter what, you keep 
finding something to fight for. Now, I know that’s not what you want to hear right now, 
but it’s -- 
Ellie: Swear to me. Swear to me that everything you said about the Fireflies is true. 
[There’s a short pause] 
Joel: I swear. 
Ellie: [pause] Okay. [Smash cut to a black screen, then credits and music] 
 
In the final seconds of the game Ellie reveals a prior hitherto unknown characterising detail of 
great significance, explaining her motivation as stemming from her friend Riley’s death and 
inviting questions as to whether she is experiencing survivor’s guilt as Joel suggests or whether 
Ellie was positively motivated to help stop this cycle of death through her unique immunity. 
Throughout my thesis I have explored several ‘self-definitional’ moments such as this in various 




flashpoints for decision-making on the part of players/readers. Joel completes his emotional 
struggle throughout the text by talking about himself with Ellie as a proxy: ‘I struggled for a 
long time with survivin’. And you – no matter what, you keep finding something to fight for. 
Now, I know that’s not what you want to hear right now, but it’s –’. Ellie interrupts, however, 
by changing the nature of the question the player is being asked and by implication asking the 
player to determine Joel’s goodness and whether his action was ethically correct: 
 
Ellie: Swear to me. Swear to me that everything you said about the Fireflies is true. 
[There’s a short pause] 
Joel: I swear. 
Ellie: [pause] Okay. [Smash cut to a black screen, then credits and music] 
 
From this scene it could be inferred that Ellie knows that Joel is lying and has in one sense 
betrayed their relationship through this lie and dismissal of Ellie’s agency even as in another 
sense it reveals the ethical sacrifice Joel has made on Ellie’s behalf to keep her safe, a sacrifice 
Ellie might also recognise as such. That the game so quickly cuts to black with ‘The Last of Us’ 
as a logo upon the screen ties this moment to the title’s connotations not only of the last human 
beings but also the last of characters’ individual humanity and emotional reservoirs, that these 
kinds of situations are what characters have been reduced to. 
 
What happens in the above moments, when Ellie revealed characterisation the player could not 
have known prior to this moment and where Joel progressed forward with characterisation 
different to his prior incarnations? Throughout my thesis I have raised the idea of identification 
being contingent upon sequence, but what are the ontological implications for the existence of 
characters, if it is in the specifically fictional nature of such processes that we are to find their 
ethics? Earlier in my thesis I also discussed Richard Walsh’s argument in The Rhetoric of 
Fictionality that using mimetic representational models of character as our criteria for emotional 
investment and emotional response does not make sense conceptually speaking – we feel 
emotion in response to phrases and values before a character has been fully established in a 
mimetic model, and what is a character but the values and ideas attached to him or her? Instead, 
Walsh argues that although readers may form emotional responses to each element of the web 
of values relating to each character, the reader’s sense that they feel emotion for an individual 
rather than in response to values associated within an individual emerges as a by-product of 
interpretation, not as the beginning of the chain. As an ongoing argument throughout my thesis, 
I have contended that the reader’s belief that they are responding to individuals is not so easily 
discarded, and that this tendency of readers can be used to account for the ability of fictional 
arguments to achieve reader agreement and investment to a greater degree than factual 
arguments. Even if we do differentiate between what is actually happening in our experiences 




that readers think certain things occur in the narrative experience can still be indicative of 
important parts of fictional stories’ effects. Here, in light of my analysis of sequence, control, 
multiplicity, and causality throughout my thesis, I would like to extend my initial response to 
value-driven theories of character further.  
 
Characters may emerge from a primordial soup of values and ideas throughout a text, generated 
by the reader as I have shown in relation to 1984 and other novels, yet ontologically they still 
have a level of unified existence insomuch as the reader considers such values and ideas as 
related to a particular individual at a particular point in the story, or else narratives would be 
nonsensical. However, nothing about what I have argued here necessitates the continuity of such 
unified characters from moment to moment in the face of diegetic rewriting of player/reader 
identification of characters. How much is too much of a shift before a character is no longer the 
same ‘person’ if characters are not ‘real’ people at all? The situation is even clearer in novels 
where only pronouns and proper nouns bind characterising details together as opposed to games 
where other audio-visual stimuli such as character models and voice actors hold characterising 
details together.  
 
In The Road, for example, I have argued that the first half features events that repeatedly 
authenticate the father’s sense of threat and mistrust towards strangers only for the novel to 
reverse this view in the second half by suggesting the father to be incorrect, even though the 
world itself appears to have changed. How can this incoherency be accounted for in ontological 
terms when so few people appear to notice it that George Monbiot suggests the novel can ‘save 
the world’ and Clive Sinclair claims that ‘some deep sympathy’ makes the father and son 
‘human and knowable to us, causes us to care almost beyond bearing about their fates, and so 
makes us read on compulsively for fear of what might happen to them. And us’? And on the 
other hand, what is going on in the minds of players when in Assassin’s Creed: Unity the 
hitherto heroic Arno murders civilians to steal wine in a misjudged game mission yet the 
diegesis provides no explanation for the sudden shift in values and indeed forgets this troubling 
incident even occurred, with the aforementioned reviewer Andrew Webster trying to unify 
various elements of Arno’s personality and concluding that the storytelling is poor:  
 
Arno has basically no memorable personality traits, aside from the fact that he's a 
sociopathic killer. There's a scene where he kills multiple people just so he can steal 
some wine and have a drink. Afterwards, he doesn't express remorse: he's just mad 
someone stole his watch while he was passed out from drinking. He’s an incredibly 
unlikable lead. Of course, storytelling has never been Assassin's Creed's strong suit. 
 
The developers are likely making no deep point about Arno’s ethics, but have likely simply 




narrative. Yet this example of Arno’s behaviour is crucial for the matter at hand in this thesis, 
for Arno is not some radically different creature from the Father in The Road – both are fictional 
characters constructed in broadly similar ways, and ‘good’ or ‘bad’ writing does not necessarily 
change what exactly they are but rather how the reader/viewer feels about them.  
 
The only reason Arno’s characterisation is problematic is because the narrative failed to provide 
sufficient explanation as to why Arno engaged in actions with values utterly unlike other 
instances of characterisation. If characters are ontologically-speaking collections of values and 
ideas interpreted by the player/reader in various stances and frames of reference, usually united 
as all referring to the same fictional being, then something has gone wrong in Assassin’s Creed: 
Unity. There are two different Arnos here, one who engages in the majority of the narrative and 
the other who seems to replace him for this mission. The Road is far better at concealing its 
perspective shift for the more gradual transition between characterising details than is found in 
Assassin’s Creed: Unity. In The Road, it is more the world around the protagonists than the 
protagonists themselves who change, and moreover the novel uses such mechanics as prolepsis 
and comedy to ease the transition for the reader and hide the seams of the shift.  
 
All characters are to some extent multitudes in this manner, loosely defined collections of 
values and ideas tied to a name, face, or voice that constantly shift throughout a text to alter the 
person we are reading about from moment to moment. No character is ‘the same person’ at two 
points of a text for they are not flesh but words, sounds, images, or code. Characters are only 
held together by the reader’s acceptance that two versions refer to the same person, and 
therefore, as characters are mental constructions by readers they gain ontological reality only 
according to this ongoing acceptance of a text’s authority to modify characters from moment to 
moment in further diegetic detail. The sudden extensive modification of character is even a 
popular literary device in this manner in the form of the ‘twist’ of such texts as The Sixth Sense 
(1999) revealing that Bruce Willis’s character Malcolm Crowe has been dead all along or that, 
for example, Scott Shelby in Heavy Rain is the Origami killer and not a detective hired by the 
victims’ families. Whatever devices promote authority for a particular reader can bind together 
multiple versions of a character into one being, whether invoking the stylistic weaving together 
of moments or even the authority of events occurring in one book as opposed to stories by 
multiple authors. For example, as I suggested earlier in this thesis, readers may ‘disagree’ with a 
new story featuring Bruce Wayne using a gun due to prior stories featuring this character 
establishing an identification wherein he would not use the weapon type that killed his parents. 
In such a case, authority is clearly located by reader outside of any one specific author and has 




narrative experiences; new iterations of Bruce Wayne are only accepted if these fit such 
personal expectations which may differ from reader to reader. 
 
What I am arguing here is something similar in theory to Roland Barthes’ ‘The Death of the 
Author’, in which authorities over texts have no innate power to fix interpretation and where the 
various ways of viewing a text are simultaneously valid. However, I am not suggesting that 
readers suddenly stop thinking of characters as unified beings just because they exist as multiple 
versions constantly shifting throughout a text. To do this would be to throw away the purpose of 
characterisation in an attempt to explain how it works. Instead, I intend to promote more in-
depth analysis of the complexities of fiction. I do so by arguing that readers are manipulated by 
textual sequence and style to construct characters in certain ways and to accept the diegetic 
alteration of character throughout a text as part of their identification; readers identify all 
characters in this sense. We can define such identification as building an internal and external 
image of everything relating to a character in an attempt to comprehend their existence as a unit 
implicitly postulated by a text. As part of this process the reader’s emotional engagement with 
narrative is likely to lead from inference and acceptance of textual authority to a narrative wish 
for certain events to occur for each character. To account fully for all these elements but to 
discover further narrative processes, to account for historical difference, and to consider the way 
in which different groups of readers might respond in different ways would in many senses be 
far beyond the scope of any individual thesis, let alone any one work by one literary critic or 
theorist. Therefore in this thesis I have attempted to reason out with the use of a comparative 
analysis of novels and video games some logical likelihoods for what these processes might 
involve rather than attempting to definitively provide a final word upon any of them.  
 
My initial theory holds identification to be ubiquitous for readers in response to all characters in 
a text, involving the harnessing of multiple versions of a character together along a given textual 
sequence and which is indelibly altered by the reader’s own causal influence. If my theory is 
accurate, what then for an ethics of reading? I have proposed already that this ‘bizarre’ ontology 
of fictional characters should be embraced when considering the ethics of reading, as opposed to 
being dismissed in favour of either pretending fictional events fit real-life standards or that they 
do not matter ethically at all. To answer this question, I will conclude by revisiting the 
arguments of my introduction and the ‘empathy-altruism’ hypothesis, in light of the account of 
identification, character, and sequence I have provided in this thesis. Suzanne Keen’s definition 
of narrative empathy in The Living Handbook of Narratology describes the process as ‘the 
sharing of feeling and perspective-taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or imagining 
narratives of another’s situation and condition’. If rephrased in the terms of my theory of 




causality/feeling combined with the absorption of diegetic rewriting of all characters in a text on 
a moment-by-moment basis with new versions negotiated in contract with inferred authority’. 
Keen’s definition of narrative empathy uses the language of ‘sharing’, ‘perspective-taking’, and 
‘another’s situation’, revealing her implicit bias as to characters somehow being ‘real’ which is 
unhelpful in exploring a process that already involves a confusion of the ‘real’ and fictional; in 
my definition of identification, I intend to demonstrate the complex and voluntary power 
dynamics into which readers enter. 
 
My prime focus throughout much of this thesis has been on issues of fictional misogyny in this 
regard, and it is here that my definition of identification can find initial value. My argument has 
in a sense gone full circle from my initial analysis of The Unfortunates, where I argued that 
although characters are fictional and therefore no real person is affected by reader construction 
of character, processes of identification still draw upon and evoke understandings of the world 
that are, in ‘real life’ senses, still ethical acts. Given its definition as a category-based attack 
eliding individual difference between women, I asked whether misogyny should be evaluated 
ethically by the harm it perpetuates towards a category. I argued that if gender categories are at 
the very least partially performance and culture-based, then fictional misogyny could be seen as 
deontologically wrong unless we impose an arbitrary ‘fictional’ caveat or readers abdicate 
responsibility by saying they were forced to recreate misogynist behaviour in reading the text. 
According to my theory of identification, however, if the imposition of reader causality and the 
acceptance of inferred authority are crucial for moment-by-moment changes to characterisation 
being accepted, then why should a misogynistic characterisation be accepted as making sense if, 
say, Arno’s characterisation in Assassin’s Creed: Unity as murdering people for wine is rejected 
as bad writing and ‘non-canonical’ to the rest of the game’s events?  
 
One answer to this question of whether a misogynistic characterisation should be accepted is to 
radically refuse to continue reading if we infer a text to have lent its authority to a misogynistic 
characterisation as opposed to featuring misogyny only to critique it, as other texts might. To 
read or not to read becomes an important ethical question if my theory of identification is 
correct; this is because of the way in which reading usually represents not only obedience to 
inferred power structures emerging during a reading but also the simultaneous involvement of 
the reader’s own causality making up parts of the character responded to. This combination 
means, logically speaking, that if someone continues to read a problematic text then in some 
scenarios obedience could alter or betray someone’s ethical values in that moment. For 
example, if a reader does not notice any misogyny occurred in such a text, then the imposition 
of these values onto the existing identification of characters makes sense according to the 




of misogyny. If the reader condemns the misogynistic example yet keeps reading, what then? 
Authority in a text can be strained without the entire text being rejected – one can ‘discard’ 
Arno the wine-murderer in Assassin’s Creed: Unity but accept each subsequent instance of 
characterisation without claiming the whole game’s narrative to have been a masterpiece. 
Indeed, I argued earlier in my thesis that the reader’s generation of working models of what 
characters would or would not do can be likened to the physics concept of potential energy 
where exerting force upon an object will cause potential energy to be stored based on position 
only to be released, such as drawing a bowstring to release it. I argued that so too can reader 
generation of characters in prose novels be seen as a potential energy version of the control seen 
in video games, an emotional wish-based investment in what characters themselves might 
choose to do and with the text ‘firing’ or ‘misfiring’ according to whether later-encountered 
characterising events succeed in either fitting reader expectations or persuading the reader to 
adopt new ones. Therefore it could be argued here that such moments just ‘misfire’, are rejected, 
and new ones accepted. Why would someone want to read a book they know to be misogynist? 
Is it because the value is not enough of a sin on the part of the text’s authority for the entire 
structure to collapse for some readers, something like a white person uneasily sitting at the front 
of a segregated bus with a mixture of token objection and a wilful attempt to move on from 
having noticed it? Indeed, if it is often poorly written texts that are rejected by readers rather 
than skilful texts such as The Road, do many readers value aesthetics above ethics when it 
comes to fiction? 
 
Two main objections could be raised to this idea that continuing to follow a text’s authority 
after being invited to construct unethical characterisation is itself wrong. Feminist readers, for 
example, might continue reading such a text in order to critique and understand the view behind 
the text as a whole – how can one discuss and write about misogyny if its manifestations are not 
understood, and how can one understand if one does not follow the steps of a process? A case 
could be made that potential feminist allies might read such texts in order to realise their own 
latent misogyny and work on their behaviour, yet if a text’s authority does not itself condemn or 
make obvious its attacks on women, then are such individuals likely as a matter of course to 
have a feminist awakening? The only other case that could be made is that if we were to refuse 
to read texts that provoke misogynistic characterisation we would lose out on the value of the 
canon of literature, of the many texts that are superbly written, that make other positive ethical 
points, or which are fundamental to the development of latter literature. All of these are 
potentially valid points, yet how many texts are studied because they were influential in their 
time period or moralistically present positive ethical points without having a concomitant 
aesthetic quality of being well written or stylistically clever? Although some might not like 




academia? Such texts are studied either because the text is in all other respects excellent or 
because, as is perhaps more likely, in the same way as The Road conceals its ethical shift, so too 
do many of these texts conceal misogyny or other elements through their style and sequence. 
Are good novels therefore perhaps quite dangerous, provoking as they might a reader to not 
recognise a shift in characterisation as problematic and therefore to implicitly accept such 
values? To reiterate here, I am not discussing texts that just feature misogyny and other 
unethical values but texts which support the ontological validity of such opinions as being true 
of women or of whatever other value or group raised.  
 
In an analogous sense to my theorising here about whether we should read or not read certain 
texts, in my analysis of Hopscotch in Chapter One I discussed those who suggest refraining 
from identification. Spivak warns against the colonizing powers of identification and how we 
should apprehend the Other as Other without judgement or invasion, rather than attempting to 
locate ourselves within that Other, reversing the liberal humanist assumption that entering into 
another’s self might be ethically valuable – that same appreciation of otherness that 
characterized much of reader response and reception theory’s ethical turn. However, the 
warning may prove undesirable, as I quoted from Bart Moore-Gilbert earlier in this thesis: 
 
An insistence on the irreducible alterity and muteness of the subaltern, one might argue, 
paralyzes not just the subaltern, but the would-be ally of the subaltern – who is left in 
the double-bind of being required to show solidarity without in any way “selfing” that 
Other or “assimilating” her to the degree that solidarity perhaps inevitably demands […] 
if its account of subaltern alterity and muteness were true, then there would be nothing 
but the West (and the native elite, perhaps) to write about.  
 
As I argued in Chapter One, if we consider that Spivak applies such ethics to our response to 
literary characters in her theories as well as real individuals, the situation becomes even 
stranger, as in her analysis of the ‘literary impulse: to imagine the other who does not resemble 
the self’ where a female character’s focalizing possibilities are foreclosed in J.M Coatzee’s 
Disgrace. To revisit these arguments with my theory of identification, these characters already 
involve the reader’s own causality out of necessity and can never reach this pure state that such 
deconstructionists ironically seem to argue for. Feminist readers of fiction might be justified in 
continuing a misogynist identification for political purposes because, by necessity, such readers 
must pretend and engage in a consciously creative act to make sense of the characters as quite 
different from such reader’s own view of the world. Other readers – perhaps even male feminist 
allies – might not be so justified in engaging in such for they have never existed within such an 
oppressed group and cannot know what having to construct such characters is like or what such 






Might it on some level therefore be unethical to identify with characters outside of one’s group 
due to a necessary lack of requisite true understanding of their real-life equivalents (and 
therefore stop reading the majority of texts)? For example, Robert Eaglestone’s analysis of 
identification of non-Holocaust survivors with accounts of survivors suggests that: 
 
[…] survivor testimony opens a problem. We who come after the Holocaust and know 
about it only through representations are frequently and with authority told that it is 
incomprehensible. However, the representations seem to demand us to do exactly that, 
to comprehend it, to grasp the experiences, to imagine the suffering through identifying 
with those who suffered. And readers and audiences do identify strongly with testimony 
accounts.197 
 
Even in non-fictional cases such as this, identification cannot fail to occur as a characterising 
process despite the reality of the people who recorded their experiences. Eaglestone argues 
various positions that are echoed in my own such as that identification is multi-faceted and often 
over-looked, but, as my thesis has argued, I would go one step further and claim identification is 
logically necessary. The ethics of engagement with non-fiction in this manner are in a general 
sense beyond the scope of this thesis albeit important as an area of further exploration, yet I 
want to open up some brief possibilities here. No real individual person is necessarily affected 
by the reader’s identification here because the person is no longer real at the point of being 
recorded into text and then characterised moment by moment; the reader may feel differently 
about what they are doing (and such a feeling is nevertheless important) and the original author 
of the text may be affected if they learn of responses, but in the moment of identification itself 
the ontology of character is broadly the same as fiction. Restricting the argument to this moment 
alone, is it wrong for readers to engage in my formula of identification – ‘the imposition of 
reader causality/feeling combined with the absorption of diegetic rewriting of all characters in a 
text on a moment-by-moment basis with new versions negotiated in contract with inferred 
authority’ – if the reader’s causality and judgement of the inferred authority cannot have true 
understanding of that group’s experiences or a right to apply their own causality with all the 
dangers that entails?  
 
I would argue that many of these potential cases for ethical and unethical engagement with 
fictional texts could meet the demandingness objection of ethics to some extent albeit in reverse, 
that readers must stop reading an inordinate amount of fiction in order to fulfil their ethical 
duties. If identification is ubiquitous, as I have argued it is, then arguments that suggest we 
should refrain from identifying with Others might seem impracticable. However, it must be 
acknowledged that the way in which these theorists have used and will likely continue to use the 
                                                          
197 Robert Eaglestone, The Holocaust and the Postmodern (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 




term ‘identification’ carries with it competing and often narrower senses than the overarching 
definition of the process that I have created throughout this thesis in relation to reader 
construction of fictional characters. I do not contest this; these theorists are indeed discussing 
identification just as I have been doing, but I would argue that there are unnecessary and 
unhelpful limitations in prior usage that obfuscate many possibilities for analysis such as reader 
identification with all characters in texts, for example. Therefore although I disagree with the 
notion that we should refrain from identification with fictional characters due to the logical 
impracticality of such refraining, such prior theories are still highly useful for extending my 
arguments particularly in terms of the ethical discussion in which theory has often debated 
narrower definitions of identification.  
 
The debate over identification in literature has been characterised by many as standing between 
‘empathy-altruism’ (the belief that narrative empathy will lead to ethical action) and views that 
oppose identification as unethical or as an inferior method of responding to fiction, as I explored 
in greater depth in the introduction to this thesis. If I were to attempt to integrate positions 
antagonistic to identification into my theory of character, an initial question could be posed: 
what if identification per se is not ethically problematic, but instead certain ways of identifying 
might involve unethical action? Identification in response to fiction could not be unethical 
without damning the entirety of fiction; such damnation is certainly an open possibility but 
beyond the scope of this current project to prove one way or the other. At the very least, it could 
be posited that certain ways of using one’s own causal power in constructing characters and 
one’s own acceptance of textual power structures without question can lead to unethical 
positions on the part of identifiers. Readers should not necessarily stop viewing characters as 
unified entities – this would defeat the point of the concept – yet such elements as an awareness 
of characters’ contingency upon sequence, the reader’s role in inferring and obeying authorities 
in texts, the easy switch from narrative prediction to wishes for events to occur, and negotiation 
between multiple characters can all be carried out with an awareness of what these processes 
ontologically lead towards and the distinction between such events and reality. Readers’ 
necessary use of their own causality, their personality, the experiences that have made them who 
they are, and the values that they hold in everyday life – all of these elements can provide an 
opportunity for appreciating what one cannot know yet the simultaneous and human yearning to 
know nevertheless.  
 
This aforementioned awareness of the inability to truly know the experiences of real alterity as 
opposed to that of fictional characters can provide ethical lessons for life outside of fiction, yet 
here I do not mean to repeat the conclusions of prior criticism in locating the ethical power of 




being a real human being or acting with similar values when reading fiction. This awareness 
helps the reader to avoid acting unethically in their response to fiction, but it does not provide a 
basis for positively ethical behaviour, that holy grail of the empathy-altruism hypothesis and all 
related theories. Does literature just have little effect other than slight personal pleasure or pain 
in such a case?  
 
I will raise one final example as a possibility for locating such ethics. In Episode 3 of the game 
series Life is Strange (2015),198 the playable protagonist and teenager Max Caulfield attempts to 
save her friend Chloe’s father from a car accident by using her recently discovered time-
manipulation power to revisit the moments before he left for his fateful journey. This fateful car 
journey will not only lead Chloe’s father to die but Chloe to become depressed, be expelled 
from school with low grades and criminal behaviour, and to Chloe’s mother marrying a man 
who slaps Chloe across the face. In the alternate time-line where the player has been able to 
prevent Chloe’s father from dying, however, the butterfly effect of alternate events occurring 
leads Chloe to become paralysed after her own accident as a teenager, entirely bedridden, in 
constant pain, and likely to die herself soon due to her worsening condition. Although it is not 
the player’s explicit choice to have gone back in time to save Chloe’s father (this is 
compulsory), the player has likely been engaged in the optional rewriting history for often 
spurious reasons prior to this as a gameplay mechanic to alter bad decisions in gameplay or to 
help Max in social situations at school, implicitly supporting the idea of time travel. As both 
Chloe and Max mourn the loss of Chloe’s father and hate Chloe’s stepfather, the player is 
unlikely to have any major reason to believe saving Chloe’s father to have been a bad idea and 
are thus likely to support it as a narrative wish. Therefore the player may feel as terrible as Max 
does about this alternative history where Chloe is paralysed, even more so due to the unspoken 
but implicit knowledge in much of what Max says in her thoughts and questions that Max will 
need to revert history to the original timeline and choose Chloe’s life over that of her father, 
killing him once again. At the end of this section, Chloe tells Max she is in a great deal of pain, 
that she knows she will die soon, and says she wants the positive memories of them watching a 
film together to be her last, requesting that Max/the player turn up her drip so that she will slip 
into a sleep and die. The player is given three options – agree, disagree, or ‘I don’t know’.  
 
During my own play-through, I agreed to kill Chloe and respect her autonomy over her own 
death, not only calling upon my real-world values as a player but having been emotionally 
affected and even feeling partially responsible due to my own involvement in Max’s diegetic 
construction via my identification with her character. The choice does not matter either way, as 
shortly afterwards Max reverts the timeline to its original status where Chloe is once more alive 
                                                          




and her father is once more dead without anyone but Max knowing anything had ever happened. 
However, the fact that this choice has no apparent ethical effect lends the moment its ethical 
poignancy. Throughout this thesis I have referred to Žižek’s claims regarding video games, 
which I will repeat here for reference: 
 
Consider the interactive computer games some of us play compulsively, games which 
enable a neurotic weakling to adopt the screen persona of a macho aggressor, beating up 
other men and violently enjoying women. It’s all too easy to assume that this weakling 
takes refuge in cyberspace in order to escape from a dull, impotent reality.  
 
Not only does this example from Life is Strange, with its two female and potentially LGBT 
teenage protagonists, utterly disprove Žižek’s assumptions regarding games involving ‘beating 
up other men and violently enjoying women’, but so too does it allow us to potentially get 
closer to the truth of the matter regarding the ethics of games.  
 
Žižek asks ‘Isn’t it precisely because I am aware that this is ‘just a game’ that in it I can do what 
I would never be able to in the real world?’, articulating ‘the perverse core of my personality 
which, because of ethico-social constraints, I am not able to act out in real life’. I would argue 
that the ethics of games lies in their bizarre ontology, not in a simulacra of real life, and that 
rather than trying to view games just as a second-rate version of reality, it is much more 
challenging and provocative to embrace their fictitious nature as providing an ethics linked to 
real-world standards but simultaneously involving other unique standards. Games, as with much 
of fiction, are utterly repeatable; novels can be read again and again, characters once dead 
temporarily alive in a way that renders fiction reading a kind of time travel in a way that cannot 
be achieved in real life. In games, not only is this element of repeatability present but so too in 
many games is a bifurcation of plot, where although actions seem to have ethical consequences 
these are inherently temporary as the game can always be replayed so that different events 
occur, inviting a whole host of other stances and motivations towards character construction in 
deciding what to do.  
 
In Life is Strange’s euthanasia choice and The Last of Us’s choice of whether to kill the doctors, 
these moments are ethically significant precisely because we have no higher aesthetic power 
telling us the outcome of the decision in a clearly defined way. The choice is irrelevant to the 
game’s programming, but extremely relevant to the player’s own sense of character 
construction. If game choices rely on feedback from the game’s systems, these instances involve 
little such acknowledgement that plot-defining choices occurred and do not allow the player to 
transpose the emotional consequences upon any diegetic rewriting of decision-making in the 
game as final responsibility lies with the player’s own causality alone, even if the player has 





It is in this implicit manner that readers make choices in novels without explicit feedback from 
the text. If readers then read without thinking consciously about the processes they are 
undertaking – if they engage in what Vladimir Nabokov calls in Pale Fire ‘brutish routine 
acceptance’ of the ‘miracle of a few written signs being able to contain immortal imagery, 
involutions of thought, new worlds with live people, speaking, weeping, laughing’ – readers 
may not realise their own responsibility and choices they make in constructing fictional 
characters from novels. Readers may not know they had any choices at all, believing their 
interpretation of the text, their sense of what happened and who these people were to be self-
evident and correct even if many acknowledge their readings to be at least slightly different 
from those of others. People talk as if something is ‘done’ to them when reading fiction, as if 
they are passive victims or recipients of its message. Readers are, on the contrary, active, as 
others have shown before and as I have tried to show here, and this is why our choices matter 
ethically even if no other real people are affected by our constructions of character.  
 
One real person, and one real person only is affected by what we do to fictional people – the 
reader of the text. Identifying characters involves the reader’s own causality, values, and 
agreement to authority, but the reader is not unaffected by such involvement. Each character is 
not a prison cell in the reader’s mind, totally segmented from anything else the reader thinks. 
Characters exist only in our minds, but the full implications of this are not obvious. Fictional 
characters are, in a sense, us, and we are them. Whatever actions we undertake for good or ill, 
we undertake only in our imagination – and it is there we can find the impact of our great and 
terrible actions, not in the real world, whether in the past or in the future of what we might do. It 
is in what we do to ourselves that the ethics of fictional identification might be found, and it is 
with this point that any future study tracing these processes must begin. Rather than mimesis or 
the depiction of values in a text, it is the self-imposed power dynamics involved in 
identification, reader causality, and the inference of authority that produces ethical and unethical 
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